134 ideas
15447 | We shouldn't always follow where the argument leads! [Lewis on Plato] |
Full Idea: There comes a time not to go on following where the argument leads! | |
From: comment on Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 667b) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Variant' | |
A reaction: Lewis is a fine one to talk, since he follows argument that take him past innumerable incredulous stares of onlookers. |
2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are always ready to change direction, if a topic crops up which is more attractive than the one to hand. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 172d) | |
A reaction: Which sounds trivial, but it may be what God does. |
2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
Full Idea: Either a syllable is not the same as its letters, in which case it cannot have the letters as parts of itself, or it is the same as its letters, in which case these basic elements are just as knowable as it is. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205b) |
2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
Full Idea: A perfect grasp of any subject depends far more on knowing elements than on knowing complexes. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206b) |
243 | It is foolish to quarrel with the mind's own reasoning processes [Plato] |
Full Idea: When the soul quarrels with knowledge or opinion or reason, its natural ruling principles, you have there what I call 'folly'. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 689b) |
241 | We ought to follow where the argument leads us [Plato] |
Full Idea: We ought to follow where the argument leads us. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 667a) |
2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as primary elements are woven together, so their names may be woven together to produce a spoken account, because an account is essentially a weaving together of names. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b) | |
A reaction: If justification requires 'logos', and logos is a 'weaving together of names', then Plato might be taken as endorsing the coherence account of justification. Or do the two 'weavings' correspond? |
21264 | Mortals are incapable of being fully rational [Plato] |
Full Idea: We mustn't assume that mortal eyes will ever be able to look upon reason and get to know it adequately. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 897d) | |
A reaction: This is in the context of the rational control of the whole Cosmos. I presume Plato would be flabbergasted by the findings of recent physics and cosmology. Did Kant believe that he was being completely rational about ethics? |
2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: Eristic discussions involve as many tricks and traps as possible, but dialectical discussions involve being serious and correcting the interlocutor's mistakes only when they are his own fault or the result of past conditioning. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167e) |
15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
Full Idea: A primary element cannot be expressed in an account; it can only be named, for a name is all that it has. But with the things composed of these ...just as the elements are woven together, so the names can woven to become an account. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b01-3) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of what I see as Aristotle's metaphysics, as derived from his epistemology, that is, ontology is what explains, and what we can give an account [logos] of. Aristotle treats this under 'definitions'. |
251 | Truth has the supreme value, for both gods and men [Plato] |
Full Idea: Truth heads the list of all things good, for gods and men alike. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 730c) |
10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: It must surely be true that a man who has completely mastered arithmetic knows all numbers? Because there are pieces of knowledge covering all numbers in his soul. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 198b) | |
A reaction: This clearly views numbers as objects. Expectation of knowing them all is a bit startling! They also appear to be innate in us, and hence they appear to be Forms. See Aristotle's comment in Idea 645. |
2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: There are two kinds of change, I think: alteration and motion. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 181d) | |
A reaction: Idea 1700 is better than this. |
2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a complex or a syllable has no parts and is a single identity, hasn't it turned out to be the same kind of thing as an element or letter? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205d) |
15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
Full Idea: But this sum now - isn't it just when there is nothing lacking that it is a sum? Yes, necessarily. And won't this very same thing - that from which nothing is lacking - be a whole? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205a) | |
A reaction: This seems to be right, be rather too vague and potentially circular to be of much use. What is the criterion for deciding that nothing is lacking? |
15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole does not consist of parts; for it did, it would be all the parts and so would be the sum. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 204e) | |
A reaction: That is, 'the whole is the sum of its parts' is a tautology! The claim that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts' gets into similar trouble. See Verity Harte on this. |
21259 | To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato] |
Full Idea: There are three elements in any given thing: the first is what the object actually is, the second is the definition of this, and the third is the name. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895d) | |
A reaction: I take the importance of this to be its distinction between what it is, and the definition of what it is. Aristotle maintains this distinction, but some modern Aristotelians seem to get the confused. Plato worried a lot more about names than we do. |
2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Things which are susceptible to a rational account are knowable. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201d) |
16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
Full Idea: A man has passed from mere judgment to expert knowledge of the being of a wagon when he has done so in virtue of having gone over the whole by means of the elements. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207c) | |
