48 ideas
2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are always ready to change direction, if a topic crops up which is more attractive than the one to hand. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 172d) | |
A reaction: Which sounds trivial, but it may be what God does. |
2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
Full Idea: A perfect grasp of any subject depends far more on knowing elements than on knowing complexes. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206b) |
2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
Full Idea: Either a syllable is not the same as its letters, in which case it cannot have the letters as parts of itself, or it is the same as its letters, in which case these basic elements are just as knowable as it is. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205b) |
2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as primary elements are woven together, so their names may be woven together to produce a spoken account, because an account is essentially a weaving together of names. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b) | |
A reaction: If justification requires 'logos', and logos is a 'weaving together of names', then Plato might be taken as endorsing the coherence account of justification. Or do the two 'weavings' correspond? |
2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: Eristic discussions involve as many tricks and traps as possible, but dialectical discussions involve being serious and correcting the interlocutor's mistakes only when they are his own fault or the result of past conditioning. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167e) |
15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
Full Idea: A primary element cannot be expressed in an account; it can only be named, for a name is all that it has. But with the things composed of these ...just as the elements are woven together, so the names can woven to become an account. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b01-3) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of what I see as Aristotle's metaphysics, as derived from his epistemology, that is, ontology is what explains, and what we can give an account [logos] of. Aristotle treats this under 'definitions'. |
10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: It must surely be true that a man who has completely mastered arithmetic knows all numbers? Because there are pieces of knowledge covering all numbers in his soul. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 198b) | |
A reaction: This clearly views numbers as objects. Expectation of knowing them all is a bit startling! They also appear to be innate in us, and hence they appear to be Forms. See Aristotle's comment in Idea 645. |
2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: There are two kinds of change, I think: alteration and motion. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 181d) | |
A reaction: Idea 1700 is better than this. |
19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The fictionalist offers the option that your simulated beliefs and assertions may be tracking a realm of genuine facts, or a realm of what you take to be facts. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 13) | |
A reaction: This means that fictionalism does not have to be an error theory. That is, we aren't mistakenly believing something that we actually made up. Instead we are sensibly believing something we know to be not literally true. Love it. |
2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a complex or a syllable has no parts and is a single identity, hasn't it turned out to be the same kind of thing as an element or letter? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205d) |
15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
Full Idea: But this sum now - isn't it just when there is nothing lacking that it is a sum? Yes, necessarily. And won't this very same thing - that from which nothing is lacking - be a whole? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205a) | |
A reaction: This seems to be right, be rather too vague and potentially circular to be of much use. What is the criterion for deciding that nothing is lacking? |
15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole does not consist of parts; for it did, it would be all the parts and so would be the sum. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 204e) | |
A reaction: That is, 'the whole is the sum of its parts' is a tautology! The claim that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts' gets into similar trouble. See Verity Harte on this. |
19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The governing fiction of possible worlds theory says that whenever something is possible, there is a world where it happens. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 05) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the only sensible attitude to possible worlds I can think of. |
2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Things which are susceptible to a rational account are knowable. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201d) |
16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
Full Idea: A man has passed from mere judgment to expert knowledge of the being of a wagon when he has done so in virtue of having gone over the whole by means of the elements. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207c) | |
A reaction: Plato is emphasising that the expert must know the hundred parts of a wagon, and not just the half dozen main components, but here the point is to go over the whole via the parts, and not just list the parts. |
2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to believe something which is not the case. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167a) |
2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the object of a belief is what is not, the object of this belief is nothing; but if there is no object to a belief, then that is not belief at all. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 189a) |
2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: Perception is always of something that is, and it is infallible, which suggests that it is knowledge. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 152c) |
2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
Full Idea: It would be peculiar if each of us were like a Trojan horse, with a whole bunch of senses sitting inside us, rather than that all these perceptions converge onto a single identity (mind, or whatever one ought to call it). | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 184d) |
2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
Full Idea: With what physical faculty do we perceive being and not-being, similarity and dissimilarity, identity and difference, oneness and many, odd and even and other maths, ….fineness and goodness? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 185d) |
2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you can't apprehend being you can't apprehend truth, and so a thing could not be known. Therefore knowledge is not located in immediate experience but in thinking about it, since the latter makes it possible to grasp being and truth. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 186c) |
2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
Full Idea: Sight or touch might make someone take eleven for twelve, but he could never form this mistaken belief about the contents of his mind. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 195e) |
2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you don't know which letters belong together in the right syllables…it is possible for true belief to be accompanied by a rational account and still not be entitled to the name of knowledge. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208b) | |
A reaction: In each case of justification there is a 'clinching' stage, for which there is never going to be a strict rule. It might be foundational, but equally it might be massive coherence, or no alternative. |
2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
Full Idea: Either a syllable and its letters are equally knowable and expressible in a rational account, or they are both equally unknowable and inexpressible. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205e) | |
A reaction: Presumably you could explain the syllable by the letters, but not vice versa, but he must mean that the explanation is worthless without the letters being explained too. So all explanation is worthless? |
2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If I only have beliefs about Theaetetus when I don't know his distinguishing mark, how on earth were my beliefs about you rather than anyone else? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 209b) | |
A reaction: This is a rather intellectualist approach to mental activity. Presumably Theaetetus has lots of distinguishing marks, but they are not conscious. Must Socrates know everything? |
2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
Full Idea: A rational account might be forming an image of one's belief, as in a mirror or a pond. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206d) | |
A reaction: Not promising, since the image is not going to be clearer than the original, or contain any new information. Maybe it would be clarified by being 'framed', instead of drifting in muddle. |
2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
Full Idea: A third sort of rational account (after giving an image, or analysing elements) is being able to mention some mark which differentiates the object in question ('the sun is the brightest heavenly body'). | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208c) | |
A reaction: This is Plato's clearest statement of what would be involved in adding the necessary logos to your true belief. An image of it, or an analysis, or an individuation. How about a cause? |
2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
Full Idea: Maybe the primary elements of which things are composed are not susceptible to rational accounts. Each of them taken by itself can only be named, but nothing further can be said about it. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201e) | |
A reaction: This still seems to be more or less the central issue in philosophy - which things should be treated as 'primitive', and which other things are analysed and explained using the primitive tools? |
2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
Full Idea: In the case of a wagon, we may only have correct belief, but someone who is able to explain what it is by going through its hundred parts has got hold of a rational account. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207b) | |
A reaction: A wonderful example. In science, you know smoking correlates with cancer, but you only know it when you know the mechanism, the causal structure. This may be a general truth. |
2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
Full Idea: What evidence could be brought if we were asked at this very moment whether we are asleep and are dreaming all our thoughts? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 158b) |
2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
Full Idea: In medicine, at least, most people are not self-sufficient at prescribing and effecting cures for themselves, and here some people are superior to others. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171e) |
2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Does a relativist have any authority to decide about things which will happen in the future? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 178c) | |
A reaction: Nice question! It seems commonsense that such speculations are possible, but without a concept of truth they are ridiculous. |
2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
Full Idea: To say that everyone believes what is the case, is to concede the truth of the oppositions' beliefs; in other words, the person has to concede that he himself is wrong. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171a) |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We know too much about thought and behaviour to trust exact and universal statements linking them. Beliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970], p.217) | |
A reaction: Now seen as a key objection to behaviourism, and rightly so. However, I am not sure about "without limit", which implies an implausible absolute metaphysical freedom. Davidson goes too far in denying any nomological link between thought and brain. |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
Full Idea: Davidson rejects ontological reduction of mental to physical because propositional attitudes are holistic; there must be extensive coherence among someone's attitudes to treat them as a rational person, and this has no counterpart in physical theory. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.5 | |
A reaction: I don't find this view persuasive. We treat the weather in simple terms, even though it is almost infinitely complex. Davidson has a Kantian overconfidence in our rationality. A coherence among the parts is needed to be a tree. |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
Full Idea: Davidson's anomalous monism says no more about the relationship between the mental and the physical than the claim that all objects with a colour have a shape says about the relationship between colours and shapes. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World §1 p.005 | |
A reaction: Indeed, I find the enthusiasm for property dualism etc. quite baffling, given that we are merely told that mind is 'an anomaly'. I take it to be old fashioned dualism in trendy clothes. |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: For Davidson, mental types are individuated by considerations that are nonscientific, distinctly humanistic, and part normative, so will not coincide with any types that are designated in scientific terms. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.8 | |
A reaction: I just don't believe this, mainly because I don't accept that there is a category called 'nonscientific'. All we are saying is that a brain is a hugely complicated object, and we don't properly understand its operations, though we relate to it very well. |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
Full Idea: Davidson's anomalous monism says that events are causes, so we can identify mental and physical events without having to identify their properties. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Tim Crane - Elements of Mind 2.18 | |
A reaction: As Fodor insists, a thing like a mountain has properties at different levels of description. We can have 'property dualism' and full-blown reductive identity. |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
Full Idea: Davidson takes mental anomalism (that the mind exhibits normativity and rationality), and in particular his claim that there are no laws connecting mental and physical properties, to undermine mind-body reductionism. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World §4 p.092 | |
A reaction: A nice summary of the core idea of property dualism. Personally I expect the whole lot to be reducible, and to follow laws, but the sheer complexity of the brain permanently bars us from actually doing the reduction. |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
Full Idea: Davidson's thesis is that if mental events of a particular kind cause physical events of a particular kind, and the two kinds are connected by a law, then they must both be physical kinds. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.137 | |
A reaction: Davidson would pretty obviously be right. The whole problem here is the idea of a 'law'. You can only have strict law for simple entities, like particles and natural kinds. The brain is a mess, like weather or explosions. |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
Full Idea: Since no laws exist connecting mental and physical properties, purely physical laws must do the causal work, which means mental events enter into causal relations only because they possess physical properties that figure in laws. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.138 | |
A reaction: Surely no such laws exist 'yet'? I can see no plausible argument that psycho-physical laws are impossible. However, the conclusion of this remark seems right. Interaction requires some sort of equality. |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The supervenience [of mental characteristics on the physical] might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or an object cannot differ mentally without altering physically. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970], I) | |
A reaction: This is the first occasion on which Davidson introduced his notion of supervenience. Supervenience is often taken to be one-way. The first implies physical causing mental; his second implies that mental causes physical. |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Davidson's version of the identity theory is couched in terms of events rather than states, because he regards causation as a relation between events. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.2 n12 | |
A reaction: I think it may be more to the point that the mind is a dynamic thing, and so it consists of events rather than states, and hence we want to know what those events are made up from. I think my chair is causing me to rest above the floor… |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
Full Idea: Davidson's argument about psychophysical anomalism has not been embraced by everyone; multiple realisability of mental properties has had a much greater impact in undermining reductionism (and hence type physicalism). | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.218 | |
A reaction: My view is that functional states are multiply realisable, but phenomenal states aren't. Fear functions in frogs much as it does in us, but being a frightened frog is nothing like being a frightened human. Their brains are different! |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
Full Idea: According to Davidson analyses of causality proceed at two different levels: at the lower level it holds between events regardless of how they are described; higher level explanations hold between descriptions of events, which pick out properties. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.4 |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
Full Idea: Davidson says causal explanations hold between descriptions of events and not between the events themselves, so the possibility of events as explanations depends on how they are described (e.g. a wind collapsing a bridge). | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.4 |
2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for God to be immoral and not to be the acme of morality; and the only way any of us can approximate to God is to become as moral as possible. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176c) |
2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |
Full Idea: The elimination of evil is impossible, Theodorus; there must always be some force ranged against good. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176a) |