12 ideas
| 7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
| Full Idea: There is a convincing claim that we need to leave behind Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that as being too simplistic. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: [John Campbell is mentioned as source of this idea] I find this proposal immediately appealing. I was taught that riding a bicycle shows the division, as hardly anyone knows the theory, but I am sure children need some propositional information. |
| 7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
| Full Idea: Three forms of (cognitive) direct realism are: two stages - non-conceptual sensory experience, then a non-sensory conceptual state; directly acquiring non-sensuous conceptual states; and sensuous states saturated with concepts. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: [First: Reid, Dretske, Evans, Sellars. Second: Armstrong, Heil, Pitcher, Clark. Third: Kant, McDowell, Strawson, McGinn, Searle]. I find the first one plausible, because of the ambiguity in language, and because unusual experiences separate them. |
| 7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
| Full Idea: Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (to serve as foundations on which the edifice of knowledge is to be constructed), and a metaphysical purpose (to provide an accurate account of the phenomenology of perceptual experience). | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This is very important, because there is a real danger (e.g. in Russell) that the epistemological convenience of sense-data for giving reliability in knowledge means that we are too quick in making the assumption that they actually exist. |
| 7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
| Full Idea: The representationalist/intentionalist thesis about perception is that we are not aware of the intrinsic qualities of experience in normal perception; we are instead aware of those objects and their qualities that are specified in the content. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: If secondary qualities are in the mind, not in objects, how come people always thought they were in objects? Answer: because this thesis is right? The primary mode of the mind is projected outwards, though we can introspect about colours. [Dretske] |
| 7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
| Full Idea: The so-called 'myth of the given' is the view that conceptual content can be rationally supported by experiences construed as states with non-conceptual content. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: The myth is attacked by Sellars and McDowell, the latter claiming that concepts must be embedded in the experiences. Maybe only realism is required to make the Given work. The experiences are definitely of something, and off we go... |
| 7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysically, mountains are only adverbial modifications of the Earth's belt. They have no existence independent of being part of the earth. Yet for all that, they have some rather strong 'object'-characteristics. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: The point being that you don't give up all the advantages of a sense-data view if you switch to adverbialism. I'm not convinced by the analogy, but we can only be aware of adverbial qualities if they have causal powers. |
| 7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
| Full Idea: The two primary motivations of the adverbialist analysis are thought to be to avoid commitment to sensory particulars such as sense-data, and to allow us to hold on to a version of direct realism. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: Maund says that the adverbialist's fears about indirect/representative theories are unfounded. My feeling is that neither account will do the job properly once we get a better account of consciousness. Maybe adverbialism is only for secondary qualities. |
| 7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The content of thought can either be expressed as satisfaction conditions (e.g. truth-conditions for beliefs), or as the exercise of at least two concepts. | |
| From: report of Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 8) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: I think I favour the first view, because not all conjunctions of concepts would count as thoughts (e.g. rhubarb-plus-contradiction). A bunch of concepts becomes a thought when it connects in some way to reality? |
| 1590 | The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato] |
| Full Idea: First, Socrates, you told me justice is harming your enemies and helping your friends. But later it seemed that the just man, since everything he does is for someone's benefit, never harms anyone. | |
| From: Plato (Clitophon [c.372 BCE], 410b) | |
| A reaction: Socrates certainly didn't subscribe to the first view, which is the traditional consensus in Greek culture. In general Socrates agreed with the views later promoted by Jesus. |
| 8070 | It would be better to point to failings of character, than to moral wrongness of actions [Anscombe] |
| Full Idea: It would be a great improvement if, instead of 'morally wrong', one always named a genus such as 'untruthful', 'unchaste', or 'unjust'. | |
| From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Modern Moral Philosophy [1958], p.183) | |
| A reaction: People are indeed much more struck by the suggestion that they have a weakness of character, rather than that they have just done something wrong. This is Anscombe's first great appeal for a return to virtue as the basis of ethics. |
| 8065 | 'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe] |
| Full Idea: The moral sense of 'ought' and of what is right should be jettisoned, if possible, because they are survivals from an earlier conception of ethics, and are only harmful without it. | |
| From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Modern Moral Philosophy [1958], p.175) | |
| A reaction: This is part of a revolutionary proposal to return to virtue theory, and has had a great influence (e.g. on me). Richard Taylor gives a good account of how duty lost its social and religious underpinnings. Our duties now seem to be purely contractual. |
| 8069 | Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe] |
| Full Idea: Between Aristotle and us came Christianity, with its law conception of ethics, and Christianity derived its ethical notions from the Torah. | |
| From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Modern Moral Philosophy [1958], p.179) | |
| A reaction: While I am a fan of the primacy of the virtues in ethical thinking, I am doubtful about the complete elimination of laws (e.g. by Particularists). The law teaches us the virtues, and reminds us of them (like speed-limit signs). |