66 ideas
23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
19917 | Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Without mutual help and the cultivation of reason, human beings necessarily live in great misery. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.05) | |
A reaction: A clarion call from a great voice of the Enlightenment. I agree, but in 2017 the rest of western civilization seems to have given up on this ideal. I blame Adorno and Horkheimer. |
23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
20768 | Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: He said that dialectical arguments were like spiderswebs: although they seem to indicate craftsmanlike skill, they are useless. | |
From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.161 | |
A reaction: Useful for the spider, but useless to Ariston. |
14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
19922 | People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The only genuinely free person is one who lives with his entire mind guided solely by reason. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
A reaction: It strikes me as blatantly impossible to be entirely guided by reason. His point is that it is a subservience to reason which is entirely chosen. Why is that different from choosing to be entirely subservient to another person? |
1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
3049 | The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The chief good is to live in perfect indifference to all those things which are of an intermediate character between virtue and vice. | |
From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.2.1 |
3549 | Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Ariston says that rules are useless if you are virtuous, and useless if you are not. | |
From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.4 |
2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
19935 | Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Nature certainly does not create peoples, individuals do, and individuals are only separated into nations by differences of language, law and morality. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.26) | |
A reaction: Quite wrong, I think. How did languages evolve if there were not already distinct peoples? Do ants and bees only form into colonies by individual choice? All social contract theories seem to make Spinoza's assumption. |
19914 | In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Since the universal power of nature is only the power of all individual things together, it follows that each individual thing has the sovereign right to do everything it can do, or the right of each thing extends as far as its determined power extends. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.01) | |
A reaction: A typically ruthless Spinoza idea, very different from the rather ill-founded claims of Locke and Rousseau about the state of nature. |
19915 | Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Each person's natural right is determined not by sound reason but by desire and power. For it is not the case that all men are naturally determined to behave according to the rules and laws of reason | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.03) | |
A reaction: Locke would have been horrified by this. It looks like hopeless unfounded optimism to claim a natural right to anything. Doomed prey can struggle all it likes, but its right to do so seems irrelevant. Yet we see self-evident injustice all the time. |
7487 | Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson] |
Full Idea: For Spinoza the purpose of society was the extension of human awareness. | |
From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.24 | |
A reaction: I like that. Personally I think human understanding is the best aim our lives can have, but I am inclined to see this in rather individualistic terms (despairing of getting others interested in the project!). |
19943 | The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: It is the purpose of the state ...to allow people's minds and bodies to develop in their own way in security and enjoy the free use of reason ...Therefore the true purpose of the state is in fact freedom. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.06) | |
A reaction: The core of Spinoza's political thinking. This strikes me as being as close to communitarianism as to liberalism. |
19930 | Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Either there is no sovereignty nor any right over subjects, or else sovereignty must necessarily extend to everything that might be effective in inducing men to submit to it. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.02) | |
A reaction: In the seventeenth century this usually includes the death penalty. Refusal to submit may be fairly passive and harmless, so the issue must concern duties, rather than rights. Taxes, jury duty, calls to arms. |
19936 | Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: As soon as the kings took control [of the Hebrews] the reason for going to war was no longer peace and liberty but rather glory, | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.05) | |
A reaction: As Spinoza was writing, Louis XIV had just invaded Holland, solely in quest of military glory. As soon as a leader like Napoleon discovers they are good at war, I assume that the thrill of glory takes over for them too. |
19937 | Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Monarchical minds are always proud, and cannot back down without feelings of humiliation. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.05) | |
A reaction: This would seem to be a problem in all politicians. As I teacher I found that backing down was sometimes quite a smart move, but you can only do it occasionally. |
19940 | Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: It is dangerous to depose a monarch, even if it is clear by every criterion that he is a tyrant. A people accustomed to royal authority and held in check only by it, will despise any lesser authority and hold it in contempt. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.07) | |
A reaction: He is obviously thinking of Charles I and Cromwell. I suspect that the respect for Cromwell in the 1650s was only as a great soldier. If the people miss royal authority, the correct response is probably 'get over it!' |
19931 | Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: People have never succeeded in devising a form of government that was not in greater danger from its own citizens than from foreign foes, and which was not more fearful of the former than of the latter. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.04) | |
A reaction: The sort of lovely clear-headed and accurate observation for which we love Spinoza. Only very powerful despots can afford to ignore the threat from the people. Stalin was paranoid, but eventually murdered almost everyone who seemed a threat. |
19920 | Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Democracy is properly defined as a united gathering of people which collectively has the sovereign right to do all that it has the power to do. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.08) | |
A reaction: Representative democracy doesn't fit this definition. What 'unites' the people, and where do they get their sovereign right? If my neighbouring village votes to invade mine, I spurn their pathetic 'sovereign right'. |
19933 | If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: [In the first Hebrew state] religious dogmas were not doctrines but rather laws and decrees, piety being regarded as justice and impiety as crime. Anyone who defected from this religion ceased to be a citizen. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.08) | |
A reaction: Presumably speeding offences count as impiety, and failing to pray is a crime. A critical question will be how far religious doubts must extend before one actually has to leave. Mere doctrinal differences, or full atheism? |
19938 | Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: How pernicious it is both for religion and the state to allow ministers of things sacred to acquire the right to make decrees or handle the business of government. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.06 (1)) | |
A reaction: Interesting that he holds it to be bad for the religion as well as the state. In Britain we have bishops in the House of Lords. |
19923 | Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: It is not acting on command in itself that makes someone a slave, but rather the reason for so acting. ...A slave is someone obliged to obey commands from a master which look only to the advantage of the master. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
