Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'poems', 'Rationality' and 'Introduction - Ontology'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality

5500	Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
	Full Idea: Biologists don't split living things into a 'structural' level and an 'abstract' level; ..rather, they are organised at many levels, each level 'abstract' with respect to those beneath it, but 'structural' as it realises those levels above it.
	From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9)
	A reaction: This is a very helpful distinction. Compare Idea 4601. It seems to fit well with the 'homuncular' picture of a hierarchical mind, and explains why there are so many levels of description available for mental life.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

5494	'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
	Full Idea: There is such a thing as synthetic and a posteriori identity that is nonetheless genuine identity, as in lightning being electrical discharge, and the Morning Star being Venus.
	From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.5)
	A reaction: It is important to note that although these identities are synthetic a posteriori, that doesn't make them contingent. The early identity theorists like Smart seemed to think that it did. Kripke must be right that they are necessary identities.

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory

23304	The ancient Memorists said virtually all types of thinking could be done simply by memory [Sorabji]
	Full Idea: The ancient medical Memorists said that ordinary thinking, inferring, reflecting, believing, assuming, examining, generalising and knowing can all be done simply on the basis of memory.
	From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Inference')
	A reaction: The think there is a plausible theory that all neurons do is remember, and are mainly distinguished by the duration of their memories. We might explain these modes of thinking in terms of various combinations of the fast and the slow.

23303	Stoics say true memory needs reflection and assent, but animals only have perceptual recognition [Sorabji]
	Full Idea: Stoics say memory proper involves reflection and assent. Animal memory, by contrast, is not memory proper, but mere perceptual recognition. The horse remembers the road when he is on it, but not when he is in the stable.
	From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Other')
	A reaction: An interesting distinction. Do I remember something if I can never recall it, and yet recognise it when it reappears, such as a person I knew long ago? 'Memory' is ambiguous, between lodged in the mind, and recallable. Unfair to horses, this.

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism

5496	Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
	Full Idea: Functionalism has three distinct levels of description: a neurophysiological description, a functional description (relative to a program which the brain is realising), and it may have a further mental description.
	From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.6)
	A reaction: I have always thought that the 'levels of description' idea was very helpful in describing the mind/brain. I feel certain that we are dealing with a single thing, so this is the only way we can account for the diverse ways in which we discuss it.

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism

5499	A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
	Full Idea: Some theorists have said that the one-to-one correspondence between the organism and parts of its 'program' is too liberal, and suggest that the state and its functional role are seen teleologically, as functioning 'for' the organism.
	From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9)
	A reaction: This seems an inevitable development, once the notion of a 'function' is considered. It has to be fitted into some sort of Aristotelian teleological picture, even if the functions are seen subjectively (by what?). Purpose is usually seen as evolutionary.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention

6017	Nomos is king [Pindar]
	Full Idea: Nomos is king.
	From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture
	A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied

5501	People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]
	Full Idea: There is now a small but vigorous industry whose purpose is to explicate biological teleology in naturalistic terms, typically in terms of causes.
	From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.10)
	A reaction: This looks like a good strategy. In some sense, it seems clear that the moon has no purpose, but an eyeball has one. Via evolution, one would expect to reduce this to causation. Purposes are real (not subjective), but they are reducible.