87 ideas
| 23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
| A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
| 3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
| 23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
| A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
| 14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
| A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
| 17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
| 3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
| 20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
| A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
| 556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
| 563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
| 557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
| 565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
| 9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
| Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
| 13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
| A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
| 13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
| 13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
| A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
| 593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
| 13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
| A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
| 11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
| 11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
| 17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
| Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
| A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
| 1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
| A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
| 3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
| A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
| 7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
| Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
| A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
| 4366 | We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Williams has expressed pessimism about the project of Aristotelian naturalism on the grounds that his conception of nature, and thereby of human nature, was normative, and that, in a scientific age, this is not a conception that we can take on board. | |
| From: report of Bernard Williams (works [1971]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.11 | |
| A reaction: I think there is a compromise here. The existentialist denial of intrinsic human nature seems daft, but Aristotelians must grasp the enormous flexibility that is possible to human behaviour because of the open nature of rationality. |
| 2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
| A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
| 19956 | True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The good man is he whose goodness is not Christian, but rather political, in the sense I have given. Such a man loves the laws of his land and is moved to act by them. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I take this to have a lot in common with Aristotle, whose simple slogan for virtue I take to as 'be a good citizen'. |
| 9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
| Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
| A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
| 94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
| A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
| 17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
| A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
| 6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
| Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
| A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
| 2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
| 19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: A being concerned only with preservation would be very timid. In such a state every man would feel himself an inferior; he could scarcely imagine himself an equal. No one would seek to attack anyone else; peace would be the first law of nature. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
| A reaction: Exactly the idea that Rousseau took up, and they both attack Hobbes for describing a more advanced stage of society, instead of focusing on the original state. A solitary individual would be crazy to launch attacks on other individuals. |
| 19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: It is unreasonable to impute to men, as Hobbes does, the desire to subjugate one another. The idea of sovereignty [l'empire] and domination is so complex and depends on so many other ideas, that it could not be the first to occur to men. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) |
| 19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: To his sense of weakness, man would soon add his needs. Encouraged by indications that their fear was shared, men would soon come together. They would feel the pleasure (and sexual attraction) of their own species. Knowledge then draws them into society. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
| A reaction: He doesn't make the point about 'knowledge' very clear. |
| 20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Men are ruled by many causes: climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, examples drawn from the pasts, customs, manners. Out of them is formed the general spirit of a nation. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.04) | |
| A reaction: This is one step away from Rousseau's general will, which is an attempt to give precise expression to this 'spirit of a nation'. |
| 19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a small republic, the public good is more keenly felt, better known, closer to every citizen; abuses are spread less widely, and consequently, are less tolerated. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) | |
| A reaction: This idea of very small republics now seems outdated, but this idea still applies. Small states like the Baltic States (or Scotland?) have a better chance of the citizens identifying with the whole community. |
| 19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a large republic, there are large fortunes, and therefore but little moderation in the minds of men. its resources are too considerable to be entrusted to a citizen. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) |
| 20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: I do not believe that anyone of [that small part of a nation that is rich and voluptuous] would submit to a lottery determining which part of the nation would be free, and which slave. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
| A reaction: Wonderful! This is exactly Rawls's 'initial position' and 'veil of ignorance'. It is used here to deconstruct implausible arguments in favour of slavery. |
| 19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Although all states share the same general objective, to preserve themselves, each has its own particular purpose (such as aggrandisement, war, religion, commerce, tranquillity, navigation, liberty, pleasures of the ruler, glory, individual independence). | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.05) | |
| A reaction: [he gives examples for each of the list in brackets] I'm trying to think of the distinctive purpose of the UK, and can't get beyond sport, music gigs and comedy shows. |
| 19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Some have thought that because nature has established the power of the parent, the most natural government is that of a single person. But the example of paternal power proves nothing. The inheritance by a father's brothers would support rule by the many. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.03) | |
| A reaction: [last bit compressed] Locke pointed out that the mother has similar entitlement, and he and Rousseau agree in rejecting this idea. |
| 19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Monarchical government has the great advantage that, since public business is guided by a single person, the executive power can operate more speedily. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.10) | |
| A reaction: Liberal democracies are particularly hopeless at quick action, because so many views have to be heard. |
| 19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a sense, nobility is one part of the essence of monarchy, whose fundamenta maxim is: 'without a monarchy, no nobility; without a nobility, no monarchy'. There are, of course, despots, but they are something else. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
| A reaction: Hence the worst vice associated with a monarchy is patronage, even when the monarch is weak and 'constitutional'. |
| 19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a monarchy, it is not enough to have intermediary ranks; there must also be a body that is a depositary of laws. They must announce the laws when they are made, and recall them to the public's attention when they are forgotten. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
| A reaction: This is the crucial difference between a monarch and a despot, because the monarch must be subservient to the law. |
| 19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a republic ambition is pernicious, but in a monarchy it has a good effect; it gives life to that type of government. Its advantage lies in that it is not dangerous, because a monarchy can continue to restrain it. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.07) | |
| A reaction: That is sometimes offered as a defence of the very weak British monarchy. |
| 19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In monarchies, men's actions are judged, not by whether they are good, but whether they appear attractive [belles]; not by whether they are just, but whether they appear grand; not by whether they are reasonable, but by whether they appear extraordinary. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.02) | |
| A reaction: A person that comes to mind is the Duke of Buckingham under James I and Charles I. Or the Earl of Essex under Elizabeth I. |
| 19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a monarchy, the laws must make the nobility hereditary, not to serve as the boundary between the power of the ruler and the weakness of the people, but as the tie that binds them together.... | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.09) | |
| A reaction: This seems rather disingenuous. If the nobility are bound together in some tight manner, this immediately serves as a sharp boundary between them and the rest of the people. Monarchs are bound to want the strict boundary. |
| 19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: A government cannot be unjust without putting some power in the hands of its agents; it is impossible that they not profit from their position. Embezzlement is, therefore, natural to such governments. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.15) |
| 19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: How could a despot permit honour? Honour depends upon scorning life; the despot has power only because he can deprive men of life. How could honour tolerate the despot? Honour has fixed rules, ...but the despot has no rule. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.08) | |
| A reaction: The old German aristocracy seem to have been utterly alienated and isolated by the Nazi regime. |
| 20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: There are two sorts of tyranny: that which is real and consists of the violence of government; and the tyranny of opinion, when those who govern institute things contrary to a nation's mode of thought. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.03) | |
| A reaction: By this reckoning the abolition of the death penalty by the UK partliament was tyrannous, as it went against popular enthusiasm for it. Representative democracy is always in danger of drifting towards mild tyranny. |
| 19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Anyone whom his senses inform continually that he is everything, and others nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant. Hence the establishment of a vizier, with power the same as his own, is a law fundamental to a despotic state. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.05) |
| 19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Under despotism, the law is nothing more than the will of the ruler. Even if the despot were wise, how could a magistrate follow a will unknown to him? He has no choice but to follow his own. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.16) |
| 19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When the nobility is numerous, there must be a senate to regulate those matters which the body of nobles is incapable of deciding. Thus aristocracy of a kind resides in the senate, democracy in the body of nobles, while the people is nothing. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
| A reaction: This presumes that the body of nobles elects the senate. |
| 19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Aristocratic families ought to be, as much as possible, members of the people. The more an aristocracy resembles a democracy, the more perfect it is; the more it resembles a monarchy, the more imperfect. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
| A reaction: Aristocrats far from the big cities seem remarkably like the rest of the people. As soon as they approach the monarch's court, they aspire to dignity and power, and begin to spurn the citizens. |
| 19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In aristocratic state there are two main sources of disorders: excessive inequality between those who govern and those who are governed, and the same degree of inequality among the different members of the ruling group [corps]. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.08) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a very historically accurate observation, since aristocrats are always at one another's throats. But maybe junior aristocrats just need to be kept more firmly in their place. |
| 19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Government is like everything else in this world: if it is to be preserved, it must first be loved. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.05) | |
| A reaction: Nice one! Right now there seems to be a declining love for representative democracy, even though almost everyone endorses it. |
| 19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In every government there are three sorts of powers: the legislative; the executivem in regard to those matters determined by the laws of nations; and the executive, in regard to those matters determined by civil law. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) |
| 19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Were the judicial power joined to the legislative, the life and liberty of the citizens would be subject to arbitrary power. For the judge would then be the legislator. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
| A reaction: This is the key 'separation of powers', which seems to be a mantra for nearly all theories of the state. |
| 19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The laws fundamental to a democracy are those that establish who is eligible to vote. (p.118 No less fundamental is the method of voting itself). | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: Tricky groups now are teenagers, convicted criminals, people with damaged brains, and citizens who live abroad. Maybe people who evade paying tax should lose the right to vote. |
| 19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: A democratic people may be said to have ministers only when these have been named by the people itself. Thus it is a maxim fundamental to this type of government that the people must name its ministers. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: In the UK we don't do this. We elect local representatives, usually of a preferred party, and then they chose the ministers, and even the leader. The people who run our country are a long way from direct democracy. |
| 19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When the people votes it should do so in public. ...For it is necessary that the lower classes be enlightened by those of higher rank, that the precipitous qualities of the lower classes be held in check by the grave example of certain notables. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: This sounds shocking to us, but the lower classes were largely illiterate. Nowadays we have television to tell us how the notables are going to vote, and the less notables seem to be increasingly unimpressed. |
| 19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: All citizens ought to have the right to choose their representatives by election. The only exception concerns those whose condition is so base that they are considered to have no will of their own. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
| A reaction: This is an amazingly liberal view of the franchise for its time (though he may not be including women), but with a rather breathtaking coda! It may be hard for us now to grasp the very humble state of an illiterate peasant. |
| 19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a democracy, the people, which holds the sovereign power, ought itself to do everything it can do well; that which it cannot do well must be done by its ministers. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: This is just what you see when a group of residents manages their own building. Citizens in representative democracies become utterly lazy about running their society, so that they won't even pick up litter, or report communal problems. |
| 19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: It is essential to fix the number of citizens who can participate in assemblies. Otherwise it would be uncertain whether all the people had spoken, or only a part of it. At Sparta the number was fixed at ten thousand. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: This looks like an immediate injustice to the citizen who came 10,001 in the rankings. 10,000 is just a smallish football crowd, so we could manage it today. We could pick the 10,000 by sortition (by lot). Most people are fairly sensible! |
| 19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When the deputies represent the body or estate of the people, as in Holland, they ought to be accountable to their constituents. When the deputies represent boroughs, as in England, the situation is not the same. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
| A reaction: Not sure how this works. Modern UK MPs are accountable to the residents of their borough. Did the Dutch actually name the citizens that a deputy represented? |
| 20003 | Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: What civil law could prevent a slave from running away? Since he is not a member of society, why should the laws of society concern him? | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
| A reaction: Hm. Does this apply to children, who can't vote or stand for office? |
| 20000 | Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: There is nothing good about the nature of slavery. The slave can achieve nothing by being virtuous. The master acquires all sorts of bad habits, and is accustomed to behaving with a total lack of moral virtues. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.01) | |
| A reaction: Most slavery of that time took place in colonies, far remote from the moral judgments of the mother country. The temptations of such power over others are far too great for most masters to live virtuously. |
| 20006 | The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The demand for slavery is the demand for luxury and voluptuousness; it has nothing to do with concern for public felicity. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
| A reaction: True monarchists and aristocratic elitists presumably think that a society should have one part which lives in great luxury. Where else are the fine arts and wonderful buildings going to come from? |
| 20009 | Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: If a state is to enjoy and preserve liberty, everyone must be able to say what he thinks. In a free state, therefore, a citizen may speak and write anything not expressly forbidden by the laws. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.27) | |
| A reaction: A commonplace now, but fairly bold then. I blame Freeborn John Lilburne for wild ideas like these. |
| 19994 | Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a society where laws exist, liberty can consist only in being able to do what one ought to will, and in not being contrained to do what one ought not to will. ...If a citizen could do what the law prohibits, all others would have the same power. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.03) | |
| A reaction: This sounds pretty quaint in 2017, but I love it. |
| 19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In monarchies and despotic states, no one aspires to equality. Not even the idea occurs; everyone aspires to superiority. People of the very lowest rank only wish to rise in order to become masters of others. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.04) |