A reaction: Plato is emphasising that the expert must know the hundred parts of a wagon, and not just the half dozen main components, but here the point is to go over the whole via the parts, and not just list the parts. |
2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to believe something which is not the case. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167a) |
2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the object of a belief is what is not, the object of this belief is nothing; but if there is no object to a belief, then that is not belief at all. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 189a) |
2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: Perception is always of something that is, and it is infallible, which suggests that it is knowledge. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 152c) |
2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
Full Idea: It would be peculiar if each of us were like a Trojan horse, with a whole bunch of senses sitting inside us, rather than that all these perceptions converge onto a single identity (mind, or whatever one ought to call it). | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 184d) |
2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
Full Idea: With what physical faculty do we perceive being and not-being, similarity and dissimilarity, identity and difference, oneness and many, odd and even and other maths, ….fineness and goodness? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 185d) |
2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you can't apprehend being you can't apprehend truth, and so a thing could not be known. Therefore knowledge is not located in immediate experience but in thinking about it, since the latter makes it possible to grasp being and truth. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 186c) |
2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
Full Idea: Sight or touch might make someone take eleven for twelve, but he could never form this mistaken belief about the contents of his mind. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 195e) |
2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you don't know which letters belong together in the right syllables…it is possible for true belief to be accompanied by a rational account and still not be entitled to the name of knowledge. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208b) | |
A reaction: In each case of justification there is a 'clinching' stage, for which there is never going to be a strict rule. It might be foundational, but equally it might be massive coherence, or no alternative. |
2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
Full Idea: Either a syllable and its letters are equally knowable and expressible in a rational account, or they are both equally unknowable and inexpressible. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205e) | |
A reaction: Presumably you could explain the syllable by the letters, but not vice versa, but he must mean that the explanation is worthless without the letters being explained too. So all explanation is worthless? |
2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If I only have beliefs about Theaetetus when I don't know his distinguishing mark, how on earth were my beliefs about you rather than anyone else? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 209b) | |
A reaction: This is a rather intellectualist approach to mental activity. Presumably Theaetetus has lots of distinguishing marks, but they are not conscious. Must Socrates know everything? |
2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
Full Idea: A rational account might be forming an image of one's belief, as in a mirror or a pond. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206d) | |
A reaction: Not promising, since the image is not going to be clearer than the original, or contain any new information. Maybe it would be clarified by being 'framed', instead of drifting in muddle. |
2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
Full Idea: A third sort of rational account (after giving an image, or analysing elements) is being able to mention some mark which differentiates the object in question ('the sun is the brightest heavenly body'). | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208c) | |
A reaction: This is Plato's clearest statement of what would be involved in adding the necessary logos to your true belief. An image of it, or an analysis, or an individuation. How about a cause? |
2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
Full Idea: Maybe the primary elements of which things are composed are not susceptible to rational accounts. Each of them taken by itself can only be named, but nothing further can be said about it. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201e) | |
A reaction: This still seems to be more or less the central issue in philosophy - which things should be treated as 'primitive', and which other things are analysed and explained using the primitive tools? |
2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
Full Idea: In the case of a wagon, we may only have correct belief, but someone who is able to explain what it is by going through its hundred parts has got hold of a rational account. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207b) | |
A reaction: A wonderful example. In science, you know smoking correlates with cancer, but you only know it when you know the mechanism, the causal structure. This may be a general truth. |
2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
Full Idea: What evidence could be brought if we were asked at this very moment whether we are asleep and are dreaming all our thoughts? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 158b) |
2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
Full Idea: In medicine, at least, most people are not self-sufficient at prescribing and effecting cures for themselves, and here some people are superior to others. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171e) |
2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
Full Idea: To say that everyone believes what is the case, is to concede the truth of the oppositions' beliefs; in other words, the person has to concede that he himself is wrong. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171a) |
2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Does a relativist have any authority to decide about things which will happen in the future? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 178c) | |
A reaction: Nice question! It seems commonsense that such speculations are possible, but without a concept of truth they are ridiculous. |
21260 | Soul is what is defined by 'self-generating motion' [Plato] |
Full Idea: The entity which we call 'soul' is precisely that which is defined by the expression 'self-generating motion'. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896a) | |
A reaction: We may suspect that he defines soul in this way for a particular context, aimed at proving the existence of a First Mover. He must think there is more to soul than the generation of movement. |
276 | My individuality is my soul, which carries my body around [Plato] |
Full Idea: While I am alive I have nothing to thank for my individuality except my soul, whereas my body is just the likeness that I carry around with me. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 959a) |
249 | People who value beauty above virtue insult the soul by placing the body above it [Plato] |
Full Idea: When a man values beauty above virtue, the disrespect he shows his soul is total and fundamental, because he argues that the body is more to be honoured than the soul. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 727e) |
19956 | True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The good man is he whose goodness is not Christian, but rather political, in the sense I have given. Such a man loves the laws of his land and is moved to act by them. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], Intro) | |
A reaction: I take this to have a lot in common with Aristotle, whose simple slogan for virtue I take to as 'be a good citizen'. |
265 | An action is only just if it is performed by someone with a just character and outlook [Plato] |
Full Idea: The description 'just' is applicable only to the benefit conferred or injury inflicted by someone with a just character and outlook. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 862b) | |
A reaction: How should we describe the occasional administering of good justice by a generally wicked judge. Greeks focus on character, but moderns focus on actions. |
269 | Attempted murder is like real murder, but we should respect the luck which avoided total ruin [Plato] |
Full Idea: An attempted murder should be treated like a successful one, but with respect shown for the luck which saved him from total ruin. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 877a) | |
A reaction: The earliest reference to moral luck, I think. 'Repect' sounds vague, but it is asking judges to 'take it into consideration', which is quite practical. Attempted murderers are just as dangerous. |
240 | It would be strange if the gods rewarded those who experienced the most pleasure in life [Plato] |
Full Idea: It would be strange if the gods gave the greatest rewards in heaven to those who led the most pleasant life, rather than the most just. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 662c) | |
A reaction: All of philosophy is just footnotes to Plato.... See Idea 1454. |
264 | The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all [Plato] |
Full Idea: The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 840c) | |
A reaction: Plato's puritanical streak. Even Aristotle doesn't agree with this. Self-control does not imply conquest of pleasure. Has a good professional wine taster conquered pleasure? |
263 | The only worthwhile life is one devoted to physical and moral perfection [Plato] |
Full Idea: A life devoted to every physical perfection and every moral virtue is the only life worth the name. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 807c) |
4332 | Virtue is a concord of reason and emotion, with pleasure and pain trained to correct ends [Plato] |
Full Idea: Virtue is the general concord of reason and emotion, but there is one key element, which is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, which makes us hate what we ought to hate, and love what we ought to love. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 653c) | |
A reaction: An important truth, taken up by Aristotle. To see another person humiliated gives some people pleasure and other people pain. |
248 | A serious desire for moral excellence is very rare indeed [Plato] |
Full Idea: People who are anxious to attain moral excellence with all possible speed are pretty thin on the ground. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 718e) |
253 | Every crime is the result of excessive self-love [Plato] |
Full Idea: The cause of each and every crime we commit is precisely this excessive love of ourselves. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 731e) |
235 | Virtue is the aim of all laws [Plato] |
Full Idea: Virtue is the aim of the laws the legislator lays down. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 631a) |
277 | The Guardians must aim to discover the common element in the four cardinal virtues [Plato] |
Full Idea: The guardians of the state should aim to get an exact idea of the common element in all the four virtues. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 965d) |
254 | Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided [Plato] |
Full Idea: Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 732c) |
266 | Injustice is the mastery of the soul by bad feelings, even if they do not lead to harm [Plato] |
Full Idea: My general description of injustice is this: the mastery of the soul by anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy and desires, whether they lead to actual damage or not. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 863e) |
242 | The best people are produced where there is no excess of wealth or poverty [Plato] |
Full Idea: The community in which neither wealth nor poverty exists will produce the finest characters. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 679b) |
256 | Virtue and great wealth are incompatible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Virtue and great wealth are quite incompatible. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 742e) |
19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is unreasonable to impute to men, as Hobbes does, the desire to subjugate one another. The idea of sovereignty [l'empire] and domination is so complex and depends on so many other ideas, that it could not be the first to occur to men. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) |
19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: A being concerned only with preservation would be very timid. In such a state every man would feel himself an inferior; he could scarcely imagine himself an equal. No one would seek to attack anyone else; peace would be the first law of nature. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
A reaction: Exactly the idea that Rousseau took up, and they both attack Hobbes for describing a more advanced stage of society, instead of focusing on the original state. A solitary individual would be crazy to launch attacks on other individuals. |
19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: To his sense of weakness, man would soon add his needs. Encouraged by indications that their fear was shared, men would soon come together. They would feel the pleasure (and sexual attraction) of their own species. Knowledge then draws them into society. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
A reaction: He doesn't make the point about 'knowledge' very clear. |
20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Men are ruled by many causes: climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, examples drawn from the pasts, customs, manners. Out of them is formed the general spirit of a nation. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.04) | |
A reaction: This is one step away from Rousseau's general will, which is an attempt to give precise expression to this 'spirit of a nation'. |
19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a small republic, the public good is more keenly felt, better known, closer to every citizen; abuses are spread less widely, and consequently, are less tolerated. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) | |
A reaction: This idea of very small republics now seems outdated, but this idea still applies. Small states like the Baltic States (or Scotland?) have a better chance of the citizens identifying with the whole community. |
19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a large republic, there are large fortunes, and therefore but little moderation in the minds of men. its resources are too considerable to be entrusted to a citizen. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) |
20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: I do not believe that anyone of [that small part of a nation that is rich and voluptuous] would submit to a lottery determining which part of the nation would be free, and which slave. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
A reaction: Wonderful! This is exactly Rawls's 'initial position' and 'veil of ignorance'. It is used here to deconstruct implausible arguments in favour of slavery. |
19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Although all states share the same general objective, to preserve themselves, each has its own particular purpose (such as aggrandisement, war, religion, commerce, tranquillity, navigation, liberty, pleasures of the ruler, glory, individual independence). | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.05) | |
A reaction: [he gives examples for each of the list in brackets] I'm trying to think of the distinctive purpose of the UK, and can't get beyond sport, music gigs and comedy shows. |
19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Some have thought that because nature has established the power of the parent, the most natural government is that of a single person. But the example of paternal power proves nothing. The inheritance by a father's brothers would support rule by the many. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.03) | |
A reaction: [last bit compressed] Locke pointed out that the mother has similar entitlement, and he and Rousseau agree in rejecting this idea. |
19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a sense, nobility is one part of the essence of monarchy, whose fundamenta maxim is: 'without a monarchy, no nobility; without a nobility, no monarchy'. There are, of course, despots, but they are something else. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
A reaction: Hence the worst vice associated with a monarchy is patronage, even when the monarch is weak and 'constitutional'. |
19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Monarchical government has the great advantage that, since public business is guided by a single person, the executive power can operate more speedily. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.10) | |
A reaction: Liberal democracies are particularly hopeless at quick action, because so many views have to be heard. |
19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a monarchy, it is not enough to have intermediary ranks; there must also be a body that is a depositary of laws. They must announce the laws when they are made, and recall them to the public's attention when they are forgotten. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
A reaction: This is the crucial difference between a monarch and a despot, because the monarch must be subservient to the law. |
19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a republic ambition is pernicious, but in a monarchy it has a good effect; it gives life to that type of government. Its advantage lies in that it is not dangerous, because a monarchy can continue to restrain it. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.07) | |
A reaction: That is sometimes offered as a defence of the very weak British monarchy. |
19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In monarchies, men's actions are judged, not by whether they are good, but whether they appear attractive [belles]; not by whether they are just, but whether they appear grand; not by whether they are reasonable, but by whether they appear extraordinary. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.02) | |
A reaction: A person that comes to mind is the Duke of Buckingham under James I and Charles I. Or the Earl of Essex under Elizabeth I. |
19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a monarchy, the laws must make the nobility hereditary, not to serve as the boundary between the power of the ruler and the weakness of the people, but as the tie that binds them together.... | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.09) | |
A reaction: This seems rather disingenuous. If the nobility are bound together in some tight manner, this immediately serves as a sharp boundary between them and the rest of the people. Monarchs are bound to want the strict boundary. |
245 | Totalitarian states destroy friendships and community spirit [Plato] |
Full Idea: Excessively authoritarian government destroys all friendship and community of spirit in the state. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 697d) |
19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Under despotism, the law is nothing more than the will of the ruler. Even if the despot were wise, how could a magistrate follow a will unknown to him? He has no choice but to follow his own. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.16) |
19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: A government cannot be unjust without putting some power in the hands of its agents; it is impossible that they not profit from their position. Embezzlement is, therefore, natural to such governments. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.15) |
19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Anyone whom his senses inform continually that he is everything, and others nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant. Hence the establishment of a vizier, with power the same as his own, is a law fundamental to a despotic state. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.05) |
19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: How could a despot permit honour? Honour depends upon scorning life; the despot has power only because he can deprive men of life. How could honour tolerate the despot? Honour has fixed rules, ...but the despot has no rule. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.08) | |
A reaction: The old German aristocracy seem to have been utterly alienated and isolated by the Nazi regime. |
20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: There are two sorts of tyranny: that which is real and consists of the violence of government; and the tyranny of opinion, when those who govern institute things contrary to a nation's mode of thought. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.03) | |
A reaction: By this reckoning the abolition of the death penalty by the UK partliament was tyrannous, as it went against popular enthusiasm for it. Representative democracy is always in danger of drifting towards mild tyranny. |
19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When the nobility is numerous, there must be a senate to regulate those matters which the body of nobles is incapable of deciding. Thus aristocracy of a kind resides in the senate, democracy in the body of nobles, while the people is nothing. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
A reaction: This presumes that the body of nobles elects the senate. |
19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Aristocratic families ought to be, as much as possible, members of the people. The more an aristocracy resembles a democracy, the more perfect it is; the more it resembles a monarchy, the more imperfect. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
A reaction: Aristocrats far from the big cities seem remarkably like the rest of the people. As soon as they approach the monarch's court, they aspire to dignity and power, and begin to spurn the citizens. |
19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In aristocratic state there are two main sources of disorders: excessive inequality between those who govern and those who are governed, and the same degree of inequality among the different members of the ruling group [corps]. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.08) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a very historically accurate observation, since aristocrats are always at one another's throats. But maybe junior aristocrats just need to be kept more firmly in their place. |
19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Government is like everything else in this world: if it is to be preserved, it must first be loved. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.05) | |
A reaction: Nice one! Right now there seems to be a declining love for representative democracy, even though almost everyone endorses it. |
19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In every government there are three sorts of powers: the legislative; the executivem in regard to those matters determined by the laws of nations; and the executive, in regard to those matters determined by civil law. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) |
19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Were the judicial power joined to the legislative, the life and liberty of the citizens would be subject to arbitrary power. For the judge would then be the legislator. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
A reaction: This is the key 'separation of powers', which seems to be a mantra for nearly all theories of the state. |
19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The laws fundamental to a democracy are those that establish who is eligible to vote. (p.118 No less fundamental is the method of voting itself). | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: Tricky groups now are teenagers, convicted criminals, people with damaged brains, and citizens who live abroad. Maybe people who evade paying tax should lose the right to vote. |
19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: A democratic people may be said to have ministers only when these have been named by the people itself. Thus it is a maxim fundamental to this type of government that the people must name its ministers. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: In the UK we don't do this. We elect local representatives, usually of a preferred party, and then they chose the ministers, and even the leader. The people who run our country are a long way from direct democracy. |
19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When the people votes it should do so in public. ...For it is necessary that the lower classes be enlightened by those of higher rank, that the precipitous qualities of the lower classes be held in check by the grave example of certain notables. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: This sounds shocking to us, but the lower classes were largely illiterate. Nowadays we have television to tell us how the notables are going to vote, and the less notables seem to be increasingly unimpressed. |
19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: All citizens ought to have the right to choose their representatives by election. The only exception concerns those whose condition is so base that they are considered to have no will of their own. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
A reaction: This is an amazingly liberal view of the franchise for its time (though he may not be including women), but with a rather breathtaking coda! It may be hard for us now to grasp the very humble state of an illiterate peasant. |
