3654
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The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
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Full Idea:
The soul is united with the body in just one place, a gland (the pineal) in the centre of the brain. It is placed so that its slightest movement will affect the passions, and it plays the essential role of uniting the two symmetrical sides of the body.
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From:
report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], §31) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
See Idea 4862 for Spinoza's nice response to Descartes' proposal. If Descartes had followed brain research for the last four hundred years, at what point would he have wavered? If every single part of the brain seems to 'interact', dualism looks unlikely.
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4313
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Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
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Full Idea:
Descartes says there are six primary passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness); Spinoza says there are just three (joy, sadness and desire).
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From:
report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.172
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A reaction:
A dubious project. However, it is now agreed that there are a few (six?) basic universal facial expressions, to which these passions may correspond.
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23989
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There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
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Full Idea:
Descartes said there are six primitive passions, namely wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. The others are either species of these, or composed of them.
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From:
report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 353) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Evidence'
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A reaction:
[not sure about ref] It's a nice touch to add 'wonder', which doesn't make it onto anyone else's list.
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20130
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It is absurd to think you can change your own essence, like a garment [Nietzsche]
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Full Idea:
Man is necessity down to his last fibre, and totally 'unfree', that is if one means by freedom the foolish demand to be able to change one's 'essentia' arbitrarily, like a garment.
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From:
Friedrich Nietzsche (Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks [1873], p.7), quoted by Brian Leiter - Nietzsche On Morality 2 'Realism'
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A reaction:
This is the big difference between the existentialism of Nietzsche and the more famous Sartrean approach, where the idea of being able to remake your essence is the most exciting and glamorous proposal. I'm with Nietzsche.
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