9 ideas
| 6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.74) | |
| A reaction: This makes assertions truth-bearers, rather than propositions. But a proposition can be true or false if it is stamped with a date and/or place. "Shakespeare was born in Stratford on 23rd April 1664". No one needs to assert that. |
| 6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Definitions are identical to universal propositions in meaning, and only differ in syntax, for whoever says 'Man is a rational mortal animal' says the same thing in meaning as whoever says 'If something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal'. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 11.8) | |
| A reaction: How strikingly like Bertrand Russell's interest and solutions. Sextus shows a straightforward interest in logical form, of a kind we associate with the twentieth century. Did Sextus Empiricus invent quantification? |
| 6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: A preconception and conception must precede every object of investigation, for how can anyone even investigate without some conception of the object of investigation? | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.331a) | |
| A reaction: The Duhem-Quine thesis about the 'theory-ladenness of observation' is just a revival of some routine ancient scepticism. As well as a conceptual scheme to accommodate the observation, there must also be some motivation for the investigation. |
| 6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |
| Full Idea: Nomos is king. | |
| From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed. |
| 6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me. |
| 6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Right action is whatever, once it has been done, has a reasonable justification. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.158) | |
| A reaction: Why does he add 'once it has been done'? Wouldn't a proposed action be right if it had a reasonable justification? This grows out of the classical and Stoic emphasis on reason in ethics, and leads towards Scanlon's Contractualism. |
| 6867 | Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: I take existentialism to be the focus on the freedom and self-making of the human being, and his or her insertion into the world. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.222) | |
| A reaction: I take 'self-making' to be the key here. If neuroscientists somehow 'proved' that there was no free will, I don't see that making any difference to existentialism. 'Insertion' seems odd, unless it refers to growing up. |
| 1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature', because nature is a harmony of three concords (4th,5th and octave), and these ratios (4:3, 3:2, and 2:1) are found in the tektraktys. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.95) |
| 6865 | A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174) | |
| A reaction: The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories? |