Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Protagoras', 'Introduction to 'Modality'' and 'Philosophy and the Nature of Language'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
     Full Idea: To everything that admits of a contrary there is one contrary and no more.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 332c)
     A reaction: The sort of thing for which a modern philosopher would demand a proof (and then reject when the proof couldn't be found), where a Greek is happy to assert it as self-evident. I can't think of a counterexample.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: If 'the Queen of England' is not a referring expression when there is no queen, nor can it be one when there is a queen - since the meaning of the expression is the same in either case.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.1)
     A reaction: I'm not convinced. Does this mean that since I can point with my finger at nothing, I therefore do not indicate anything when there is an object at which I am pointing. Sounds silly to me.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: If our most basic concepts, like time, space, substance or causality, are not shared by some peoples, it puts paid to the cherished ideal of philosophers to discover a set of concepts or categories which any rational human must employ in his thinking.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2)
     A reaction: This seems to be a place where a priori philosophy (Aristotle,Kant,Hegel) meets empirical research (Whorf). However, interpreting the research is so fraught with problems it drives you back to the a priori…
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
     Full Idea: If someone asked me 'Is justice itself just or unjust?' I should answer that it was just, wouldn't you? I agree.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 330c)
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Maybe modal thought is unavoidable, as a priori recognition of necessary truth-preservation in reasoning [Hale/Hoffmann,A]
     Full Idea: There are 'transcendental' arguments saying that modal thought is unavoidable - recognition, a priori, of the necessarily truth-preserving character of some forms of inference is a precondition for rational thought in general, and scientific theorizing.
     From: Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann (Introduction to 'Modality' [2010], 1)
     A reaction: So the debate about the status of logical truths and valid inference, are partly debates about whether out thought has to involve modality, or whether it could just be about the actual world. I take possibilities and necssities to be features of nature.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: It would be shameful indeed to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful forces in human activity.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 352d)
     A reaction: He lumps wisdom and knowledge together, and I think we can take 'knowledge' to mean something like understanding, because obviously mere atomistic propositional knowledge can be utterly trivial.
The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only real kind of faring ill is the loss of knowledge.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 345b)
     A reaction: This must crucially involve the intellectualist view (of Socrates) that virtuos behaviour results from knowledge, and moral wickedness is the result of ignorance. It is hard to see how forgetting a phone number is evil.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: If it is claimed that linguistic differences significantly correlate with cultural differences, it must therefore be possible to identify the linguistic differences independently from the cultural ones.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.1)
     A reaction: This is a basic objection to any extreme relativist version of the S-P hypothesis. They are part of the conspiracy to overemphasise language in philosophy, and they are wrong.
A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: It would be absurd to say the Hopi lack the concept of time because they lack tensed verbs, ..but how do we find out what a man's concepts are except in terms of his language?
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2)
     A reaction: Presumably we should look at animals, where concepts must be inferred in order to explain behaviour. I don't see why introspection (scientifically wicked) should not also be employed to detect our own non-verbal concepts. How are new words invented?
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
     Full Idea: Everything resembles everything else up to a point.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 331d)
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.3)
     A reaction: Yet another telling objection to behaviourism. When I look at broccoli I may have a disposition to be sick, but that isn't part of the concept of broccoli.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: It is not meaningless for me to postulate the potential for humans to sense in a manner which is at present unimaginable and indescribable. There is no reason to believe me, but I might be right.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1)
     A reaction: The key counterexample to verificationist theories of meaning is wild speculations, which are clearly meaningful, though frequently far beyond any likely human experience. Logical positivists are allergic to imagination.
The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: It seems that the positivists must admit that there is at least one statement which is meaningful, but which is neither verifiable nor analytic - namely, the statement of the principle of verification itself.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1)
     A reaction: Some people think this objection is decisive, but I think any theory must be permitted a few metatheoretic assertions or axioms which are beyond discussion. Ayer thought the VP might be treated as analytic. Everyone has to start somewhere.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4)
     A reaction: Personally I find examples like this decisive against the 'use' theory of meaning. Maybe the defence is that the theory works for sentences, and individual words (like passwords) are peripheral.
'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: The sentence 'How now brown cow?' has its use in elocutions classes, yet this aspect of its use tells us nothing about its meaning.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4)
     A reaction: Indeed, and also there are weird sentence of which we can assemble a meaning, but cannot think of any conceivable use ('rats swim in purple marmalade').
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.2)
     A reaction: Sounds right. If the basic scenario is picking someone out in a crowd, your listener may think they know which person you are talking about, with a high degree of probability.
Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: Any thesis about reference is also going to be a thesis about what there is in existence to refer to.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4)
     A reaction: I see the point, but we must not put the cart before the horse. I may have an intuition that something exists, but not know how to refer to it (because of my small vocabulary).
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: If predicates are names of entities, then subject/predicate sentences are pairs of names, since subjects are names (or referring expressions). But a pair of names is not a sentence at all, it is a mere list.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.4)
     A reaction: If that is meant to demolish universals it is too quick. Concatenating names is not the same as listing them. A relationship is asserted. There is a (mysterious) Platonic 'partaking' between form and particular. Perhaps.
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: The definition of analytic truth which has, I believe, the most chance of success is one in terms of synonymy; ..an analytic truth is one which can be transformed into a logical truth once synonyms are replaced by synonyms.
     From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §7.1)
     A reaction: Sounds promising, though there is Quine's notorious problem of circularity in all these concepts. If synonymy is conventional, then so is analyticity. I personally feel that the circle can be broken.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
     Full Idea: Knowledge of what is and is not to be feared is courage.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 360d)
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
     Full Idea: No one willingly goes to meet evil, or what he thinks is evil.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 358d)
     A reaction: Presumably people who actively choose satanism can override this deep-seated attitude. But their adherence to evil usually seems to be rather restrained. A danger of tautology with ideas like this.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
     Full Idea: 'Do you mean by good those things that are beneficial to men?' 'Not only those. I call some things which are not beneficial good as well'.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 333e)
     A reaction: Examples needed, but this would be bad news for utilitarians. Good health is not seen as beneficial if it is taken for granted. Not being deaf.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
     Full Idea: There are some pleasures which are not good, and some pains which are not evil.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 351d)
     A reaction: Sadism and child birth. Though Bentham (I think) says that there is nothing good about the pain, since the event would obviously be better without it.
People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only reason the common man disapproves of pleasures is if they lead to pain and deprive us of future pleasures.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 354a)
     A reaction: Plato has a strong sense that some pleasures are just innately depraved and wicked. If those pleasure don't hurt anyone, it is very hard to pinpoint what is wrong with them.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates: I do not believe that virtue can be taught.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 320b)
Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates is contradicting himself by saying virtue is not teachable, and yet trying to demonstrate that every virtue is knowledge.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 361b)
If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]
     Full Idea: Athenians inflict punishment on wrong-doers, which shows that they too think it possible to impart and teach goodness.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 324c)