88 ideas
23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
Full Idea: Modality in the actual world is the import of the Barcan formula, and there are good reasons for accepting the Barcan formula. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 1.2) | |
A reaction: If you thought logic was irrelevant to metaphysics, this should make you think twice. |
9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
Full Idea: If one says that 'everything that exists is causally active', that rules out abstracta (notably sets and numbers), and it rules out objects that are causally isolated. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.5) | |
A reaction: I like the principle. I take abstracta to be brain events, so they are causally active, within highly refined and focused brains, and if your physics is built on the notion of fields then I would think a 'causally isolated' object incoherent. |
9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
Full Idea: If one's naturalistic principles are formulated in terms of supervenience, then necessary entities are left untouched. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.5) | |
A reaction: I take this to be part of the reason why some people like supervenience - that it leaves a pure 'space of reasons' which is unreachable from the flesh and blood inside a cranium. Personall I like the space of reasons, but I drop the 'pure'. |
14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
Full Idea: The thought that there might be just one fundamental natural property is not that strange. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 6.3) | |
A reaction: A nice variation on the Parmenides idea that only the One exists. Bird's point would refer to a possible unification of modern physics. We see, for example, the forces of electricity and of magnetism turning out to be the same force. |
9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
Full Idea: Categorical properties do not have their dispositional characters modally fixed, but may change their dispositional characters (and their causal and nomic behaviour more generally) across different worlds. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: This is the key ground for Bird's praiseworth opposition to categorical propertie. I take it to be a nonsense to call the category in which we place something a 'property' of that thing. A confusion of thought with reality. |
9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
Full Idea: In the categoricalist view, the essential properties of a natural property are limited to its essentially being itself and not some distinct property. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.1) | |
A reaction: He associates this view with Lewis (modern regularity view) and Armstrong (nomic necessitation), and launches a splendid attack against it. I have always laughed at the idea that 'being Socrates' was one of the properties of Socrates. |
9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
Full Idea: The possibility of abstract definition does not show that we have defined a property that we can know, independently of any theory, that it is physically possible for some object to possess. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.3.1) | |
A reaction: This is a naturalist resisting the idea that there is no more to a property than set-membership. I strongly agree. We need a firm notion of properties as features of the actual world; anything else should be called something like 'categorisations'. |
9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
Full Idea: The categoricalist conception of properties takes them to be quiddities, which are primitive identities between fundamental qualities, having no difference with regard to their essence. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.5) | |
A reaction: Compare 'haecceitism' about indentity of objects, though 'quidditism' sounds even less plausible. Bird attributes this view to Lewis and Armstrong, and makes it sound well daft. |
9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
Full Idea: It isn't clear what it is to name an abundant property. One might reify them, as akin to Fregean concepts, or it might be equivalent to a simple predication. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 7.1.2) | |
A reaction: 'Fregean concepts' would make them functions that purely link things (hence relational?). One suspects that people who actually treat abundant properties as part of their ontology (Lewis) are confusing natural properties with predicates. |
14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
Full Idea: Bird says only real powers are fundamental. | |
From: report of Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 1.5 | |
A reaction: They disagree, and want higher-level properties in their ontology. I'm with Bird, except that something must exist to have the powers. Powers are fundamental to all the activity of nature, and are intrinsic to the stuff which constitutes nature. |
9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
Full Idea: Potencies are characterized in terms of their stimulus and manifestation properties, then if potencies are the only properties then these properties are also potencies, and must be characterized by yet further properties, leading to a vicious regress. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This is cited as the most popular objection to the dispositional account of properties. |
9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
Full Idea: The essence of a potency involves a relation to something else; if inertial mass is a potency then its essence involves a relation to a stimulus property (impressed force) and a manifestation property (acceleration). | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.3.3) | |
A reaction: It doesn't seem quite right to say that the relations are part of the essence, if they might not occur, but some other relations might happen in their place. An essence is what makes a relation possible (like being good-looking). |
9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
Full Idea: Finkish dispositions arise because the time delay between stimulus and manifestation provides an opportunity for the disposition to go out of existence and so halt the process that would bring about the manifestation. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 2.2.3) | |
A reaction: This is a problem for the conditional analysis of dispositions; there may be a disposition, but it never reaches manifestation. Bird rightly points us towards actual powers rather than dispositions that need manifestation. |
9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
Full Idea: If a robust iron pot is attached to a bomb with a sensitive detonator. If the pot is struck, the bomb will go off, so they counterfactual 'if the pot were struck it would break' is true, but it is not a fragile pot. This is a 'mimic' of the disposition. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 2.2.5.1) | |
A reaction: A very nice example, showing that a true disposition would have to be an internal feature (a power) of the pot itself, not a mere disposition to behave. The problem is these pesky empiricists, who want to reduce it all to what is observable. |
9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
Full Idea: The Megarian actualist denies that a disposition can exist without being manifested. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.4) | |
A reaction: I agree with Bird that this extreme realism seems wrong. As he puts it (p.109), "unrealized possibilities must be part of the actual world". This commitment is beginning to change my understanding of the world I am looking at. |
9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
Full Idea: An instantiation condition seems to be a failure of nerve as regards realism about universals. If universals really are entities in their own right, why should their existence depend upon a relationship with existing particulars? | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.2) | |
A reaction: I like this challenge, which seems to leave fans of universals no option but full-blown Platonism, which most of them recognise as being deeply implausible. |
20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
Full Idea: The realist view of resemblance nominalism is that it is resemblance that needs explaining. When there is resemblance it is natural to want to explain it, in terms of something held in common. Explanations end somewhere, but not with resemblance. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: I smell a regress. If a knife and a razor resemble because they share sharpness, you have to see that the sharp phenomenon falls within the category of 'sharpness' before you can make the connection, which is spotting its similarity. |
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
Full Idea: It does not add to the kinds of necessity to say that p is 'nomologically necessary' iff (the laws of nature → p) is metaphysically necessary. That trick of construction could be pulled for 'feline necessity' (true in all worlds that contain cats). | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1.2) | |
A reaction: I love it! Bird seems to think that the only necessity is 'metaphysical' necessity, true in all possible worlds, and he is right. The question arises in modal logic, though, of the accessibility between worlds (which might give degrees of necessity?). |
9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
Full Idea: I do not regard logical necessitation as a kind of necessity. It is logically possible that George Orwell is not Eric Blair, but in what sense is this any kind of possibility? It arises from having two names, but that confers no genuine possibility. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1.2) | |
A reaction: How refreshing. All kinds of concepts like this are just accepted by philosophers as obvious, until someone challenges them. The whole undergrowth of modal thinking needs a good flamethrower taken to it. |
9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
Full Idea: Whereas the link between imaginability and possibility was once held, under the influence of empiricism, to be close, it is now widely held to be very remote. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 8) | |
A reaction: Tim Williamson nicely argues the opposite - that assessment of possibility is an adjunct of our ability to think counterfactually, which is precisely an operation of the imagination. Big error is possible, but how else could we do it? |
9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
Full Idea: The core of haecceitism is the view that the transworld identity of particulars does not supervene on their qualitative features. ...The simplest expression of it is that particulars lack essential properties. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be something the 'bare substratum' account of substance (associated with Locke). You are left with the difficulty of how to individuate an instance of the haecceity, as opposed to the bundle of properties attached to it. |
17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
Full Idea: Some regard the potential regress of explanations as a reason to think that the very idea of explanation is illusory. This is a fallacy; it is not a necessary condition on A's explaining B that we have an explanation for A also. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.4) | |
A reaction: True, though to say 'B is explained by A, but A is totally baffling' is not the account we are dreaming of. And the explanation would certainly fail if we could say nothing at all about A, apart from naming it. |
1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
20547 | We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift] |
Full Idea: Forcing people to do what is rational involves a lack of respect, a failure to respect the value of her living her life in her own (irrational) way. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Resisting' 6) | |
A reaction: Up to a point. Irrationally eccentric is one thing, and irrationally self-destructive is another. You can sit back and watch your children embrace a life less happy than the one you wanted for them - but not a life of utter misery. |
2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
20564 | Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift] |
Full Idea: Nationalist movements seeking to throw off the yoke of colonial rule are often motivated by a sense that their 'people' have the right to self-determination. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Intrinsic 1') | |
A reaction: In 2017, Basques, Catalans and Kurds come to mind. The whole of Africa was an example of this c.1950-80, but there was uncertainty about states, tribes and language groups. |
20535 | Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift] |
Full Idea: Wouldn't it be more rational to choose principles that would maximize the average position, perhaps subject to some 'floor' level beneath which they would not want to take the risk of sinking? | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
A reaction: The criticism is that Rawls's prediction is over-cautious, and that people will take mild risks in what they choose, as long as there is no danger of disaster. (Just as you should allow small children to risk injury, but not death). |
20537 | Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift] |
Full Idea: A common objection to Rawls is that hypothetical contracts, unlike real ones, have no binding force. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
A reaction: [I think Dworkin made this point] 'Contract' may be metaphorical. Perhaps it is just an 'initial agreement' or a 'working arrangement', |
20542 | Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift] |
Full Idea: Cosmopolitans who claim that the same distributive principles should apply to all human beings seem to be denying that different states may make different judgements about how they want to allocate resources among their members. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Social') | |
A reaction: If you want to be a citizen of the world, you have to face up to the pluralistic character of cultures. Do you thereby want to be a citizen of both California and Saudi Arabia? Or are you actually just becoming a citizen of nowhere? |
20559 | Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift] |
Full Idea: During WW2 Winston Churchill famously said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Procedures') | |
A reaction: [Actually a speech in 1947, which began 'it has been said that....'] Aristotle thought an intelligent and benevolent dictatorship was the best form, but held little hope of achieving it. Getting rid of bad rulers is the big virtue. |
20561 | Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift] |
Full Idea: If there were moral knowledge about political matters, democracy would be a very strange way of reaching it. Democratic law-making means treating each person's view as equally good, which only makes sense if there is nothing to be right or wrong about. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Subjectivism') | |
A reaction: Ah, I suddenly grasp that the modern fad for a rather gormless blanket relativism is rooted in the modern desire to take democracy really seriously. Important to remember Condorcet's point here. |
20562 | Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift] |
Full Idea: If your main reason for being a democrat is that democratic procedures respect citizens equally, then you may want a different kind of democracy from those who favour it because they think it tends to produce better citizens? | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Values') | |
A reaction: [Combine this with Idea 20563] |
20563 | Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift] |
Full Idea: If you value democracy because it yields political stability, then you will probably worry about different aspects of the procedure from those who care about its producing good decisions. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Values') | |
A reaction: [Combine this with Idea 20562] Surely the primary aim must be good decisions? The other three options are the result of pessimism about any method achieving that. Instability, inequality and dud citizens are bars to good decisions. |
20560 | Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift] |
Full Idea: We are averse to teledemocracy because it misses out some important parts of a good decision-making procedure, such as debate and deliberation. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Procedures') | |
A reaction: Perhaps you should be sent a short info pack, and only allowed to vote when you have passed a factual multiple choice test about the topic. Or one pack from each political party. Maybe compulsory online discussion as well. |
20554 | Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift] |
Full Idea: For those wanting to regard the state itself as a community, multiculturalism can be a problem. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Liberalism') | |
A reaction: A very important idea. A certain type of aggressive patriot passionately wants the whole country to be a close-bound community, and becomes deeply frustrated by the impossibility of this in a complex and fluid modern world. |
20553 | Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift] |
Full Idea: The two core liberal mistakes (according to communitarians) are that people choose their values, and that they do so in some way detached from their communities. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Correcting') | |
A reaction: I think I might be a communitarian liberal, meaning that extreme individualism is both incorrect and pernicious, but that communities should only exist to promote the varied lives of individuals within them. |
20556 | The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift] |
Full Idea: There is nothing like a war to build a sense of common purpose, of being in the same boat, and to generate the kind of interaction between people that breaks down divisive social boundaries. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014]) | |
A reaction: A nice warning to those who over-do or simplify communitarianism. Alternatively, the greatest sign of health in a community is that citizens have almost no interest in one another? |
20557 | Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift] |
Full Idea: Community is about membership and inclusion. But that means it is also about non-membership and exclusion. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Conc') | |
A reaction: I'm a fan of communitarianism (focused on Aristotle's life of individual virtue for each citizen), but I'm beginning to see that it has a poisonous cousin travelling under the same name. The cousin's rallying cries focus on aliens and enemies. |
20555 | Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift] |
Full Idea: Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community - from practices that stifle the individual's freedom to choose for herself how she lives her life. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Liberalism') | |
A reaction: The phrase 'too much community' is an excellent warning to communitarians. I'm happy to be enmeshed in a community, as long as it is composed of highly liberal and easy-going individuals. Avoid too much bad community. |
20540 | Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift] |
Full Idea: Treating people as means seems like a fairly accurate description of what is involved when the state coercively redistributes resources from some to others. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Nozick') | |
A reaction: The objection comes from Nozick, and alludes to Kant's desire to treat everyone as an end in themselves. Personally I don't mind at all being treated as a means, when my wife asks me to make her a cup of tea. Or paying my taxes to help the community. |
20551 | Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift] |
Full Idea: The problem for feminists is that men have had the power to structure all our social institutions - family, economy, polity - in ways that suit them. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Gender') | |
A reaction: An interesting question is whether masculine domination runs even deeper than that, into our value system, our metaphysics, our science, our epistemology, our language. How do you tell? If women take over half the masculine roles, does that solve it? |
20545 | Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift] |
Full Idea: Maybe freedom is a triadic relation, involving an agent, freedom from a contraint, and in order to act towards some goal. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Two') | |
A reaction: [He cites Gerald MacCallum for this thought] The point is that this makes freedom both negative and positive, contrary to Isaiah Berlin's claim. But on the first day of the school holidays you are 'free', with nothing in particular in mind. |
20550 | Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift] |
Full Idea: The minimal conception of equality of opportunity is that race or gender or religion should not affect chances of a good job or education. The conventional conception needs equality in acquiring competences. Radical views ignore inborn disadvantages. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Equality') | |
A reaction: [my summary of Swift] The strong version only says the less talented should have access to large rewards. The whole idea has strong capitalist assumptions. |
20536 | Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift] |
Full Idea: Without inequalities, people will have no incentive to do one job rather than another - to do the kind of work which is most useful. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
A reaction: The reality is that the lowest pay goes to the jobs that no one wants to do, and all the really nice jobs are usually well paid. Which is a conspiracy, because all the salaries are set by the people with the nice jobs. |
20548 | A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift] |
Full Idea: Someone who rejects equality can care passionately that resources should be transferred from the rich to the poor. They are just rejecting a particular reason that might be offered to justify the redistribution. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Intro') | |
A reaction: For example, it might be for utilitarian reasons, which usually only seek maximised happiness, not equal happiness. And one may love many forms of equality, without economic equality being one of them. |
20541 | You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift] |
Full Idea: Ownership is a complicated idea. I have a right to the office photocopier, but I can's sell the right to others. If people have absolute rights over what they produce, why can't parents sell their children into slavery? | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Nozick') | |
A reaction: If I make a car from stolen parts, does constructing it make it mine? Etc. Do birds own their nests? Swift goes on to ask if we 'own' our bodies. |
20546 | Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift] |
Full Idea: Libertarians say that they care about freedom, and argue for private property rights on freedom grounds. But they don't sem to care about, or even notice, the unfreedom implied by the existence of private property rights. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Freedom') | |
A reaction: When I pass some vast country estate totally surrounded by a high wall, I certainly don't think how wonderful it is that someone has the right to own this property as private land. On the contrary.... |
20533 | Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift] |
Full Idea: The three influential conceptions of justice are as fairness (Rawls), as entitlement (Nozick), and as desert. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Concept') |
9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
Full Idea: The notion of 'causal power' is not to be analysed in terms of causation; if anything, the relationship is the reverse. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.1 n71) | |
A reaction: It is a popular view these days to take causation as basic (as opposed to the counterfactual account), but I prefer this view. If anything is basic in nature, it is the dynamic force in the engine room, which is the active powers of substances. |
9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
Full Idea: While singularists about causation might think that a particular has its causal powers independently of law, it is difficult to see how a universal could have or confer causal powers without generating what we would naturally think of as a law. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.1 n71) | |
A reaction: This is a middle road between the purely singularist account (Anscombe) and the fully nomological account. We might say that a caused event will be 'involved in law-like behaviour', without attributing the cause to a law. |
9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
Full Idea: The laws of a domain are the fundamental, general explanatory relationships between kinds, quantities, and qualities of that domain, that supervene upon the essential natures of those things. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 10.1) | |
A reaction: This is the scientific essentialist view of laws [see entries there, in 'Laws of Nature']. There seems uncertainty between 'kinds' and 'qualities' (with 'quantities' looking like a category mistake). I vote, with Ellis, for natural kinds as the basis. |
9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
Full Idea: Instead of viewing laws as regular relationships between dispositional properties and stimulus-manifestation, they can be conceived of as a relation between properties. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.4) | |
A reaction: Bird offers these as the two main views, with the first coming from scientific essentialism, and the second from Armstrong's account of universals. Personally I favour the first, but Bird suggests that powers give the best support for both views. |
9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
Full Idea: The fact that some other diamonds are hard does not explain why this diamond is hard. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.3.2) | |
A reaction: A very nice aphorism! It pinpoints the whole error of trying to explain the behaviour of the world by citing laws. Why should this item obey that law? Bird prefers 'powers', and so do I. |
9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
Full Idea: For the regularity version of dispositional essentialism about laws, laws are those regularities whose truth is guaranteed by the essential dispositional nature of one or more of the constituents. Regularities that supervene on such laws are also laws. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1.2) | |
A reaction: Even if you accept necessary behaviour resulting from essential dispositions, you still need to distinguish the important regularities from the accidental ones, so the word 'guarantee' is helpful, even if it raises lots of difficulties. |
9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
Full Idea: Laws, or what flow from them, are supposed to provide a unified explanation of the behaviours of particulars. Without universals the explanation of the behaviours of things lacks the required unity. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: Sounds a bit question-begging? Gravity seems fairly unified, whereas the frequency of London buses doesn't. Maybe I could unify bus-behaviour by positing a few new universals? The unity should first be in the phenomena, not in the explanation. |
9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
Full Idea: If universals exist only where and when they are instantiated, this make serious trouble for the universals view of laws. It would be most odd if a particular, merely by changing its properties, could cause a law to go out of existence. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.2) | |
A reaction: This sounds conclusive. He notes that this is probably why Armstrong does not adopt this view (though Lowe seems to favour it). Could there be a possible property (and concomitant law) which was never ever instantiated? |
9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
Full Idea: We cannot have a world where it is true both that salt exists (which requires Coulomb's Law to be true), and that it fails to dissolve in water (which requires Coulomb's Law to be false). So the dissolving is necessary even if the Law is contingent. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Excellent. It is just like the bonfire on the Moon (imaginable through ignorance, but impossible). People who assert that the solubility of salt is contingent tend not to know much about chemistry. |
23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
Full Idea: According to Bird, non-fundamental laws supervene on fundamental laws, and so are ultimately explained by fundamental powers. | |
From: report of Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007]) by Friend/Kimpton-Nye - Dispositions and Powers 3.6.1 | |
A reaction: This looks like the picture I subscribe to. Roughly, fundamental laws are explained by powers, and non-fundamental laws are explained by properties, which are complexes of powers. 'Fundamental' may not be a precise term! |
9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
Full Idea: The straightforward dispositional essentialist account of laws by subjunctive conditionals is false because dispositions typically suffer from finks and antidotes. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.4) | |
A reaction: [Finks and antidotes intervene before a disposition can take effect] This seems very persuasive to me, and shows why you can't just explain laws as counterfactual or conditional claims. Explanation demands what underlies them. |
9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |
Full Idea: The obvious problem with the simple relational view of space and time is that it fails to account for the full range of spatio-temporal possibility. There seem to be times and places where objects and events could be, but are not. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 7.3.2) | |
A reaction: This view seems strongly supported by intuition. I certainly don't accept the views of physicists and cosmologists on the subject, because they seem to approach the whole thing too instrumentally. |
1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |