3 ideas
| 4038 | Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Lewis agrees that properties cannot be sets of their actual instances, but claims they can be sets of their possible instances. This would distinguish coextensive properties like being cordate and renate, since they might be separated. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (Modal Realism at Work: Properties [1986]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §10 | |
| A reaction: Sounds wrong. Two properties could be obviously different even if they could never be separated. In this world a creature might briefly survive without kidneys. |
| 3016 | Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Even the gods cannot strive against necessity. | |
| From: report of Pittacus (reports [c.610 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 01.5.4 |
| 22001 | The real will of the cooperative will replace the 'will of the people' [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Under collective property, the so called will of the people disappears in order to make way for the real will of the cooperative. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Grundrisse [1876], p.563), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 10 | |
| A reaction: [from an 1874 note on Bakunin's 'Statism and Anarchy'] So how do you settle on the 'real' will of a cooperative? The travesty is when a ruling elite decide that, without consultation. An institution is needed. This is still a social contract. |