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All the ideas for 'poems', 'Letters to Antoine Arnauld' and 'Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz]
     Full Idea: I agree entirely with Dummett that the right way to answer the question 'what is logic?' is to consider transitions between sentences.
     From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], §04)
     A reaction: I always protest at this point that reliance on sentences is speciesism against animals, who are thereby debarred from reasoning. See the wonderful Idea 1875 of Chrysippus. Hacking's basic suggestion seems right. Transition between thoughts.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz]
     Full Idea: With Gentzen's natural deduction, we may say that the introductions represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the logical constants. The introductions are not literally understood as 'definitions'.
     From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], 2.2.2)
     A reaction: [Hacking, in 'What is Logic? §9' says Gentzen had the idea that his rules actually define the constants; not sure if Prawitz and Hacking are disagreeing]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz]
     Full Idea: In Gentzen's natural deduction, the inferences are broken down into atomic steps in such a way that each step involves only one logical constant. The steps are the introduction or elimination of the logical constants.
     From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], 1.1)
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Since every basic truth depends on God's omnipotence, I would not dare to say that God cannot make it....that one and two should not be three.
     From: René Descartes (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1645]), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 01.3
     A reaction: An unusual view. Most people would say that if Descartes can doubt something that simple, he should also doubt his reasons for believing in God's existence.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nomos is king [Pindar]
     Full Idea: Nomos is king.
     From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture
     A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed.