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All the ideas for 'works', 'The Nature of Mathematics' and 'Gorgias'

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64 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
     Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61
     A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy.
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Callicles: Even a naturally gifted philosopher isn't going to develop into a real man, because he's avoiding the heart of his community and the thick of the agora.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 485d)
     A reaction: A serious charge against philosophy. An attraction of the subject is its purity, its necessity, its timelessness, and in some ways these are just nicer and easier and more understandable than the hard mess of real life. But understanding has to be good.
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Philosophy, although it uses no microscopes or other apparatus of special observation, is really an experimental science, resting on that experience which is common to us all.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], I)
     A reaction: The 'experimental' either implies that thought-experiments are central to the subject, or that philosophers are discussing the findings of scientists, but at a high level of theory and abstraction. Peirce probably means the latter. I can't disagree.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
     Full Idea: It is an anacoluthon to say that a proposition is impossible because it is self-contradictory. It rather is thought so to appear self-contradictory because the ideal induction has shown it to be impossible.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III)
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil]
     Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70
     A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing.
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato]
     Full Idea: In the 'Gorgias' Socrates is still supremely confident that the elenchus is the final arbiter of moral truth.
     From: comment on Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.117
We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato]
     Full Idea: Test me, and let yourself be tested as well, by asking and answering questions.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 462a)
     A reaction: The idea must be to avoid wild speculation, by continually filtering ideas through rival critical intelligences. The best philosophical method ever devised.
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Mathematics is purely hypothetical: it produces nothing but conditional propositions. Logic, on the contrary, is categorical in its assertions. True, it is a normative science, and not a mere discovery of what really is. It discovers ends from means.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], II)
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The whole of the theory of numbers belongs to logic; or rather, it would do so, were it not, as pure mathematics, pre-logical, that is, even more abstract than logic.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], IV)
     A reaction: Peirce seems to flirt with logicism, but rejects in favour of some subtler relationship. I just don't believe that numbers are purely logical entities.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv
     A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
     Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118
Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15
     A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle?
When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a
The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
     Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2
     A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3
     A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3
     A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality.
Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5
     A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it!
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2
     A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
     Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis]
     Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?'
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Many say everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction. In this sense two contradictory propositions may be severally possible. In the substantive sense, the contradictory of a possible proposition is impossible (if we were omniscient).
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III)
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
     Full Idea: If Mill says that experience is the only source of any kind of knowledge, I grant it at once, provided only that by experience he means personal history, life. But if he wants me to admit that inner experience is nothing, he asks what cannot be granted.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898])
     A reaction: Notice from Idea 14785 that Peirce has ideas in mind, and not just inner experiences like hunger. Empiricism certainly begins to look more plausible if we expand the notion of experience. It must include what we learned from prior experience.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The real world is the world of sensible experience, and it is part of the process of sensible experience to locate its facts in the world of ideas.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III)
     A reaction: This is the neatest demolition of the sharp dividing line between empiricism and rationalism that I have ever encountered.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben]
     Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2
     A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88
     A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives.
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato]
     Full Idea: Rhetoric is an agent of the kind of persuasion which is designed to produce conviction, but not to educate people about right and wrong.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 455a)
     A reaction: Surely there must be good rhetoric (or at least it is an open question)?
Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12
     A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that.
Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato]
     Full Idea: Rhetoric is a knack, because it lacks rational understanding of its object or what it dispenses (and can't explain the reason anything happens).
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 465a)
     A reaction: If there are cunning people who have the wrong sort of intelligence for morality, there must be cunning users of rhetoric who know exactly what they are doing.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
All activity aims at the good [Plato]
     Full Idea: All activity aims at the good.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 499e)
     A reaction: He includes non-conscious activity, so this is the 'teleological' view of nature, which seems a bit optimistic to the modern mind.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Ethics is the science of aims.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], II)
     A reaction: Intriguing slogan. He is discussing the aims of logic. I think what he means is that ethics is the science of value. 'Science' may be optimistic, but I would sort of agree with his basic idea.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
     Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never!
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276
     A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato]
     Full Idea: Callicles: It's the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rules.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483b)
     A reaction: An aristocrat bemoans democracy. Presumably the qualification for being a 'weakling' is shortage of money. How strong are the scions of the aristocrats?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
     Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43
     A reaction: anti Charles Taylor
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato]
     Full Idea: A good person is bound to do whatever he does well and successfully, and success brings fulfilment and happiness.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507c)
     A reaction: Not how we would see it, I guess, but this is the Greek idea that a good person is one who functions well. Anyone who functions well is probably having a good time.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Callicles: Nature says the only authentic way of life is to do nothing to hinder or restrain the expansion of one's desires.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 491e)
     A reaction: Sounds like the natural desires of a young single man. Parents and spouses have natural desires that focus on other people's desires.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
     Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8
     A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato]
     Full Idea: When we drink to quench thirst, we lose the distress of the thirst and the pleasure of drinking at the same moment, but one loss is good and the other bad, so the pleasure and the goodness must be separate.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 497d)
     A reaction: This is open to the objection that the good of slaking one's thirst is a long-term pleasure, where the drinking is short-term, so pleasure is still the good.
Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27
     A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence?
Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato]
     Full Idea: Good should be the goal of pleasant activities, rather than pleasure being the goal of good activities.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 500a)
     A reaction: Nice. Not far off what Aristotle says on the topic. So what activities should we seek out? Narrow the pleasures down to the good ones, or narrow the good ones down to the pleasurable?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
     Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117
     A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato]
     Full Idea: There is little to tell between good and bad people (e.g. cowards) in terms of how much pleasure and distress they experience.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 498c)
     A reaction: A very perceptive remark. If the good are people with empathy for others, then they may suffer more distress than the insensitive wicked.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates: I want to ask whether a lifetime spent scratching, itching and scratching, no end of scratching, is also a life of happiness.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 494c)
     A reaction: There are plenty of people who think 'fun' is the main aim of life, and who fit what Socrates is referring to. We don't admire such a life, but not many people can be admired.
In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato]
     Full Idea: In a fool's mind desire is a leaky jar, …which is an analogy for the mind's insatiability, showing we should prefer an orderly life, in which one is content with whatever is to hand, to a self-indulgent life of insatiable desire.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 493b)
     A reaction: This points to an interesting paradox, that pleasure requires the misery of desire. And yet absence of desire is like death. An Aristotelian mean, of living according to nature, seems the escape route.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Callicles: If a person has the means to live a life of sensual, self-indulgent freedom, there's no better or happier state of existence.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492c)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut]
     Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato
     A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates: We should avoid doing wrong because of all the bad consequences it will bring us.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 480a)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates: If I had to choose between doing wrong and having wrong done to me, I'd prefer the latter to the former.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 469c)
     A reaction: cf Democritus 68B45
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato]
     Full Idea: Self-indulgent desire makes a person incapable of co-operation, which is a prerequisite of friendship.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507e)
If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato]
     Full Idea: Callicles: If people who need nothing are happy, there would be nothing happier than a stone or a corpse.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492e)
     A reaction: We aren't really supposed to approve of Callicles, but to me this is a splendidly crushing western response to many of the ideals found in eastern philosophy.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates: A criminal is worse off if he doesn't pay the penalty, and continues to do wrong without getting punished.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 472e)
Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Callicles: Why do most people praise self-discipline and justice? Because their own timidity makes them incapable of satisfying their pleasures.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492a)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato]
     Full Idea: I'm sure you know the list of human advantages in the party song: 'The very best is health, Second good looks, and third honest wealth'.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 451e)
     A reaction: This invites the obvious question of why anyone wants these three things, with the implied answer of 'pleasure'. But we might want them even if we couldn't use them, implying pluralism.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato is boring.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato]
     Full Idea: As in every case (an artefact, a body, a mind, a creature), a good state is an organised and orderly state.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 506e)
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only responsibility of a good member of a community is altering the community's needs rather than going along with them.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 517b)
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Callicles: It's because most people are second-rate that they are happy for things to be distributed equally.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483c)
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Callicles: We only have to look at nature to find evidence that it is right for better to have a greater share than worse.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483d)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14