11 ideas
17833 | The first-order ZF axiomatisation is highly non-categorical [Hallett,M] |
Full Idea: The first-order Sermelo-Fraenkel axiomatisation is highly non-categorical. | |
From: Michael Hallett (Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper [1996], p.1213) |
17834 | Non-categoricity reveals a sort of incompleteness, with sets existing that the axioms don't reveal [Hallett,M] |
Full Idea: The non-categoricity of the axioms which Zermelo demonstrates reveals an incompleteness of a sort, ....for this seems to show that there will always be a set (indeed, an unending sequence) that the basic axioms are incapable of revealing to be sets. | |
From: Michael Hallett (Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper [1996], p.1215) | |
A reaction: Hallett says the incompleteness concerning Zermelo was the (transfinitely) indefinite iterability of the power set operation (which is what drives the 'iterative conception' of sets). |
17837 | Zermelo allows ur-elements, to enable the widespread application of set-theory [Hallett,M] |
Full Idea: Unlike earlier writers (such as Fraenkel), Zermelo clearly allows that there might be ur-elements (that is, objects other than the empty set, which have no members). Indeed he sees in this the possibility of widespread application of set-theory. | |
From: Michael Hallett (Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper [1996], p.1217) |
17836 | The General Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with ZF [Hallett,M] |
Full Idea: In 1938, Gödel showed that ZF plus the General Continuum Hypothesis is consistent if ZF is. Cohen showed that ZF and not-GCH is also consistent if ZF is, which finally shows that neither GCH nor ¬GCH can be proved from ZF itself. | |
From: Michael Hallett (Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper [1996], p.1217) |
19271 | No rule can be fully explained [Kripke] |
Full Idea: Every explanation of a rule could conceivably be misunderstood. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982], 3) | |
A reaction: This is Kripke's summary of what he takes to be Wittgenstein's scepticism about rules. |
19269 | 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke] |
Full Idea: I will define 'quus' by x-quus-y = x + y, if x, y < 57, and otherwise it equals 5. Who is to say that this is not the function I previously meant by '+'? | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982], 2) | |
A reaction: Kripke's famous example, to illustrate the big new scepticism introduced by Wittgenstein's questions about the rationality of following a rule. I suspect that you have to delve into psychology to understand rule-following, rather than logic. |
7305 | Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Quine and Kripke's Wittgenstein attempt to argue that there are no facts about meaning, that the notion of meaning, as Kripke puts it, 'vanishes into thin air'. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language Pref | |
A reaction: A tempting solution to the problem. If, though, it is possible for someone to say something that is self-evidently meaningless, or to accuse someone of speaking (deep down) without meaning, then that needs explaining. |
19270 | If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke] |
Full Idea: What can there be in my mind that I make use of when I follow a general rule to add in the future? It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982], 2) | |
A reaction: Introspection probably isn't the best way to investigate the phenomenon of meaning. Indeed it seems rather old-fashioned and Cartesian. Kripke says, though, that seeking 'tacit' rules is even worse [end of note 22]. |
11076 | Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna] |
Full Idea: If we take account of the fact that a speaker is in a community, then we must adopt an assertability-conditions semantics (based on what is legitimately assertible), and reject truth-conditional semantics (based on correspondence to the facts). | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 6.1 | |
A reaction: [Part of Hanna's full summary of Kripke's argument] This sounds wrong to me. There are conditions where it is agreed that a lie should be told. Two people can be guilty of the same malapropism. |
11075 | The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna] |
Full Idea: Kripke argues that the 'rule-following paradox' is essential to the more controversial private language argument, and introduces a radically new form of scepticism. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 6.1 | |
A reaction: It certainly seems that Kripke is right to emphasise the separateness of the two, as the paradox is quite persuasive, but the private language argument seems less so. |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |
Full Idea: Nomos is king. | |
From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture | |
A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed. |