19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a democracy, the people, which holds the sovereign power, ought itself to do everything it can do well; that which it cannot do well must be done by its ministers. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: This is just what you see when a group of residents manages their own building. Citizens in representative democracies become utterly lazy about running their society, so that they won't even pick up litter, or report communal problems. |
19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is essential to fix the number of citizens who can participate in assemblies. Otherwise it would be uncertain whether all the people had spoken, or only a part of it. At Sparta the number was fixed at ten thousand. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: This looks like an immediate injustice to the citizen who came 10,001 in the rankings. 10,000 is just a smallish football crowd, so we could manage it today. We could pick the 10,000 by sortition (by lot). Most people are fairly sensible! |
19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When the deputies represent the body or estate of the people, as in Holland, they ought to be accountable to their constituents. When the deputies represent boroughs, as in England, the situation is not the same. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
A reaction: Not sure how this works. Modern UK MPs are accountable to the residents of their borough. Did the Dutch actually name the citizens that a deputy represented? |
239 | Education in virtue produces citizens who are active but obedient [Plato] |
Full Idea: Education in virtue produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 643e) |
20000 | Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: There is nothing good about the nature of slavery. The slave can achieve nothing by being virtuous. The master acquires all sorts of bad habits, and is accustomed to behaving with a total lack of moral virtues. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.01) | |
A reaction: Most slavery of that time took place in colonies, far remote from the moral judgments of the mother country. The temptations of such power over others are far too great for most masters to live virtuously. |
20003 | Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: What civil law could prevent a slave from running away? Since he is not a member of society, why should the laws of society concern him? | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
A reaction: Hm. Does this apply to children, who can't vote or stand for office? |
20006 | The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The demand for slavery is the demand for luxury and voluptuousness; it has nothing to do with concern for public felicity. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
A reaction: True monarchists and aristocratic elitists presumably think that a society should have one part which lives in great luxury. Where else are the fine arts and wonderful buildings going to come from? |
20009 | Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: If a state is to enjoy and preserve liberty, everyone must be able to say what he thinks. In a free state, therefore, a citizen may speak and write anything not expressly forbidden by the laws. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.27) | |
A reaction: A commonplace now, but fairly bold then. I blame Freeborn John Lilburne for wild ideas like these. |
19994 | Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a society where laws exist, liberty can consist only in being able to do what one ought to will, and in not being contrained to do what one ought not to will. ...If a citizen could do what the law prohibits, all others would have the same power. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.03) | |
A reaction: This sounds pretty quaint in 2017, but I love it. |
1402 | Friendship is impossible between master and slave, even if they are made equal [Plato] |
Full Idea: Even if you proclaim that a master and a slave shall have equal status, friendship between them is inherently impossible. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 757a) |
19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In monarchies and despotic states, no one aspires to equality. Not even the idea occurs; everyone aspires to superiority. People of the very lowest rank only wish to rise in order to become masters of others. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.04) |
19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The spirit of true equality consists, not in creating a situation in which everyone commands, or in which no one is commanded, but rather in obeying or commanding only our equals. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.03) | |
A reaction: I love this idea, but it is so easy to feel superior when you command, or to feel inferior when you are commanded. I take the solution to be the appointment of everyone in authority by those they will command (but fat chance of that). |
262 | Men and women should qualify equally for honours on merit [Plato] |
Full Idea: Men and women who have shown conspicuous merit should qualify for all honours without distinction of sex. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 802a) |
19990 | Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Democracy is corrupted in two ways: when it loses the spirit of equality, and when the spirit of equality becomes extreme, that is, when everyone wishes to be the equal of those he has chosen to command him. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.02) | |
A reaction: The latter seems to be what happens when a referendum is called (as in Brexit 2016). The winners come to despise the elected representatives, if the latter disagree with the outcome. |
19982 | Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Equality is so difficult that exactitude is not possible. It is enough to place citizens by a census within categories that reduce or fix differences. Then laws compensate for inequalities by taxes on the rich and relief given to the poor. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.05) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Placing citizens within categories (e.g. 'nobility') has long gone out of fashion. He doesn't say whether you tax the capital or the income of the rich. |
19983 | Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In some cases, equality among citizens may be denied by democracy for the utility of democracy. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.05) | |
A reaction: He cites people who make sacrifices for the public, and lower orders who are getting above themselves! The desire for equality quickly comes into conflict with other values. |
236 | Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them [Plato] |
Full Idea: Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 631b) |
259 | Justice is granting the equality which unequals deserve [Plato] |
Full Idea: Justice consists of granting the 'equality' which unequals deserve to get. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 757d) | |
A reaction: Beautifully simple, and hard to improve on. It shows the close link between equality and justice, but shows why they are not the same. The main debate about justice concerns the criteria for 'deserving'. |
19959 | Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The relations of equity precede the positive laws that establish them. It is right to conform to laws in a society; intelligent beings should be grateful for benefits; we remain dependent on those who create us; an injury merits the same in return. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.01) | |
A reaction: [the examples are compressed] A nice statement of the idea of natural law. It doesn't follow that because an injury merits retaliation, that it should be implemented (just that no one can complain if it happens). |
19960 | Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Animals have natural laws because they are united by sensation, ...but they do not invariably follow thieir natural laws; these are better observed by vegetables, which have neither knowledge nor sensation. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
A reaction: With the example of vegetables the concept of natural law is drifting into the laws of nature, and evidently Montesquie makes no sharp distinction here. |
20002 | The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is permissible to put a criminal to death because the law that punishes him was made to protect him. For example, a murderer has enjoyed the benefits of the law by which he is condemned. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
A reaction: Dubious! We could add torture, and life imprisonment for parking offences, if this argument is sufficient justification. |
20010 | If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When religion teaches that human actions are predetermined, penalties imposed by law ought to be more severe, for without these measures men would behave with complete abandon. If the dogma of religion is free will, the situation is altogether different. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 24.14) | |
A reaction: Presumably persuasion and influence come into the free will picture. Calvinist Geneva was determinist, and Catholic France for free will. |
20001 | The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: War can confer only one right over captives, and that is to ensure that they no longer harm victors. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
A reaction: He is arguing against both the killing of captives, and their enslavement. |
19973 | The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The power of the clergy is as dangerous in a republic, as it is appropriate to a monarchy. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
A reaction: This makes me look at the UK in a new light, with the clergy hovering around when the monarch is crowned, and the bishops sitting by right in the House of Lords. |
20011 | Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Religion can support the state when the laws themselves lack the power to do so. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 24.16) | |
A reaction: A thought which didn't occur to Spinoza, but then the thought merely confirms that religion offers a rival to the rule of law. |
19987 | Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In these [despotic] states, religion has more influence than anywhere else; it is fear added to fear. The peoples of the Mohammedan empires in part derive from their religion their extraordinary veneration for their rulers. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.14) | |
A reaction: I suppose religions have submission to authority built into them. |
20004 | French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Louis XIII was made extremely uneasy by the law that enslaved all the negroes in his colonies. But when told that this was the most efficacious way of converting them, he gave his consent. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.04) | |
A reaction: That is a spectaculary bad advert for giving an established religion a leading role in society. It is relevant to the upbringing of children, as well as to slaves. |
19979 | In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Just as the purpose of education in monarchies is to ennoble men's hearts, so its purpose in despotic states is to debase them. In despotic states education must be servile. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.03) | |
A reaction: This is an early insight into the way that all social institutions, such as education, are largely pawns of a larger political system. |
260 | Control of education is the key office of state, and should go to the best citizen [Plato] |
Full Idea: The Minister of Education is by far the most important of all the supreme offices of the state; the best all-round citizen in the state should be appointed. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 765e) |
238 | Children's games should channel their pleasures into adult activity [Plato] |
Full Idea: We should use children's games to channel their pleasures and desires towards activities in which they will have to engage when they are adult. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 643c) |
257 | Mathematics has the widest application of any subject on the curriculum [Plato] |
Full Idea: For domestic and public purposes, and all professional skills, no branch of a child's education has as big a range of applications as mathematics. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 747a) |
4331 | Education is channelling a child's feelings into the right course before it understands why [Plato] |
Full Idea: I call 'education' the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, are channelled in the right courses before he can understand the reason why. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 653b) | |
A reaction: A precursor of Aristotle's view (Ethics 1104b11). A profound, simple and important insight. |
250 | The best way to educate the young is not to rebuke them, but to set a good example [Plato] |
Full Idea: The best way to educate the younger generation (as well as yourself) is not to rebuke them but patently to practise all your life what you preach to others. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 729c) |