| 19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The spirit of true equality consists, not in creating a situation in which everyone commands, or in which no one is commanded, but rather in obeying or commanding only our equals. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.03) | |
| A reaction: I love this idea, but it is so easy to feel superior when you command, or to feel inferior when you are commanded. I take the solution to be the appointment of everyone in authority by those they will command (but fat chance of that). |
| 19990 | Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Democracy is corrupted in two ways: when it loses the spirit of equality, and when the spirit of equality becomes extreme, that is, when everyone wishes to be the equal of those he has chosen to command him. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.02) | |
| A reaction: The latter seems to be what happens when a referendum is called (as in Brexit 2016). The winners come to despise the elected representatives, if the latter disagree with the outcome. |
| 19982 | Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Equality is so difficult that exactitude is not possible. It is enough to place citizens by a census within categories that reduce or fix differences. Then laws compensate for inequalities by taxes on the rich and relief given to the poor. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.05) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Placing citizens within categories (e.g. 'nobility') has long gone out of fashion. He doesn't say whether you tax the capital or the income of the rich. |
| 19983 | Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In some cases, equality among citizens may be denied by democracy for the utility of democracy. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.05) | |
| A reaction: He cites people who make sacrifices for the public, and lower orders who are getting above themselves! The desire for equality quickly comes into conflict with other values. |
| 19959 | Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The relations of equity precede the positive laws that establish them. It is right to conform to laws in a society; intelligent beings should be grateful for benefits; we remain dependent on those who create us; an injury merits the same in return. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.01) | |
| A reaction: [the examples are compressed] A nice statement of the idea of natural law. It doesn't follow that because an injury merits retaliation, that it should be implemented (just that no one can complain if it happens). |
| 19960 | Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Animals have natural laws because they are united by sensation, ...but they do not invariably follow thieir natural laws; these are better observed by vegetables, which have neither knowledge nor sensation. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
| A reaction: With the example of vegetables the concept of natural law is drifting into the laws of nature, and evidently Montesquie makes no sharp distinction here. |
| 20002 | The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: It is permissible to put a criminal to death because the law that punishes him was made to protect him. For example, a murderer has enjoyed the benefits of the law by which he is condemned. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
| A reaction: Dubious! We could add torture, and life imprisonment for parking offences, if this argument is sufficient justification. |
| 20010 | If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When religion teaches that human actions are predetermined, penalties imposed by law ought to be more severe, for without these measures men would behave with complete abandon. If the dogma of religion is free will, the situation is altogether different. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 24.14) | |
| A reaction: Presumably persuasion and influence come into the free will picture. Calvinist Geneva was determinist, and Catholic France for free will. |
| 20001 | The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: War can confer only one right over captives, and that is to ensure that they no longer harm victors. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
| A reaction: He is arguing against both the killing of captives, and their enslavement. |
| 19973 | The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The power of the clergy is as dangerous in a republic, as it is appropriate to a monarchy. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
| A reaction: This makes me look at the UK in a new light, with the clergy hovering around when the monarch is crowned, and the bishops sitting by right in the House of Lords. |
| 19987 | Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In these [despotic] states, religion has more influence than anywhere else; it is fear added to fear. The peoples of the Mohammedan empires in part derive from their religion their extraordinary veneration for their rulers. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.14) | |
| A reaction: I suppose religions have submission to authority built into them. |
| 20011 | Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Religion can support the state when the laws themselves lack the power to do so. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 24.16) | |
| A reaction: A thought which didn't occur to Spinoza, but then the thought merely confirms that religion offers a rival to the rule of law. |
| 20004 | French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Louis XIII was made extremely uneasy by the law that enslaved all the negroes in his colonies. But when told that this was the most efficacious way of converting them, he gave his consent. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.04) | |
| A reaction: That is a spectaculary bad advert for giving an established religion a leading role in society. It is relevant to the upbringing of children, as well as to slaves. |
| 19979 | In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Just as the purpose of education in monarchies is to ennoble men's hearts, so its purpose in despotic states is to debase them. In despotic states education must be servile. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.03) | |
| A reaction: This is an early insight into the way that all social institutions, such as education, are largely pawns of a larger political system. |
| 19957 | Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: It is when we instruct others that we can best practice that general virtue which teaches us to love everyone. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], Preface) | |
| A reaction: A very nice thought. One tricky issue is that some people dislike, and even resent, being taught. If we all just adored both teaching and learning, we would be in a sort of paradise, but it doesn't seem to happen. |
| 19958 | Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Laws, in the broadest meaning of the term, are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.01) | |
| A reaction: Montesquieu is about to discuss social laws, but this is the clearest statement I have ever met of the essentialist view of the laws of nature. |
| 1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |