68 ideas
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e) |
17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
Full Idea: I uphold the belief that for clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability 1.5 | |
A reaction: [written in 1961] This contradicts the implication normally taken from his much earlier Incompleteness Theorems. |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a) |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71 | |
A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light. |
9542 | The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell] |
Full Idea: The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell. There are four axioms: (p∨p)→p, q→(p∨q), (p→q)→(q∨p), and (q→r)→((p∨q)→(p∨r)), plus Substitution and Modus Ponens rules. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by GE Hughes/M Cresswell - An Introduction to Modal Logic Ch.1 |
21720 | Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: The axiom of Reducibility ...is crucial in the reduction of classes to logic, ...and seems to be a quite legitimate logical notion for Russell. | |
From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.4 | |
A reaction: This is an unusual defence of the axiom, which is usually presumed to have been kicked into the long grass by Quine. If one could reduce classes to logic, that would destroy the opposition to logicism in a single neat coup. |
10044 | Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Russell adduces two reasons against the extensional view of classes, namely the existence of the null class (which cannot very well be a collection), and the unit classes (which would have to be identical with their single elements). | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Structure and Ontology p.459 | |
A reaction: Gödel believes in the reality of classes. I have great sympathy with Russell, when people start to claim that sets are not just conveniences to help us think about things, but actual abstract entities. Is the singleton of my pencil is on this table? |
18208 | We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: Classes, so far as we introduce them, are merely symbolic or linguistic conveniences, not genuine objects. | |
From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.72), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics III.2 |
9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved the completeness of standard formalizations of first-order logic, including Frege's original one. However, an implication of his famous theorem on the incompleteness of arithmetic is that second-order logic is incomplete. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (works [1930]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
A reaction: This must mean that it is impossible to characterise arithmetic fully in terms of first-order logic. In which case we can only characterize the features of abstract reality in general if we employ an incomplete system. We're doomed. |
8204 | Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: Russell call 'if...then' implication, when the material conditional is a much better account; C.I.Lewis (in founding modern modal logic) preserved Russell's confusion by creating 'strict implication', and called that implication. | |
From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Willard Quine - Reply to Professor Marcus p.177 | |
A reaction: [A compession of Quine's paragraph]. All of this assumes that logicians can give an accurate account of what if...then means, when ordinary usage is broad and vague. Strict implication seems to drain all the normal meaning out of 'if...then'. |
9359 | Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: In Mr Russell's idea of implication, if twenty random sentences from a newspaper were put in a hat, and two of them drawn at random, one will certainly imply the other, and it is an even bet the implication will be mutual. | |
From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by C.I. Lewis - A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori p.366 | |
A reaction: This sort of lament leads modern logicians to suggest 'relevance' as an important criterion. It certainly seems odd that so-called 'classical logic' should contain a principle so at variance with everyday reasoning. |
21707 | Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: Russell did not view logic as an uninterpreted calculus awaiting interpretations [the modern view]. Rather, logic is a single 'interpreted' body of a priori truths, of propositions rather than sentence forms - but maximally general and topic neutral. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1 | |
A reaction: This is the view which Wittgenstein challenged, saying logic is just conventional. Linsky claims that Russell's logicism is much more plausible, once you understand his view of logic. |
10036 | In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
Full Idea: In 'Principia' a young science was enriched with a new abstract theory of relations, ..and not only Cantor's set theory but also ordinary arithmetic and the theory of measurement are treated from this abstract relational standpoint. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.448 | |
A reaction: I presume this is accounting for relations in terms of ordered sets. |
10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
Full Idea: At that time (c.1930) a concept of objective mathematical truth as opposed to demonstrability was viewed with greatest suspicion and widely rejected as meaningless. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 28.2 | |
A reaction: [quoted from a letter] This is the time of Ramsey's redundancy account, and before Tarski's famous paper of 1933. It is also the high point of Formalism, associated with Hilbert. |
17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
Full Idea: Gödel was quick to point out that his original incompleteness theorems did not produce instances of absolute undecidability and hence did not undermine Hilbert's conviction that for every precise mathematical question there is a discoverable answer. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (works [1930]) by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability Intro | |
A reaction: The normal simplistic view among philosophes is that Gödel did indeed decisively refute the optimistic claims of Hilbert. Roughly, whether Hilbert is right depends on which axioms of set theory you adopt. |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections' |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337 |
18248 | A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: For Russell the real number 2 is the class of rationals less than 2 (i.e. 2/1). ...Notice that on this definition, real numbers are classes of rational numbers. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.2 |
17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
Full Idea: Eventually Gödel ...expressed the hope that there might be a generalised completeness theorem according to which there are no absolutely undecidable sentences. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (works [1930]) by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability Intro | |
A reaction: This comes as a bit of a shock to those who associate him with the inherent undecidability of reality. |
10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
Full Idea: The concept of truth of sentences in a language cannot be defined in the language. This is the true reason for the existence of undecidable propositions in the formal systems containing arithmetic. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 21.6 | |
A reaction: [from a letter by Gödel] So they key to Incompleteness is Tarski's observations about truth. Highly significant, as I take it. |
18152 | Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: Although Russell takes numbers to be certain classes, his 'no-class' theory then eliminates all mention of classes in favour of the 'propositional functions' that define them; and in the case of the numbers these just are the numerical quantifiers. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 9.B.4 |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a) | |
A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed. |
10025 | Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes] |
Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic, ..and came close to identifying numbers with numerical quantifiers. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic p.148 | |
A reaction: The point here is 'higher-order'. |
8683 | Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Unlike Frege, Russell and Whitehead were not realists about mathematical objects, and whereas Frege thought that only arithmetic and analysis are branches of logic, they think the vast majority of mathematics (including geometry) is essentially logical. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
A reaction: If, in essence, Descartes reduced geometry to algebra (by inventing co-ordinates), then geometry ought to be included. It is characteristic of Russell's hubris to want to embrace everything. |
10037 | 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: What is missing, above all, in 'Principia', is a precise statement of the syntax of the formalism. | |
From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.448 |
10093 | The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead's ramified theory of types worked not with sets, but with propositional functions (similar to Frege's concepts), with a more restrictive assignment of variables, insisting that bound, as well as free, variables be of lower type. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.3 | |
A reaction: I don't fully understand this (and no one seems much interested any more), but I think variables are a key notion, and there is something interesting going on here. I am intrigued by ordinary language which behaves like variables. |
8691 | The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: The Russell/Whitehead type theory reduces mathematics to a consistent founding discipline, but is criticised for not really being logic. They could not prove the existence of infinite sets, and introduced a non-logical 'axiom of reducibility'. | |
From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.6 | |
A reaction: To have reduced most of mathematics to a founding discipline sounds like quite an achievement, and its failure to be based in pure logic doesn't sound too bad. However, it seems to reduce some maths to just other maths. |
10305 | In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: In the system of 'Principia Mathematica', it is not only the axioms of infinity and reducibility which go beyond pure logic, but also the initial conception of a universal domain of individuals and of a domain of predicates. | |
From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.267) by Paul Bernays - On Platonism in Mathematics p.267 | |
A reaction: This sort of criticism seems to be the real collapse of the logicist programme, rather than Russell's paradox, or Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. It just became impossible to stick strictly to logic in the reduction of arithmetic. |
8684 | Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead are particularly careful to avoid paradox, and consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
A reaction: This strikes me as quite a good argument. It is certainly counterintuitive that reality, and abstractions from reality, would contain contradictions. The realist view would be that we have paradoxes because we have misdescribed the facts. |
8746 | To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Russell insisted on the vicious circle principle, and thus rejected impredicative definitions, which resulted in an unwieldy ramified type theory, with the ad hoc axiom of reducibility. Ramsey's simpler theory was impredicative and avoided the axiom. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.2 | |
A reaction: Nowadays the theory of types seems to have been given up, possibly because it has no real attraction if it lacks the strict character which Russell aspired to. |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d) |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08 | |
A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God. |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c) |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d) | |
A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism. |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5 | |
A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something? |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2 | |
A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships. |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies. |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts. |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically. |
12033 | An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM] |
Full Idea: Trivially, the Identity of Indiscernibles says that two individuals, Castor and Pollux, cannot have all properties in common. For Castor must have the properties of being identical with Castor and not being identical with Pollux, which Pollux can't share. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], I p.57) by Robert Merrihew Adams - Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity 2 | |
A reaction: I suspect that either the property of being identical with itself is quite vacuous, or it is parasytic on primitive identity, or it is the criterion which is actually used to define identity. Either way, I don't find this claim very illuminating. |
10040 | Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
Full Idea: By analyzing the paradoxes to which Cantor's set theory had led, ..Russell brought to light the amazing fact that our logical intuitions (concerning such notions as truth, concept, being, class) are self-contradictory. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.452 | |
A reaction: The main intuition that failed was, I take it, that every concept has an extension, that is, there are always objects which will or could fall under the concept. |
21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The multiple relations theory of judgement proposes that assertions about propositions are dependent upon genuine facts involving belief and other attitude relations, subjects of those attitudes, and the constituents of the belief. | |
From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to require a commitment to universals (especially relations) with which we can be directly acquainted. I prefer propositions, but as mental entities, not platonic entities. |
23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: When a judgement occurs, there is a certain complex entity, composed of the mind and the various objects of the judgement. | |
From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44) | |
A reaction: This is Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgement, which replaced his earlier belief in unified propositions (now 'false abstractions'). He seems to have accepted Locke's view, that the act of judgement produces the unity. |
23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: When I judge 'Socrates is human', the meaning is completed by the act of judging. | |
From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus | |
A reaction: Morris says this is Russell's multiple-relations theory of judgement. The theory accompanies the rejection of the concept of the unified proposition. When I hear 'Socrates had a mole on his shoulder' I get the meaning without judging. |
23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: When Russell moved to his multiple relation theory of judgement …he then faced difficulties making sense of the unity of sentences. | |
From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 3A | |
A reaction: Roughly, he seems committed to saying that there is only unity if you think there is unity; there is no unity in a sentence prior to the act of judgement. |
18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: When I judge 'Socrates is human', the meaning is completed by the act of judging, and we no longer have an incomplete symbol. | |
From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap | |
A reaction: Personally I would have thought that you needed to know the meaning properly before you could make the judgement, but then he is Bertrand Russell and I'm not. |
23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
Full Idea: A 'proposition', in the sense in which a proposition is supposed to be the object of a judgement, is a false abstraction, because a judgement has several objects, not one. | |
From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2E | |
A reaction: This is the rejection of the 'Russellian' theory of propositions, in favour of his multiple-relations theory of judgement. But why don't the related objects add up to a proposition about a state of affairs? |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a) |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e) |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 231 |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b) |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 233. |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |