Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Protagoras', 'Prescriptivism' and 'The World'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
     Full Idea: To everything that admits of a contrary there is one contrary and no more.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 332c)
     A reaction: The sort of thing for which a modern philosopher would demand a proof (and then reject when the proof couldn't be found), where a Greek is happy to assert it as self-evident. I can't think of a counterexample.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
     Full Idea: If someone asked me 'Is justice itself just or unjust?' I should answer that it was just, wouldn't you? I agree.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 330c)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only real kind of faring ill is the loss of knowledge.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 345b)
     A reaction: This must crucially involve the intellectualist view (of Socrates) that virtuos behaviour results from knowledge, and moral wickedness is the result of ignorance. It is hard to see how forgetting a phone number is evil.
The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: It would be shameful indeed to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful forces in human activity.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 352d)
     A reaction: He lumps wisdom and knowledge together, and I think we can take 'knowledge' to mean something like understanding, because obviously mere atomistic propositional knowledge can be utterly trivial.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes]
     Full Idea: There can be a difference between our sensation of light and what is in the objects that produce that sensation in us.
     From: René Descartes (The World [1631]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 1
     A reaction: Note only that they 'may' differ, and that he does not assert that they are entirely different. Secondary qualities give information, and are not just mental events.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
     Full Idea: Everything resembles everything else up to a point.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 331d)
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
     Full Idea: Knowledge of what is and is not to be feared is courage.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 360d)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
     Full Idea: Prescriptivism holds that if you think one 'ought' to do a certain kind of act, and yet you are not committed to doing that act in the relevant circumstances, then you either spoke insincerely, or are using the word 'ought' in a weak sense.
     From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)
     A reaction: So that's an 'ought', but not a 'genuine ought', then? (No True Scotsman move). Someone ought to rescue that drowning child, but I can't be bothered.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
     Full Idea: No one willingly goes to meet evil, or what he thinks is evil.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 358d)
     A reaction: Presumably people who actively choose satanism can override this deep-seated attitude. But their adherence to evil usually seems to be rather restrained. A danger of tautology with ideas like this.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
     Full Idea: 'Do you mean by good those things that are beneficial to men?' 'Not only those. I call some things which are not beneficial good as well'.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 333e)
     A reaction: Examples needed, but this would be bad news for utilitarians. Good health is not seen as beneficial if it is taken for granted. Not being deaf.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
     Full Idea: There are some pleasures which are not good, and some pains which are not evil.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 351d)
     A reaction: Sadism and child birth. Though Bentham (I think) says that there is nothing good about the pain, since the event would obviously be better without it.
People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only reason the common man disapproves of pleasures is if they lead to pain and deprive us of future pleasures.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 354a)
     A reaction: Plato has a strong sense that some pleasures are just innately depraved and wicked. If those pleasure don't hurt anyone, it is very hard to pinpoint what is wrong with them.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B]
     Full Idea: Prescriptivity is especially important if moral judgements are universalizable, for then we can employ golden rule-style reasoning ('do as you would be done by').
     From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]
     Full Idea: Athenians inflict punishment on wrong-doers, which shows that they too think it possible to impart and teach goodness.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 324c)
Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates: I do not believe that virtue can be taught.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 320b)
Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates is contradicting himself by saying virtue is not teachable, and yet trying to demonstrate that every virtue is knowledge.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 361b)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes]
     Full Idea: If you find it strange that in explaining these elements I do not use the qualities called Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry - as the philosophers do - I shall say to you that these qualities themselves seem to me to need explanation.
     From: René Descartes (The World [1631], 9:25-6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 1.3
     A reaction: Nice. I take pushing the boundaries of explanation back (or down) to be the basic driving force of all human thought, in metaphysics as well as in physics.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Descartes, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Descartes incorporated the conservation of what he called 'quantity of motion', by which he meant mass times speed.
     From: report of René Descartes (The World [1631]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 2
     A reaction: Mass times velocity is now called 'momentum'. Is this the first ever conservation law? There are now lots of them.