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All the ideas for 'poems', 'Dialogue on Things and Words' and 'Quantification and Descriptions'

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5 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B]
     Full Idea: A 'contextual' definition shows how to eliminate a description from a context.
     From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 2)
     A reaction: I'm trying to think of an example, but what I come up with are better described as 'paraphrases' than as 'definitions'.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Truth really belongs to the class of thoughts which are possible.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on Things and Words [1677], p.7)
     A reaction: I like the fact that this ties truth to 'thoughts', rather than peculiar abstract unthought entities called 'propositions', but I take it that thoughts which are possible but not thought will thereby not exist, so they can't be true.
True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: B: I concede that truth and falsity both pertain to thoughts and not to things. A: But this contradicts your previous opinion that a proposition remains true even when you are not thinking about it.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on Things and Words [1677], p.7)
     A reaction: I don't trigger the truth of a proposition by thinking about it - I see that it is true. But I dislike the idea that reality is full of propositions, which seems to be mad metaphysics. So I deny unthought propositions are true, because there aren't any.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
     Full Idea: Definite descriptions seem to have a logical structure in a way that proper names do not.
     From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 1.1.1)
     A reaction: Thus descriptions have implications which plain names do not.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nomos is king [Pindar]
     Full Idea: Nomos is king.
     From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture
     A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed.