8 ideas
| 15970 | People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman] |
| Full Idea: The topic of the laws of nature has a tendency to become too philosophical because it becomes too general, and a person talks in such generalities, that everybody can understand him. It is then considered to be some deep philosophy. | |
| From: Richard P. Feynman (The Character of Physical Law [1965], 1) | |
| A reaction: Feynman was famously anti-philosophical, but this is a good challenge. I like philosophy because I want to know broad general truths about my world, but I may just be gravitating towards what is easier. The challenge is to get true generalities. |
| 16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
| Full Idea: Geometrical concepts appear to depend in some way on a spatial ability. Although one can translate geometrical propositions into algebraic ones and produce equivalent models, the meaning of the propositions seems to me to be thereby lost. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 4) | |
| A reaction: I think this is a widely held view nowadays. Giaquinto has a book on it. A successful model of something can't replace it. Set theory can't replace arithmetic. |
| 16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
| Full Idea: In the Peano axiomatisation, arithmetic seems primitively to involve the thought that 0 is a number. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 5) | |
| A reaction: Burge is pointing this out as a problem for Frege, for whom only the logic is primitive. |
| 16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
| Full Idea: Whereas Leibniz and Frege predicate apriority primarily of truths (or more fundamentally, proofs of truths), Kant predicates apriority primarily of cognition and the employment of representations. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 1) |
| 6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |
| Full Idea: Nomos is king. | |
| From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed. |
| 9410 | Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman] |
| Full Idea: There is a rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena of nature which is not apparent to the eye, but only to the eye of analysis; and it is these rhythms and patterns which we call Physical Laws. | |
| From: Richard P. Feynman (The Character of Physical Law [1965], Ch.1) |
| 18530 | Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman] |
| Full Idea: I think I can safely say the nobody understands quantum mechanics. | |
| From: Richard P. Feynman (The Character of Physical Law [1965], 6) | |
| A reaction: It is really important that philosophers grasp this point! |
| 17707 | We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares] |
| Full Idea: Feynman claims that we should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces, which have positive length, width and depth. | |
| From: report of Richard P. Feynman (The Character of Physical Law [1965], p.166) by Edwin D. Mares - A Priori 06.7 | |
| A reaction: The idea seems to be these are the minimum bits of space in which something can happen. |