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All the ideas for 'The Statesman', 'reports' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
     A reaction: I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Whenever you perceive a community of things, you should also hunt out differences in the group [Plato]
     Full Idea: The rule is that when one perceives first the community between the members of a group of many things, one should not desist until one sees in it all those differences that are located in classes.
     From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 285b)
     A reaction: He goes on to recommend the opposite as well - see community even when there appears to be nothing but differences. I take this to be analysis, just as much as modern linguistic approaches are. Analyse the world, not language.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
To reveal a nature, divide down, and strip away what it has in common with other things [Plato]
     Full Idea: Let's take the kind posited and cut it in two, .then follow the righthand part of what we've cut, and hold onto things that the sophist is associated with until we strip away everything he has in common with other things, then display his peculiar nature.
     From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 264e)
     A reaction: This seems to be close to Aristotle's account of definition, when he is trying to get at what-it-is-to-be some thing. But if you strip away everything the definiendum has in common with other things, will anything remain?
No one wants to define 'weaving' just for the sake of weaving [Plato]
     Full Idea: I don't suppose that anyone with any sense would want to hunt down the definition of 'weaving' for the sake of weaving itself.
     From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 285d)
     A reaction: The point seems to be that the definition brings out the connections between weaving and other activities and objects, thus enlarging our understanding.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
     A reaction: Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
The soul gets its goodness from god, and its evil from previous existence. [Plato]
     Full Idea: From its composer the soul possesses all beautiful things, but from its former condition, everything that proves to be harsh and unjust in heaven.
     From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 273b)
     A reaction: A neat move to explain the origins of evil (or rather, to shift the problem of evil to a long long way from here). This view presumably traces back to the views of Empedocles on good and evil. Can the soul acquire evil in its current existence?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: You can end up with an error theory of perception, which says our experience is not as it seems to be, as bizarre as that might be.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.140)
     A reaction: This is because of the clash between subjective and objective aspects of perception. It is an enticing proposal, just the sort of thing I pay philosophers to come up with. Given oddities like blindsight, I think it should be taken seriously.
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
The question of whether or not to persuade comes before the science of persuasion [Plato]
     Full Idea: The science of whether one must persuade or not must rule over the science capable of persuading.
     From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 304c)
     A reaction: Plato probably thinks that reason has to be top of the pyramid, but there is always the Nietzschean/romantic question of why we should place such a value on what is rational.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105)
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Non-physical beauty can only be shown clearly by speech [Plato]
     Full Idea: The bodiless things, being the most beautiful and the greatest, are only shown with clarity by speech and nothing else.
     From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 286a)
     A reaction: Unfortunately this will be true of warped and ugly ideas as well.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7
     A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18
     A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23
     A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22
     A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me.
Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069)
     A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074)
     A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46
     A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'?
Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27
     A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070)
     A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25
     A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37
A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where?
Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon].
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95
     A reaction: [not sure about the translation here]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043)
Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is by preserving the mean that arts produce everything that is good and beautiful.
     From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 284b)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43
Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68
     A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42
Democracy is the worst of good constitutions, but the best of bad constitutions [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Plato judged that when the constitution is decent, democracy is the worst of them, but when they are bad it is the best.
     From: report of Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 302e) by Aristotle - Politics 1289b07
     A reaction: Aristotle denies that a good oligarchy is superior. What of technocracy? The challenge is to set up institutions which ensure the health of the democracy. The big modern problem is populists who lie.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Only divine things can always stay the same, and bodies are not like that [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is fitting for only the most divine things of all to be always the same and in the same state and in the same respects, and the nature of body is not of this ordering.
     From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 269b)