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All the ideas for 'poems', 'Maxims' and 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
To try to be wise all on one's own is folly [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: To try to be wise all on one's own is sheer folly.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 231)
     A reaction: I agree strongly with this. There are counter-examples, of whom Spinoza may be the greatest, and Nietzsche thought that philosophy was essentially a solitary business, but most of us are not Spinoza or Nietzsche.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
     Full Idea: So-called 'Aristotelian essentialism' is the doctrine of essences not relative to specifications.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III)
     A reaction: In other words, they are so-called 'real essences', understood as de re. Quine says essences are all de dicto, and relative to some specification. I vote for Aristotle.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Just as a sentence is necessary if it holds in all worlds, so it is causally necessary if it holds in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], V)
     A reaction: I don't believe in the so-called 'laws of nature', so I'm not buying that. Is there no distinction in Lewis's view between those sentences which must hold, and those which happen to hold universally?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Even if Humphrey is a modal continuant, it doesn't take the whole of him to do such things as winning.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], Post B)
     A reaction: This responds to Kripke's famous example, that people only care about what happens to themselves, and not to some 'counterpart' of themselves.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Probably Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus Lewis's view seems even more bizarre that the usual transworld identification it replaces.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 13
     A reaction: I begin to see this as a devastating reply to a theory I previously found quite congenial.
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I)
     A reaction: It is a dilemma. If my counterpart were exactly me, I couldn't contemplate possibly losing a leg, or my sanity. But if my counterpart isn't exactly me, then I don't have much interest in its fate. Only essences can save us here. Cf. me tomorrow.
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If whatever thing in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in w6 resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I)
     A reaction: This is the nub, because the whole theory rests on deciding whether two things resemble sufficiently 'closely'. But then we need a criterion of closeness, so we must start talking about which properties matter. Essences loom.
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
     Full Idea: An essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all its counterparts.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III)
     A reaction: I don't like this. It ties essence entirely to identity, but I think essence precedes identity. Essence is a nexus of causal and explanatory powers which bestows an identity on each thing. But essence might be unstable, and identity with it.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
La Rochefoucauld's idea of disguised self-love implies an unconscious mind [Rochefoucauld, by Sartre]
     Full Idea: La Rochefoucauld is one of the first to have made use of the unconscious without naming it: for him, amour-propre conceals itself in the most diverse disguises.
     From: report of La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663]) by Jean-Paul Sartre - Transcendence of the Ego I (C)
     A reaction: It seems odd that no one before that ever thought that someone might have hidden motives of which even they themselves were unaware. How about Iago, or Macbeth, or Hamlet? It is a profound change in our view of human nature.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nomos is king [Pindar]
     Full Idea: Nomos is king.
     From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture
     A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Judging by effects, love looks more like hatred than friendship [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: If love be judged by its most visible effects it looks more like hatred than friendship.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 072)
     A reaction: Presumably he is thinking of pursuit, possession and jealousy. The remark is plausible if you add the word 'sometimes' to it, but as a universal generalisation it is ridiculous, the product of a society where they competed to exceed in cynicism.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 244)
     A reaction: Good. Right at the heart of wisdom is some kind of grasp of right values. It is so complex and subtle that it seems like pure intuition, but I am sure that reason is involved. 'Intelligent' people tend to be better at it. Some justifications can be given.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Realising our future misery is a kind of happiness [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: To realise how much misery we have to face is in itself a kind of happiness.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 570)
     A reaction: Probably true. Knowing that you have got hold of the truth is a sort of happiness in any area, no matter how grim the truth. However, a happy life could easily be poisoned by brooding on the future. Should the happily married brood on future solitude?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue doesn't go far without the support of vanity [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: Virtue would not go far without vanity to bear it company.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 200)
     A reaction: Rochefoucauld's cynicism gets a bit tedious, but lovers of virtue must face up to this possibility when they consider what motivates them. At the heart of Aristotle there is a missing question, of what is so good about right-functioning and virtue.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
True friendship is even rarer than true love [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: Rare though true love may be, true friendship is rarer still.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 473)
     A reaction: This seems to be true. Our culture doesn't encourage friendship as a high ideal. Are women better at friendship than men? Which culture, past or present, led to the greatest flourishing of friendship? Epicurus's Garden?
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
We are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: Almost always we are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 555)
     A reaction: An obvious exception would be a celebrity being bored with their fans. Their very excess of interest is precisely what is boring. If two people communicate well, it is unlikely that either of them will ever be bored.