A reaction: So if I forcibly enslaved you, and then only commanded things which were for your own good, that would not be slavery? If the master feeds the slave, is that not part of the slavery? Most jobs might count as slavery by this account? |
19939 | Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Government is bound to become extremely oppressive where dissident opinions which are within the domain of each individual, a right which no one can give up, are treated as a crime. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.06 (2)) | |
A reaction: One might compare illicit desires, such as those of a paedophile, where it is a crime to act on them, but presumably they cannot be given up, so there is no point in legislating against the mere desires. |
19944 | Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: If liberty of thought is suppressed ...this would undemine the trust which is the first essential of a state; detestable flattery and deceit would flourish, giving rise to intrigues and every sort of honest behaviour. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.11) | |
A reaction: Spinoza specifically defends philosophy, as the epitome of freedom of thought. |
19942 | Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: We cannot altogether deny that treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.05) | |
A reaction: For example, betraying a major state secret. This is an important idea, for anyone who simplistically demands utter freedom of speech. There is also subversive speech, which is very hard to assess. Incitements can be crimes in Britain. |
19924 | The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The freest state is that whose laws are founded on sound reason; for there each man can be free whenever he wishes, that is, he can live under the guidance of reason with his whole mind. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
A reaction: I wonder if is not so much that the state is rational as that it is right. Freedom is submission to the truth. Rationality is only good because it arrives at truth. But is there a 'truth' about how a state should be run? Enlightenment optimism. |
7827 | Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Spinoza's advocacy of democracy on the basis of individual rights was extraordinarily bold for its time, and it qualifies him as the first truly modern political philosopher. | |
From: comment on Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch. 6 | |
A reaction: Sounds right. Hobbes may have been the 'first modern man', but his politics was fairly medieval. John Lilburne and co. may have campaigned for rights and democracy, but they weren't really philosophers. |
19926 | The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: No offence can be committed against subjects by sovereigns, since they are of right permitted to do all things., and therefore offences occur only between private persons obliged by law not to harm one another. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.14) | |
A reaction: This slightly alarming remark is the consequence of Spinoza's denial of natural rights. Nowadays we have international law to appeal to. Locke thinks revolution could be justified, but this implies the Spinoza does not? |
19918 | Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: People had to make a firm decision to decide everything by the sole dictates of reason (which no one dares contradict openly). They had to curb their appetites if it would hurt someone else, and not do to others what they did not want done to themselves. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.05) | |
A reaction: The last bit invokes the Golden Rule. Being in society does indeed meaning curbing appetites, such as envy and lust. |
19919 | People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: No one will give up his right to all things, and absolutely no one will keep his promises, except from fear of a greater ill or hope of a greater good. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.06) | |
A reaction: I think Locke and Rousseau would agree with this. It is hard to imagine doing anything other than in hope of a greater good. But what to do when your hopes are disappointed? |
19921 | Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: If people had wanted to keep any right for themselves, they should have made this provision at the same time as they could have safely defended it. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.08) | |
A reaction: Spinoza is wonderful for grasping nettles. The other fans of social contracts seem blithely cheerful about how it is going to work out. But forming a society is like marriage - a risky commitment which could go horribly wrong. |
19925 | In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: In a democracy no one transfers their natural right to another in such a way that they are not thereafter consulted, but rather to the majority of the whole society of which they are part. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.11) | |
A reaction: At this time democracy means Athenian direct democracy. In representative democracy you are only consulted once every few years, and in between the government can ignore the people (as Rousseau pointed out). |
19928 | No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: No one will ever be able to transfer his power and (consequently) his right to another person in such a way that he ceases to be a human being. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.01) | |
A reaction: Spinoza disdains natural rights, but this is a modest (and pretty uncontroversial) concession. |
19929 | Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: People have never given up their right and transferred their power to another in such a way that they did not fear the very persons who received their right and power, and put the government at greater risk from its own citizens than from its enemies. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.01) | |
A reaction: I take this idea to be Rousseau's key motivation for the idea of the general will, because you are there supposed to be alienating your natural rights to yourself (sort of). In a democracy you alienate them partly to yourself. |
19932 | The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The Hebrews being in this natural state, they resolved, on the advice of Moses in whom they all had the greatest trust, to transfer their right to no mortal man but rather to God alone. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.07) | |
A reaction: [He cites Exodus 24:7] He calls this the first Hebrew state, which seems to have depended heavily on Moses. Priests and prophets become crucial in this situation, and they may be in conflict about God's commands. |
19916 | The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The order of nature, under which all human beings are born and for the most part live, prohibits nothing but what no one desires or no one can do; it does not prohibit strife or hatred or anger or anything at all that appetite foments. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.04) | |
A reaction: This is as vigorous a rejection of natural law as I have met with. It is hard to see on what grounds anyone could disagree, other than hopeful sentiment. |
19927 | State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: No one would be obliged by law if he considered it against his faith, and everyone could claim licence to do anything. Since the law of the state would then be wholly violated, it follows that the right of deciding about religion belongs to the sovereign. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.21) | |
A reaction: This is an era when British puritans emigrate to America, because the state is not sufficiently tolerant. The needs of sovereignty and of religion can be very far apart. You can see those with great religious devotion not liking this idea. |
1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |
19934 | Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Having transferred their right to God, the Hebrews believed their kingdom was the kingdom of God, that they alone were the children of God, and that other nations were enemies of God, whom for that reason they regarded with extreme hostility. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.23) | |
A reaction: [He cites Psalm 139:21-2] So, according to Spinoza, they did not become the chosen people because they thought God had chosen then, but because they were the only state trying to align itself with God. |
4300 | The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The Bible leaves reason absolutely free and has nothing in common with philosophy. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) | |
A reaction: Hm. The Bible may not contain reasoning, but it contains the fruits of reasoning, and it is obviously possible for reasoning to contradict its message. |