19957 | Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is when we instruct others that we can best practice that general virtue which teaches us to love everyone. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], Preface) | |
A reaction: A very nice thought. One tricky issue is that some people dislike, and even resent, being taught. If we all just adored both teaching and learning, we would be in a sort of paradise, but it doesn't seem to happen. |
275 | Creation is not for you; you exist for the sake of creation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Creation is not for your benefit; you exist for the sake of the universe. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 903c) |
19958 | Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Laws, in the broadest meaning of the term, are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.01) | |
A reaction: Montesquieu is about to discuss social laws, but this is the clearest statement I have ever met of the essentialist view of the laws of nature. |
273 | Movement is transmitted through everything, and it must have started with self-generated motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: Motion is transmitted to innumerable things, and this must spring from some initial principle, which must be the change effected by self-generated motion. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895a) |
2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for God to be immoral and not to be the acme of morality; and the only way any of us can approximate to God is to become as moral as possible. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176c) |
8004 | In 'The Laws', to obey the law is to be obey god [Plato, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The divine is important in 'The Laws' because it is identified with law; to be obedient before the law is to be obedient before god. | |
From: report of Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Christian conservativism in a nutshell. Plato is rejecting his view in Euthyphro that piety (etc.) must precede the will of the gods. The obvious problem is bad laws, made by corrupt rulers. |
21257 | Self-generating motion is clearly superior to all other kinds of motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: We can't resist the conclusion that the motion which can generate itself is infinitely superior, and all the others are inferior to it. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 894d) | |
A reaction: Who said you can't get values from facts! Not that the argument depends on superiority. There could be an inferior First Mover, as a bus driver is subservient to the passengers, or (my favourite) a head teacher is inferior to the pupils. |
21261 | Self-moving soul has to be the oldest thing there is [Plato] |
Full Idea: Soul, being the source of motion, is the most ancient thing there is. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896b) | |
A reaction: Plato seems to assume that the First Mover must still exist, which doesn't follow from anything in the argument. The First Pusher could be dead before the last domino falls. Why can't activity be the default state of everything? |
21258 | The only possible beginning for the endless motions of reality is something self-generated [Plato] |
Full Idea: When the motion in reality is transmitted to thousands of things one after another, the entire sequence of their movements must surely spring from some initial principle, which can hardly be anything except the change effected by self-generated motion. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895a) | |
A reaction: This gives a domino picture of reality, with all of reality responding inertly to a first kick. Much better is to see self-generated motion in the active qualities of all matter, as seen in the sea of virtual subatomic particles at the smallest level. |
274 | Soul must be the cause of all the opposites, such as good and evil or beauty and ugliness [Plato] |
Full Idea: Soul must be cause of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, and all the opposites. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896d) |
21263 | If all the motions of nature reflect calculations of reason, then the best kind of soul must direct it [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the movement of the heavens and all that is in them reflects the motion and revolution and calculation of reason ...then clearly we have to admit that it is the best kind of soul that cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best path. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 897c) | |
A reaction: Most of this passage reflects the cosmological argument - that without some initiating source natural events could not occur - but this slides into the design argument. So who designed mud (which is too inferior to have a Form)? |
278 | If astronomical movements are seen as necessary instead of by divine will, this leads to atheism [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a man studying astronomy sees events apparently happening by necessity rather than being directed by the intention of a benevolent will, he will turn into an atheist. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 967a) |
21265 | The heavens must be full of gods, controlling nature either externally or from within [Plato] |
Full Idea: A soul or souls have been shown to be cause of all the phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we insist that these souls are gods. So 'everything is full of gods'. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 899b) | |
A reaction: This seems to have little to do with the pagan gods on Olympus. It is also notably not monotheistic. It is somewhere between animism and panpsychism. Does he think the rivers and woods contain gods? Probably not. Just the orderly heavens. |
21262 | There must be at least two souls controlling the cosmos, one doing good, the other the opposite [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be more than one soul (not fewer than two) controlling movement and the heavens: that which does good, and that which has the opposite capacity. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896e) | |
A reaction: [Wording compressed - as often with the dialogues] This idea of controlling opposites is found in Empedocles. Presumably this good soul defers to the Form of the Good, as implied by the Euthyphro Question. |
2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |
Full Idea: The elimination of evil is impossible, Theodorus; there must always be some force ranged against good. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176a) |