66 ideas
23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Theories of truth and theories of predication are closely related: it seems probable that any comprehensive theory of truth will include a theory of predication. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: Davidson defends the view that it is this way round. It is tempting to label them both as 'primitive'. Davidson distinguishes a 'theory' about truth from a 'definition'. |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Antirealism, with its limitations of truth to what can be ascertained, deprives truth of its role as an intersubjective standard. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: I like this, because it lifts truth out of individual minds. I take truth to be an ideal - a simple one with little content, which is thus fairly uncontroversial. Truth is the main general purpose of thinking. |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The 'epistemic' view of truth asserts an essential tie to epistemology, and introduces a dependence of truth on what can somehow be verified by finite rational creatures. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: This view, which seems to be widely held, strikes me as an elementary confusion. I take truth to be fully successful belief. If you say belief can never be fully successful, then we can't know the truth - but that doesn't destroy the concept of truth. |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The real objection to the correspondence theory of truth is that there is nothing interesting or instructive to which true sentences correspond. (C.I. Lewis challenged defenders to locate the fact or part of reality to which a truth corresponded). | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Davidson defended a correspondence view in 'True to the Facts'. Davidson evidently also thinks the same objection applies to claims about truthmakers. If you say 'gold is shiny', the gold is very dispersed, but it is still there. |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The Slingshot argument (of Frege, Church and Gödel) assumes that if two sentences are logically equivalent, they correspond to the same thing, and what a sentence corresponds to is not changed if a singular term is replaced by a coreferring term. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: This obviously won't work for 'Oedipus thinks he ought to marry Jocasta'. Sentences correspond, I presume, to what they are about, which is often a matter of emphasis or phrasing. Hence the Slingshot sounds like nonsense to me. |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Slingshot: 'Scott is the author of Waverley' and 'The number of counties in Utah is twenty-nine' can be rephrased by substitution so that they are both about the number twenty-nine, and are thus correspond to the same thing. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: [my paraphrase of Davidson's quote from Church 1956:24] These sentences clearly do not correspond to the same thing, so something has gone wrong with the idea that logically equivalent sentences have identical correspondents. |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
Full Idea: A pure coherence theory of truth says that all sentences in a consistent set of sentences are true. ...I class this with epistemic views, because it ties truth directly to what is believed. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Neurath] I would have thought that coherence is rather more than mere consistency. Truths which have nothing whatever in common can be consistent with one another. [but see his p.43 n14] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Truth is easily defined in terms of satisfaction (as Tarski showed), but, alternatively, satisfaction can be taken to be whatever relation yields a correct account of truth. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Davidson is assessing which is the prior 'primitive' concept, and he votes for truth. A perennial problem in philosophy, and very hard to find reasons for a preference. The axiomatic approach grows from taking truth as primitive. Axioms for satisfaction? |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
Full Idea: That the truth of sentences is defined by appeal to the semantic properties of words suggests that, if we could give an account of the semantic properties of words (essentially, of reference or satisfaction), we would understand the concept of truth. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: If you thought that words were prior to sentences, this might be the route to go. Davidson gives priority to sentences, and so prefers to work from the other end, which treats truth as primitive, and then defines reference and meaning. |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Axioms specify how each unstructured predicate is satisfied by a particular sequence. Then recursive axioms characterise complex sentences built from simpler ones. Closed sentences have no free variables, so true sentences are satisfied by all sequences. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: I take 'all sequences' to mean all combinations of objects in the domain. Thus nothing in domain contradicts the satisfied sentences. Hence Tarski's truth is said to be 'true in a model', where the whole system vouches for the sentence. |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is complained that Tarski's definitions do not establish the connection between truth and meaning that many philosophers hold to be essential. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: This, of course, was Davidson's big mission - to build on Tarski's theory a view of truth which dovetailed it with theories of meaning and reference. |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
Full Idea: There is no indication in Tarski's formal work of what it is that his various truth predicates have in common, and this is part of the content of the concept. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: This seems like a good question to raise. If I list all the 'red' things, I can still ask what qualifies them to all appear on the same list. |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The key role of Convention-T in determining that truth, as characterised by the theory, has the same extension as the intuitive concept of truth makes it seem that it is truth rather than reference that is the basic primitive. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: The key strength of Tarski's account is that it specifies the extension of 'true' for a given language (as expressed in a richer meta-language). |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
Full Idea: When we enquire whether a truth definition defines the class of true sentences in a particular language, we are thinking of the truth definition as stipulating a possible language. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: Thus I might say "Nij wonk yang" is true if and only if snow is white, and make my first step towards a new language. An interesting way of looking at Tarski's project. |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Truth is one of the clearest and most basic concepts we have, so it is fruitless to dream of eliminating it in favor of something simpler or more fundamental. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: For redundancy theorists, I suppose, truth would be eliminated in favour of 'assertion'. Replacing it with 'satisfaction' doesn't seem very illuminating. Davidson would say 'reference' is more tricky and elusive than truth. |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is clearly a mistake to call Tarski a disquotationalist. ...We say of a sentence not at hand (such as 'You gave the right answer to this question last night, but I can't remember what you said') that it is true or false. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We can think of 'satisfaction' as a generalised form of reference. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Just the sort of simple point we novices need from the great minds, to help us see what is going on. One day someone is going to explain Tarski's account of truth in plain English, but probably not in my lifetime. |
14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
Full Idea: 'Theaetetus is a member of the set of seated objects' doesn't mention the predicate 'sits', but has a new predicate 'is a member of', with no given semantic role. We are back with Plato's problem with the predicate 'instantiates'. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: Plato's problem is the 'third man' problem - a regress in the explanation. In other words, if we are trying to explain predication, treating predicates as sets gets us nowhere. Just as I always thought. But you have to want explanations. |
17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
Full Idea: We cannot assume that every meaningful predicate necessarily expresses a property that some entity could possess. The predicate 'is non-self-exemplifying' is meaningful, yet it would be contradictory for there to be any such property. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003]) | |
A reaction: This clinches what I would take to be a foregone conclusion - that you can't know what the world contains just by examining the predicates of the English language. However, I suppose predicates are needed to know properties. |
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A sphere's matter could not be what makes it one sphere, since matter lacks intrinsic unity, ..and the form cannot make it that very sphere, since an identical sphere may exemplify that universal. So it is a combination of form and matter. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 5) | |
A reaction: But how do two aspects of the sphere, neither of which has the power to individuate, achieve individuation when they are combined? Like parents, I suppose. Two totally identical spheres can only be individuated by location. |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Kolmogorov's axiomatisation of probability puts clear constraints on the concept of probability, but leaves open whether probability is further characterised as relative frequency, degree of belief, or something else. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Davidson cites this to show the limitations of axiomatic approaches to any topic (e.g. sets, truth, arithmetic). The item in question must be treated as a 'primitive'. This always has the feeling of second-best. |
17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Two distinct entities cannot explain each other, in the same sense of 'explain'. If the height of the flagpole causally explains the length of the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole, though it may predict the latter. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 12) | |
A reaction: This seems related to the question of the direction of time/causation. Some explanations can be benignly circular, as when a married couple have a passion for chinese food. [S.Bromberger 1966 invented the flagpole case]. |
8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |
Full Idea: In no sense is a property a 'constituent' of an object: it is merely a 'facet' or 'aspect' of an object - something which we can talk about or think of separately from that object only by an act of abstraction. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 8) | |
A reaction: This appears to be in tune with traditional abstractionism, even though Lowe is committed to the reality of universals. To what do I refer when I say 'I like your car, apart from its colour'? |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Predicates introduce generality into sentences. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: Not sure about this. Most words introduce generality. 'From' is a very general word about direction. 'Dogs bark' is as generally about dogs as it is generally about barking. |
1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If we give up facts that make entities true, we ought to give up representations at the same time, for the legitimacy of each depends on the legitimacy of the other. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Not sure about this, because I'm not sure I know what he means by 'representations'. Surely every sentence is 'about' something? Is that just the references within the sentence, but not the sentence as a whole? |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We understand an imperative if and only if we know under what conditions what it orders or commands is obeyed. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: How could this be wrong? 'Do you understand the order?' 'Yes sir!' 'Well do it then!' 'Do what sir?' |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
Full Idea: An utterance has certain truth conditions only if the speaker intends it to be interpreted as having those truth conditions. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a concession to the rather sensible things that Grice said about meaning. What about malapropisms? Surely there the speaker does not understand the truth conditions of her own utterance? Truth conditions are in the head? |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Meaning depends on use, but it is not easy to say how, for uses to which we may put the utterance of a sentence are endless while its meaning remains fixed. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: Quite so. The password is 'Swordfish' (or 'Sweet marjoram', if you prefer). |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Our interest in the parts of sentences is derivative; we recognise at once that sentences are effective linguistic units, while we must figure out or decide what constitutes the meaningful words and particles. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: It depends on whether linguistic priority goes to complete thoughts that require expression, or to naming and ostensive definition to relate to elements of the environment. I find it hard to have a strong view on this one. Just So stories? |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The notion of 'places' in a predicate is the key to the modern concept of a predicate. Any expression obtained from a sentence by deleting one or more singular terms from the sentence counts as a predicate. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 4) |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
Full Idea: My strategy is to show how our grasp of the concept of truth can explain predication. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7) | |
A reaction: His account of the concept of truth centres on Tarski's theory, but he clearly thinks more is needed than the bare bones offered by Tarski. The point, I think, is that predication is what makes a sentence 'truth-apt'. |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The puzzle is that once plausible assignments of semantic roles have been made to parts of sentences, the parts do not seem to compose a united whole. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: It's not clear to me that a sentence does compose a 'whole', given that you can often add or remove bits from sentences, sometimes without changing the meaning. We often, in speech, assemble sentences before we have thought of their full meaning. |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Truth is the essential semantic concept with which to begin a top-down analysis of sentences, since truth, or lack of it, is the most obvious semantic property of sentences, and provides the clearest explanation of judging and conveying information. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [a bit compressed] Presumably this goes with giving sentences semantic priority. The alternative approach is compositional, and is likely to give reference of terms priority over truth of the sentence. But accurate reference is a sort of truth. |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The sentence 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about the concept of humanity, unlike the "equivalent" 'Socrates is human', so they express different propositions. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I like this a lot, because it shows why we should focus on propositions rather than on sentences, or even utterances. And asking what the sentence is 'about' focuses us on the underlying proposition or thought. |
3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The principle of charity says that it is unavoidable that the pattern of sentences to which a speaker assents reflects the semantics of the logical constants. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: That is not all the principle says, of course. Davidson seems to assume classical logic here, with a bivalent semantics. I wonder if all speakers use 'false' in the normal way, as well as 'true'? Do all languages even contain 'true'? |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The sentences that contain metaphors are typically obviously false or trivially true, because these are typically indications that something is intended as a metaphor. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: A nice point which sounds correct. Metaphors are famous being false, but the 'obvious' falseness signals the metaphor. If a metaphor is only obscurely false, that makes it difficult to read. |
7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |