20 ideas
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
Full Idea: A sentence is held true because of two factors: what the holder takes the sentence to mean, and what he believes. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.20) | |
A reaction: A key question is whether a belief (e.g. an imagistic one, or one held by an animal) could be true, even though no sentence is involved. Linguistic philosophers tend to avoid this question, or assume the answer is 'no'. |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Someone cannot have a belief unless he understands the possibility of being mistaken. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.170) | |
A reaction: If you pretend to throw a ball for a dog, but don't release it, the dog experiences being mistaken very dramatically. |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We have the idea of belief from its role in the interpretation of language; as a private attitude it is not intelligible except in relation to public language. So a creature must be a member of a speech community to have the concept of belief. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.22) | |
A reaction: This shows how Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4152) hovers behind Davidson's philosophy. The idea is quite persuasive. A solitary creature just follows its mental states. The question of whether it believes them is a meta-thought. |
17472 | Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: In chemistry the 'thick' notion of a mechanism traces out positions of electrons and atomic cores, and correlates them with energies, showing the whole reaction. 'Thin' mechanisms focus on a discrete set of intermediate steps. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1) |
17471 | Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: The production of mechanisms as explanatory schemes finds its original home in chemistry. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This is as opposed to mechanisms in biology or neuroscience, which come later. |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The thesis I want to refine and then argue for is that thought depends on speech. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.8) | |
A reaction: This has the instant and rather implausible implication that animals don't think. He is not, of course, saying that all thought is speech, which would leave out thinking in images. You can't do much proper thought without concepts and propositions. |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
Full Idea: A creature cannot have a thought unless it is an interpreter of the speech of another. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.9) | |
A reaction: His use of the word 'creature' shows that he is perfectly aware of the issue of whether animals think, and he is, presumably, denying it. At first glance this sounds silly, but maybe animals don't really 'think', in our sense of the word. |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
Full Idea: A private attitude is not intelligible except as an adjustment to the public norms provided by language. It follows that a creature must be a member of speech community if it is to have the concept of belief. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.170) | |
A reaction: This obviously draws on Wittgenstein's private language argument, and strikes me as blatantly wrong, because I take higher animals to have concepts without language. Pure vision gives rise to concepts. I don't even think they are necessarily conscious. |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Once a sentence is understood, an utterance of it may be used to serve almost any extra-linguistic purpose; an instrument that could be put to only one use would lack autonomy of meaning, which means it should not be counted as language. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.17) | |
A reaction: I find this point very appealing, in opposition to the Wittgenstein view of meaning as use. Passwords seem to me a striking case of the separation of meaning and use. I like the phrase 'autonomy of meaning'. Random sticks can form a word. |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Although most utterances are not concerned with truth, it is the pattern of sentences held true that gives sentences their meaning. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.14) | |
A reaction: Davidson's distinctive version of meaning holism, as opposed to Quine's rather behaviouristic version. I agree that we relate to people through the pattern of sentences they hold true, but I am unconvinced that this 'gives sentences their meaning'. |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |
Full Idea: Nomos is king. | |
From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture | |
A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed. |
17465 | Lavoisier's elements included four types of earth [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Four types of earth found a place on Lavoisier's list of elements. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.2) | |
A reaction: A nice intermediate point between the ancient Greek and the modern view of earth. |
17468 | Over 100,000,000 compounds have been discovered or synthesised [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: There are well over 100,000,000 chemical compounds that have been discovered or synthesised, all of which have been formally characterised. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.3) |
17470 | Water molecules dissociate, and form large polymers, explaining its properties [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Water's structure cannot simply be described as a collection of individual molecules. There is a continual dissociation of H2O molecules into hydrogen and hydroxide ions; they former larger polymeric species, explaining conductivity, melting and boiling. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] If philosophers try to state the 'essence of water', they had better not be too glib about it. |
17473 | It is unlikely that chemistry will ever be reduced to physics [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Most philosophers believe chemistry has not been reduced to physics nor is it likely to be. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6) | |
A reaction: [Le Poidevin 2007 argues the opposite] That chemical features are actually metaphysically 'emergent' is a rare view, defended by Hendry. The general view is that the concepts are too different, and approximations render it hopeless. |
17474 | Quantum theory won't tell us which structure a set of atoms will form [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Quantum mechanics cannot tell us why a given collection of atoms will adopt one molecular structure (and set of chemical properties) or the other. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably it the 'chance' process of how the atoms are thrown together. |
17475 | For temperature to be mean kinetic energy, a state of equilibrium is also required [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Having a particular average kinetic energy is only a necessary condition for having a given temperature, not a sufficient one, because only gases at equilibrium have a well-defined temperature. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.2) | |
A reaction: If you try to pin it all down more precisely, the definition turns out to be circular. |
17469 | 'H2O' just gives the element proportions, not the microstructure [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: 'H2O' is not a description of any microstructure. It is a compositional formula, describing the combining proportions of hydrogen and oxygen to make water. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5) |
17467 | Isotopes (such as those of hydrogen) can vary in their rates of chemical reaction [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: There are chemically salient differences among the isotopes, best illustrated by the three isotopes of hydrogen: protium, deuterium and tritium, which show different rates of reaction, making heavy water poisonous where ordinary water is not. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [They cite Paul Needham 2008] The point is that the isotopes are the natural kinds, rather than the traditional elements. The view is unorthodox, but clearly makes a good point. |
17466 | Mendeleev systematised the elements, and also gave an account of their nature [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: In addition to providing the systematization of the elements used in modern chemistry, Mendeleev also gave an account of the nature of the elements which informs contemporary philosophical understanding. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.3) |