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All the ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Real Essentialism' and 'Problems of Knowledge'

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87 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato]
     Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e)
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato]
     Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a)
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic.
     From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71
     A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The standard classification holds that 'animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.5)
     A reaction: My understanding of 'difference' would take it down to the level of the individual, so the question is - which did Aristotle believe in. Not all commentators agree with Oderberg, and Wedin thinks the individual substance is paramount.
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: To define something just means to set forth its limits in such a way that one can distinguish it from all other things of a different kind. To distinguish it from all other things of the same kind belongs to the theory of 'individuation'.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4)
     A reaction: I take Aristotle to have included individuation as part of his understanding of definition. Are tigers a kind, or are fierce tigers a kind, and is my tiger one-of-a-kind?
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: The trouble with appeal to facts in the correspondence theory is that, in general, we have no way of indicating what fact a sentence, when true, corresponds to other than asserting the sentence.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.12)
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: It is often claimed that coherence is more than 'absence of conflict' between beliefs; it also involves 'positive connections'.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10)
Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Contemporary coherence theorists are advancing a theory of justification, not of truth, …with those who argue that truth is also coherence explaining it in terms of ideal coherence, or coherence at the limit of enquiry.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: The rules of deduction are rules of entailment, not rules of inference. They tell us what follows from what, not what to believe on the basis of what.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.18)
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle]
     Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections'
Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made.
     From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The Aristotelian account of numbers is that their existence depends on the existence of things that are not numbers, ..since numbers are abstractions from the existence of things.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.2)
     A reaction: This is the deeply unfashionable view to which I am attached. The problem is the status of transfinite, complex etc numbers. They look like fictions to me.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
     Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a)
     A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Being is heterogeneous: there is substantial being, accidental being, complete being, incomplete being, necessary being, contingent being, possible being, absolute being, relative being, intrinsic being, extrinsic being, and so on.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 5.3)
     A reaction: Dependent being? Oderberg is giving the modern scholastic view. Personally I take 'being' to be univocal, even if it can be qualified in all sorts of ways. I don't believe we actually have any grasp at all of different ways to exist.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
     Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d)
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
     A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
     Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c)
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract?
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.5)
     A reaction: I take this to be a conclusive objection to claims for any such thing to be abstract. See, for example, Dummett's claim that the Equator is an abstract object.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: We need a theory of essence to help us distinguish between the powers that do and do not belong to the essence of a thing.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3)
     A reaction: I take this to be a very good reason for searching for the essence of things, though the need to distinguish does not guarantee that there really is something to distinguish. Maybe powers just come and go. A power is essential in you but not in me?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
     Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c)
You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
     Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
     Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d)
The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
     Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e)
If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d)
If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
     Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c)
Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
     Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e)
Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
     A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
     Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a)
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
     Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b)
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
     Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e)
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
     Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c)
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a)
If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
     Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a)
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
     Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d)
     A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The demise of 'substance' was wholly due to mistaken notions, mainly from the empiricists, by which it was conceived either as an unknowable featureless substratum, or as dispensable in favour of some or other bundle theory.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.4)
     A reaction: There seems to be a view that the notion of substance is essential to explaining how we understand the world. I am inclined to think that if we accept the notion of essence we can totally dispense with the notion of substance.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
     Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5
     A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
     Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2
     A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships.
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
     A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
     Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2
     A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
     Full Idea: Real essences are objectively real, they concern being, they are knowable, they are definable, and they are classifiable.
     From: report of David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This is a lovely summary (spread over two pages) of what essentialism is all about. It might be added that they are about unity and identity. The fact that they are intrinsically classifiable seems to mislead some people into a confused view.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Nominalism is consistent with belief in individual essences, but real essentialism postulates essences as universals (quiddities). Nominalists are nearly always empiricists, though the converse may not be the case.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 2.1)
     A reaction: This is where I part company with Oderberg. I want to argue that the nominalist/individualist view is more in tune with what Aristotle believed (though he spotted a dilemma here). Only individual essences explain individual behaviour.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Real essentialism, more than any other ontological theory, stresses and seeks to explain the unity of objects.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.3)
     A reaction: A key piece in the jigsaw I am beginning to assemble. If explanation is the aim, and essence the key to explanation, then explaining unity is the part of it that connects with other metaphysics, about identity and so on. 'Units' breed numbers.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Essence is not reducible to explanatory relations, ...and fundamentally the role of essence is not explanatory but constitutive.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Effectively, this asserts essence as part of 'pure' metaphysics, but I like impure metaphysics, as the best explanation of the things we can know. Hence we can speculate about constitution only by means of explanation. Constitution is active.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: A substance is constituted by its essence, and properties are a species of accident. No property of a thing is part of a thing's essence, though properties flow from the essence.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 7.2)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this. How can you know of something which has no properties? I'm wondering if the whole notion of a 'property' should be eliminated from good metaphysics.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Why not do away with talk of essences and replace it with talk of powers pure and simple, or reduce essences to collections of powers? But then what unites the powers, and could a power be lost, and is there entailment between the powers?
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3)
     A reaction: [He cites Bennett and Hacker 2003 for this view] The point would seem to be that in addition to the powers, there are also identity and unity and kind-membership to be explained. Oderberg says the powers flow from the essence.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
     Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: That is, if two things must have identical properties because they are the same thing, this is because those properties are essential to the thing. Otherwise two things could be the same, even though one of them lacked a non-identifying property.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The fundamental thesis of real essentialism is that every finite material body has a twofold composition, being a compound of act and potency. ...Reality can take on new kinds of existence because there is a principle of potentiality inherent in reality.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.1)
     A reaction: I take from this remark that the 'powers' discussed by Molnar and other scientific essentialists is roughly the same as 'potentiality' identified by Aristotle.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Any realist theory of possible worlds will be circular in its attempt to illuminate modality, for there has to be some criterion of what counts as a possible world.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: Seems right. At the very least, if we are going to rule out contradictory worlds as impossible (and is there a more obvious criterion?), we already need to understand 'impossible' in order to state that rule.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The necessity of identity carries the appearance of triviality, because it is the eviscerated contemporary essentialist form of a foundational real essentialist truth to the effect that every object has its own nature.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: I like this. Writers like Mackie and Forbes have to put the 'trivial' aspects of essence to one side, without ever seeing why there is such a problem. Real substantial essences have necessity of identity as a side-effect.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The rigid designator approach to essentialism has essentialist assumptions. ..The necessity of identity is built into the very conception of a rigid designator,..and Leibniz's Law is presupposed...and necessity of origin presupposes sufficiency of origin.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: [compressed. He cites Salmon 1981:196 for the last point] This sounds right. You feel happy to 'rigidly designate' something precisely because you think there is something definite and stable which can be designated.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Asking how many beliefs I have is like asking how many drops of water there are in a bucket. If I believe my dog is in the garden, do I also believe he is not in the house, or in Siberia?
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11)
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Propositional content is inseparable from possible error. Therefore no judgement, however modest, is indubitable. So if basic experiential knowledge has to be indubitable, there is no such knowledge.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8)
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Phenomenalism is a form of idealism.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.12)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: The point of insisting on the absolute immediacy of sense data is that representation always seems to involve the possibility of misrepresentation.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Acquaintance with sense data is supposed to be a form of non-propositional knowledge, but how can something be non-propositional and yet knowledge?
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8)
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: What exactly is supposed to be 'justified': a person's believing some particular proposition, or the proposition that he believes?
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1)
     A reaction: A key distinction. See my comment on Idea 3752. What would justify a sign saying 'treasure buried here'? People can be justified in believing falsehoods. How could a false proposition be justified?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: A theory that represents working practices as unworkable is a bad theory.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.13)
     A reaction: Good point. There's a lot of this about in epistemology, especially accusations of circularity or infinite regress, which (if true) don't somehow seem to worry the cove on the Clapham omnibus.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: If we are to treat experience as the foundation of knowledge, then experience must itself be understood to involve propositional content.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8)
     A reaction: This sounds right, but since pure 'experience' obviously doesn't have propositional content, because it needs interpretation and evaluation, then this strategy won't work.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Empirical foundationists must decide whether knowledge ultimately rests on either beliefs or judgements about experience, or on the experiences or sensations themselves.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8)
     A reaction: This clarifies the key issue very nicely, and I firmly vote for the former option. The simplest point is that error is possible about what sensations are taken to be of, so they won't do on their own.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: The foundationalists dilemma is to define a basis for knowledge modest enough to be secure but rich enough to be adequate.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 7)
     A reaction: ..And that is just what they are unable to do, precisely because adequate support would have to have enough content to be defeasibe or fallible.
Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: A strongly justificationist view of rationality may not be so rational; we want the truth, but avoiding all errors and maximising our number of true beliefs are not the same thing.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 7)
     A reaction: An interesting dilemma - to avoid all errors, believing nothing; to maximise true belief, believe everything. It is rational to follow intuition, guesses, and a wing and a prayer - once you are experienced and educated.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Why should political theory ever have much to do with quantum physics, or pet care with parliamentary history?
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11)
     A reaction: This hardly demolishes the coherence account of justification, since your views on pet care had better be coherent, for your pet's sake. It's a pity people can make their politics cohere with their ethics.
Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Coherence theory implicitly assigns the criteria of coherence a special status. …In so far as this status is assigned a priori, the coherence theory represents a rationalistic variant of foundationalism.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11)
     A reaction: Nice move, to accuse coherence theorists of foundationalism! Wrong, though, because the a priori principles of coherence are not basic beliefs, but evolved pragmatic procedures (or something...).
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: From an externalist point of view, knowing about one's reliability is not required for 'first-order' knowledge.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2)
     A reaction: Ah. 'First-order knowledge' - what's that? What we used to call 'true belief', I would say. Adequate for animals, and a good guide to daily life, but uncritical and unjustifiable.
Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: A problem with pure externalism is that it ignores the social dimension of knowledge.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2)
     A reaction: This seems to be contradicted by Idea 3573, which allows a social dimension to agreement over what is reliable. I am inclined to take knowledge as an entirely social concept.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: According to Goldman's early causal theory of knowledge, my belief that p counts as knowledge if and only if it is caused by the fact that p. This is sufficient as well as necessary, and so does not involve justification.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2)
     A reaction: I take his theory simply to be false because what causes a belief is not what justifies it. I expect my mother to ring; the phone rings; I 'know' it is my mother (and it is), because I strongly expect it.
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: It is not clear what would even be meant by supposing that there are causal relations to mathematical facts.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2)
     A reaction: I agree, though platonists seem to be willing to entertain the possibility that there are causal relations, for which no further explanation can be given. Better is knowledge without a causal relation.
Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Justification requires logical rather than causal connections. That is the point of the slogan that only a belief can justify a belief.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10)
     A reaction: It seems better to talk of 'rational' connections, rather than 'logical' connections. It isn't 'logical' to believe that someone despises me because their lip is faintly curled.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: The radical externalists' key notion is 'reliability', which is a normative condition governing adequate performance, involving reference to a range of conditions which we decide rather than discover.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2)
     A reaction: If we can decide whether a source is reliable, we can also decide whether a reliable source has performed well on this occasion, and that will always take precedence.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: I may reach a belief using a procedure that is in fact reliable, but which I ought to distrust.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1)
     A reaction: The tramp on the park bench who gives good share tips. The clock that is finally working, but has been going haywire for weeks. Reliabilism is a bad theory.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: All the sceptic's arguments show is that there are limits to our capacity to give reasons or cite evidence.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.13)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: The classical Five Modes of Scepticism are Discrepancy (people always disagree), Relativity ('according to you'), Infinity (infinite regress of questions), Assumption (ending in dogma) and Circularity (end up where you started).
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 5)
     A reaction: I take Relativity to be different from scepticism (because, roughly, it says there is nothing to know), and the others go with Agrippa's Trilemma of justification, which may have solutions.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Armed with enough theory, we can see electrons in a cloud chamber.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10)
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: In the foundationalist picture the meaning of individual words (defined ostensively) is primary, and that of sentences is derivative. For coherentists sentences come first, with meaning understood functionally or inferentially.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10)
     A reaction: Coherentism about language doesn't imply coherentism about justification. On language I vote for foundationalism, because I am impressed by the phenomenon of compositionality.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato]
     Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: In the traditional terminology, function follows essence. Essence just is the principle from which flows the characteristic behaviour of a thing.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 2.1)
     A reaction: Hence essence must be identified if the behaviour is to be explained, and a successful identification of essence is the terminus of our explanations. But the essences must go down to the micro-level. Explain non-characteristic behaviour?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato]
     Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Some things do not partake of the One [Plato]
     Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 231
The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato]
     Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b)
Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato]
     Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 233.
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Even if there were no multiplicity in unity - only a Parmenidean 'block' - still the question would arise as to what gave the amorphous lump its unity; by virtue of what would it be one rather than many?
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Which is prior, division or unification? If it was divided, he would ask what divided it. One of them must be primitive, so why not unity? If one big Unity is primitive, why could not lots of unities be primitive? Etc.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: It is incorrect to hold that the job of the real essentialist just is the job of the scientist.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.3)
     A reaction: Presumably scientific essentialism, while being firmly a branch of metaphysics, is meant to clarify the activities of science, and thereby be of some practical use. You can't beat knowing what it is you are trying to do.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4)
     A reaction: Oderberg's point is that essence doesn't just occur at the bottom of the hierarchy of kinds, but can exist on a macro-level, and need not be a concealed structure, as we see in the essence of a pile of stones.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato]
     Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d)