Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Clitophon', 'Introduction to 'Modality'' and 'The Language of Morals'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience

16050	The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare]
	Full Idea: Characteristic of value-words is that they name 'supervenient' properties. If we are discussing whether a picture is a good picture, ..and there is another picture that is a replica of it, we cannot say 'they are alike, but one is good and the other not'.
	From: Richard M. Hare (The Language of Morals [1952], 5.2)
	A reaction: [compressed] Horgan says this is the passage which introduced 'supervenience' into contemporary discussions. I think the best simple word for it is that the goodness of the picture 'tracks' its physical characteristics. It also depend on them.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality

14528	Maybe modal thought is unavoidable, as a priori recognition of necessary truth-preservation in reasoning [Hale/Hoffmann,A]
	Full Idea: There are 'transcendental' arguments saying that modal thought is unavoidable - recognition, a priori, of the necessarily truth-preserving character of some forms of inference is a precondition for rational thought in general, and scientific theorizing.
	From: Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann (Introduction to 'Modality' [2010], 1)
	A reaction: So the debate about the status of logical truths and valid inference, are partly debates about whether out thought has to involve modality, or whether it could just be about the actual world. I take possibilities and necssities to be features of nature.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism

2855	In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
	Full Idea: Hare says words are secondarily evaluative (e.g. 'soft-hearted') if prescriptive meaning varies but description is constant; primarily evaluative words ('good', 'right', 'ought') are the opposite, with the descriptive content varying.
	From: report of Richard M. Hare (The Language of Morals [1952]) by Brad W. Hooker - Prescriptivism p.640
	A reaction: I would have thought that the prescriptive meaning of the evaluative word could at least vary in strength. You really, really ought to do that.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism

1590	The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato]
	Full Idea: First, Socrates, you told me justice is harming your enemies and helping your friends. But later it seemed that the just man, since everything he does is for someone's benefit, never harms anyone.
	From: Plato (Clitophon [c.372 BCE], 410b)
	A reaction: Socrates certainly didn't subscribe to the first view, which is the traditional consensus in Greek culture. In general Socrates agreed with the views later promoted by Jesus.