7 ideas
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Substitutionalists simulate quantification over fictional characters by quantifying for real over fictional names. | |
From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.159) | |
A reaction: I would say that a fiction is a file of conceptual information, identified by a label. The label brings baggage with it, and there is no existence in the label. |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We can quantify over Meinongian objects by quantifying for real over property bundles (such as the bundle of roundness and squareness). | |
From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.159) |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
Full Idea: An expansive friend of the controversial entities who says they all exist may be called an 'allist'; a tough desert-dweller who says that none of them exist may be called a 'noneist'. | |
From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.152) | |
A reaction: Lewis gives examples of the obvious and the controversial entities. Lewis implies that he himself is in between. The word 'desert' is a reference to Quine. |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If 'existence' is understood so that it can be a substantive thesis that only some of the things there are exist, we will have none of it. | |
From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.163) | |
A reaction: Lewis is a strong advocate, following Quine, of the univocal sense of the word 'exist', and I agree with them. |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |
Full Idea: Nomos is king. | |
From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture | |
A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed. |
1474 | Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG] |
Full Idea: Moral evil may be acceptable to a benevolent God because it is the only way to allow genuine free will, which may have a supreme value in creation (even if we are unsure what it is). | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Free Will Defence [1965], Pref.) by PG - Db (ideas) |
1475 | It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG] |
Full Idea: Physical evil (e.g. earthquakes) may be attributable to a fallen angel (Satan), who is the enemy of God, and this is enough to retain the idea that God is omnipotent and benevolent, and yet evil exists. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Free Will Defence [1965], III) by PG - Db (ideas) |