Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'poems', 'The Language of Morals' and 'Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori'

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7 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare]
     Full Idea: Characteristic of value-words is that they name 'supervenient' properties. If we are discussing whether a picture is a good picture, ..and there is another picture that is a replica of it, we cannot say 'they are alike, but one is good and the other not'.
     From: Richard M. Hare (The Language of Morals [1952], 5.2)
     A reaction: [compressed] Horgan says this is the passage which introduced 'supervenience' into contemporary discussions. I think the best simple word for it is that the goodness of the picture 'tracks' its physical characteristics. It also depend on them.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
     Full Idea: On a friendly reading of Quine, there is nothing to make the difference between a table's being contingently plastic and its being essentially plastic.
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 5)
     A reaction: This is, of course, the dreaded modern usage of 'essential' to just mean 'necessary' and nothing more. In my view, there may be a big problem with knowing whether a problem is necessary, but knowing whether it is essential is much easier.
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
     Full Idea: On the possible world's account, x's being essentially F is nothing more nor less than x's being F in every world in which it appears.
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 6)
     A reaction: There you go - 'true in every possible world' is the definition of metaphysical necessity, not the definition of essence. Either get back to Aristotle, or stop (forever!) talking about 'essence'!
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
     Full Idea: The unfriendly response to Quine's objection to essentialism is that it conflates the de re and the de dicto. The friendly response is that behind that conflation is a real epistemological problem for essentialism.
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 1)
     A reaction: He cites Richard Cartwright 1968 for the friendly response. The epistemological question is how we can know the essentialness of an essence.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
     Full Idea: If something is offered as a candidate necessary a posteriori truth, how could we show that it is necessary, in the face of the fact that it takes investigation to show that it is true, and so, in some sense, it might have turned out to be false?
     From: Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 1)
     A reaction: This is the topic of his paper, which he compares with how we can know that essences are essential.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
     Full Idea: Hare says words are secondarily evaluative (e.g. 'soft-hearted') if prescriptive meaning varies but description is constant; primarily evaluative words ('good', 'right', 'ought') are the opposite, with the descriptive content varying.
     From: report of Richard M. Hare (The Language of Morals [1952]) by Brad W. Hooker - Prescriptivism p.640
     A reaction: I would have thought that the prescriptive meaning of the evaluative word could at least vary in strength. You really, really ought to do that.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nomos is king [Pindar]
     Full Idea: Nomos is king.
     From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture
     A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed.