36 ideas
| 7910 | Pursue truth with the urgency of someone whose clothes are on fire [Ashvaghosha] |
| Full Idea: As though your turban or your clothes were on fire, so with a sense of urgency should you apply your intellect to the comprehension of the truths. | |
| From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
| A reaction: The best philosophers need no such urging. I retain a romantic view that we should be 'natural' in these things. See Plato's views in Idea 2153 and 1638. However, maybe I should be confronted with this quotation every morning when I awake. |
| 125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: Even a naturally gifted philosopher isn't going to develop into a real man, because he's avoiding the heart of his community and the thick of the agora. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 485d) | |
| A reaction: A serious charge against philosophy. An attraction of the subject is its purity, its necessity, its timelessness, and in some ways these are just nicer and easier and more understandable than the hard mess of real life. But understanding has to be good. |
| 1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
| Full Idea: In the 'Gorgias' Socrates is still supremely confident that the elenchus is the final arbiter of moral truth. | |
| From: comment on Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.117 |
| 4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Test me, and let yourself be tested as well, by asking and answering questions. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 462a) | |
| A reaction: The idea must be to avoid wild speculation, by continually filtering ideas through rival critical intelligences. The best philosophical method ever devised. |
| 9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366) | |
| A reaction: As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all. |
| 9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365) | |
| A reaction: I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it. |
| 9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368) | |
| A reaction: I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians. |
| 9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: Those laws and those laws only have necessary truth which we are prepared to maintain, no matter what. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367) | |
| A reaction: This bold and simple claim has famously been torpedoed by a well-known counterexample - that virtually every human being will cling on to the proposition "dogs have at some time existed" no matter what, but it clearly isn't a necessary truth. |
| 9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The a priori contains principles which can be maintained in the face of all experience, representing the initiative of the mind. But they are subject to alteration on pragmatic grounds, if expanding experience shows their intellectual infelicity. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.373) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This simply IS Quine's famous 'web of belief' picture, showing how firmly Quine is in the pragmatist tradition. Lewis treats a priori principles as a pragmatic toolkit, which can be refined to be more effective. Not implausible... |
| 9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: Physical processes present us with phenomena in which the purely mathematical has to be separated out by abstraction. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367) | |
| A reaction: This is the father of modal logic endorsing traditional abstractionism, it seems. He is also, though, endorsing the view that a priori knowledge is created by us, with pragmatic ends in view. |
| 114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Rhetoric is an agent of the kind of persuasion which is designed to produce conviction, but not to educate people about right and wrong. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 455a) | |
| A reaction: Surely there must be good rhetoric (or at least it is an open question)? |
| 116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Rhetoric is a knack, because it lacks rational understanding of its object or what it dispenses (and can't explain the reason anything happens). | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 465a) | |
| A reaction: If there are cunning people who have the wrong sort of intelligence for morality, there must be cunning users of rhetoric who know exactly what they are doing. |
| 135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
| Full Idea: All activity aims at the good. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 499e) | |
| A reaction: He includes non-conscious activity, so this is the 'teleological' view of nature, which seems a bit optimistic to the modern mind. |
| 122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: It's the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rules. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483b) | |
| A reaction: An aristocrat bemoans democracy. Presumably the qualification for being a 'weakling' is shortage of money. How strong are the scions of the aristocrats? |
| 139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A good person is bound to do whatever he does well and successfully, and success brings fulfilment and happiness. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507c) | |
| A reaction: Not how we would see it, I guess, but this is the Greek idea that a good person is one who functions well. Anyone who functions well is probably having a good time. |
| 128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: Nature says the only authentic way of life is to do nothing to hinder or restrain the expansion of one's desires. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 491e) | |
| A reaction: Sounds like the natural desires of a young single man. Parents and spouses have natural desires that focus on other people's desires. |
| 4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
| Full Idea: When we drink to quench thirst, we lose the distress of the thirst and the pleasure of drinking at the same moment, but one loss is good and the other bad, so the pleasure and the goodness must be separate. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 497d) | |
| A reaction: This is open to the objection that the good of slaking one's thirst is a long-term pleasure, where the drinking is short-term, so pleasure is still the good. |
| 136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Good should be the goal of pleasant activities, rather than pleasure being the goal of good activities. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 500a) | |
| A reaction: Nice. Not far off what Aristotle says on the topic. So what activities should we seek out? Narrow the pleasures down to the good ones, or narrow the good ones down to the pleasurable? |
| 134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There is little to tell between good and bad people (e.g. cowards) in terms of how much pleasure and distress they experience. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 498c) | |
| A reaction: A very perceptive remark. If the good are people with empathy for others, then they may suffer more distress than the insensitive wicked. |
| 132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Socrates: I want to ask whether a lifetime spent scratching, itching and scratching, no end of scratching, is also a life of happiness. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 494c) | |
| A reaction: There are plenty of people who think 'fun' is the main aim of life, and who fit what Socrates is referring to. We don't admire such a life, but not many people can be admired. |
| 4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In a fool's mind desire is a leaky jar, …which is an analogy for the mind's insatiability, showing we should prefer an orderly life, in which one is content with whatever is to hand, to a self-indulgent life of insatiable desire. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 493b) | |
| A reaction: This points to an interesting paradox, that pleasure requires the misery of desire. And yet absence of desire is like death. An Aristotelian mean, of living according to nature, seems the escape route. |
| 130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: If a person has the means to live a life of sensual, self-indulgent freedom, there's no better or happier state of existence. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492c) |
| 120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Socrates: We should avoid doing wrong because of all the bad consequences it will bring us. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 480a) |
| 118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Socrates: If I had to choose between doing wrong and having wrong done to me, I'd prefer the latter to the former. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 469c) | |
| A reaction: cf Democritus 68B45 |
| 140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Self-indulgent desire makes a person incapable of co-operation, which is a prerequisite of friendship. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507e) |
| 131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: If people who need nothing are happy, there would be nothing happier than a stone or a corpse. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492e) | |
| A reaction: We aren't really supposed to approve of Callicles, but to me this is a splendidly crushing western response to many of the ideals found in eastern philosophy. |
| 119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Socrates: A criminal is worse off if he doesn't pay the penalty, and continues to do wrong without getting punished. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 472e) |
| 129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: Why do most people praise self-discipline and justice? Because their own timidity makes them incapable of satisfying their pleasures. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492a) |
| 4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
| Full Idea: I'm sure you know the list of human advantages in the party song: 'The very best is health, Second good looks, and third honest wealth'. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 451e) | |
| A reaction: This invites the obvious question of why anyone wants these three things, with the implied answer of 'pleasure'. But we might want them even if we couldn't use them, implying pluralism. |
| 137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
| Full Idea: As in every case (an artefact, a body, a mind, a creature), a good state is an organised and orderly state. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 506e) |
| 141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The only responsibility of a good member of a community is altering the community's needs rather than going along with them. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 517b) |
| 123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: It's because most people are second-rate that they are happy for things to be distributed equally. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483c) |
| 124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Callicles: We only have to look at nature to find evidence that it is right for better to have a greater share than worse. | |
| From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483d) |
| 9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |
| Full Idea: The scientific search is for such classification as will make it possible to correlate appearance and behaviour, to discover law, to penetrate to the "essential nature" of things in order that behaviour may become predictable. | |
| From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368) | |
| A reaction: Modern scientific essentialists no longer invoke scare quotes, and I think we should talk of the search for the 'mechanisms' which explain behaviour, but Lewis seems to have been sixty years ahead of his time. |
| 7909 | The Eightfold Path concerns morality, wisdom, and tranquillity [Ashvaghosha] |
| Full Idea: The Eightfold Path has three steps concerning morality - right speech, right bodily action, and right livelihood; three of wisdom - right views, right intentions, and right effort; and two of tranquillity - right mindfulness and right concentration. | |
| From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
| A reaction: Most of this translates quite comfortably into the aspirations of western philosophy. For example, 'right effort' sounds like Kant's claim that only a good will is truly good (Idea 3710). The Buddhist division is interesting for action theory. |
| 7908 | At the end of a saint, he is not located in space, but just ceases to be disturbed [Ashvaghosha] |
| Full Idea: When an accomplished saint comes to the end, he does not go anywhere down in the earth or up in the sky, nor into any of the directions of space, but because his defilements have become extinct he simply ceases to be disturbed. | |
| From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
| A reaction: To 'cease to be disturbed' is the most attractive account of heaven I have encountered. It all sounds a bit dull though. I wonder, as usual, how they know all this stuff. |