55 ideas
| 23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
| A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
| 3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
| 10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
| Full Idea: I understand questions about the Fregean notion of an object to be inseparable from questions in the philosophy of language - questions of the existence of objects are tantamount to questions about non-vacuous singular terms of a certain kind. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This view hovers somewhere between Quine and J.L. Austin, and Dummett is its originator. I am instinctively deeply opposed to the identification of metaphysics with semantics. |
| 23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
| A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
| 10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
| Full Idea: An expression ... should be reckoned a genuine singular term only if it resists elimination by paraphrase. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as extraordinarily optimistic. It will be relative to a language, and the resources of a given speaker, and seems open to the invention of new expressions to do the job (e.g. an equivalent adjective for every noun in the dictionary). |
| 10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The criteria for a genuine singular term should pick out not the singular terms themselves but their uses, since they may be genuine in one context and not another. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: [rephrased] This will certainly meet problems with vagueness (e.g. as the reference of a singular term is gradually clarified). |
| 10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
| Full Idea: In 'the whale is increasingly scarce' and 'the whale is much improved today' (our pet whale), we cannot infer that there is something that is much improved and increasingly scarce, so this singular term fails Dummett's criterion based on inference. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: [much rephrased] This is not just a problem for a few cunningly selected examples. With contortions almost any singular term can be undermined in this way. Singular terms are simply not a useful guide to the existence of abstracta. |
| 10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Some examples where a definite singular noun phrase is not 'genuine' (giving ontological commitment): 'left us in the lurch'; 'for my mother's sake'; 'given the sack'; 'in the nick of time', 'the whereabouts of the PM', 'the identity of the murderer'. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: These are not just freakish examples. If I 'go on a journey', that doesn't involve extra entities called 'journeys', just because the meaning is clearer and a more commonplace part of the language. |
| 10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
| Full Idea: If we lack any general, language-neutral characterization of singular terms, must not a parallel linguistic relativity infect the objects which are to be thought of as their non-linguistic correlates? | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.III) | |
| A reaction: Hale thinks he can answer this, but I would have thought that this problem dooms the linguistic approach from the start. There needs to be more imagination about how very different a language could be, while still qualifying as a language. |
| 10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The 'concrete/abstract' distinction has a strong intuitive feel, and can seem to be drawable by familiar contrasts, between what can/cannot be perceived, what can/cannot be involved in causal interactions, and is/is not located in space and time. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.I) | |
| A reaction: Problems arise, needless to say. The idea of an abstraction can be causal, and abstractions seem to change. If universals are abstract, we seem to perceive some of them. They can hardly be non-spatial if they have a temporal beginning and end. |
| 10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: It might seem that colours would qualify both as concrete and as abstract objects. ...and geometrical points also seem to be borderline. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.II) | |
| A reaction: The theory of tropes exploits this uncertainty. Dummett (1973:ch.14) notes that we can point to colours, but also slip from an adjectival to a noun usage of colour-terms. He concludes that colours are concrete. I think I agree. |
| 10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Noonan suggests that the distinction between abstract and concrete objects should be seen as derivative from a difference between the relations centrally involved in criteria of identity associated with names of objects. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Noonan 1976, but I've lost it] I don't understand this, but collect it as a lead to something that might be interesting. A careful reading of Hale might reveal what Noonan meant. |
| 10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: In familiar, though doubtless not wholly problematic jargon, token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: This is indeed problematic. The marks may be tokens, but the preliminary to identifying the type is to see that the marks are in fact words. To grasp the concrete, grasp the abstraction. An excellent example of the blurring of the distinction. |
| 10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The domain of the abstract can be seen as exemplifying a hierarchical structure, with differences of level reflecting the number of steps of abstraction, via appropriate equivalence relations, required for recognition at different levels. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: I think this is right, and so does almost everyone else, since people cheerfully talk of 'somewhat' abstract and 'highly' abstract. Don't dream of a neat picture though. You might reach a level by two steps from one direction, and four from another. |
| 14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
| A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
| 10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: If Fs are incapable of spatial location, it is impossible for a and b to be at the same time in different places and yet be the same F. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: A passing remark from Hale which strikes me as incredibly significant. The very idea of a 'one-over-many' is that there are many locations for the thing, so to conclude that the thing is therefore non-located seems to negate the original problem. |
| 10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
| Full Idea: On the traditional realist's view abstract qualities (universals) are the common referents of two quite different sorts of expression - of ordinary adjectives (predicates), and of abstract nouns referring to them. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: This fact alone should make us suspicious, especially as there isn't an isomorphism between the nouns and the adjectives, and the match-up will vary between languages. |
| 10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The traditional conception of universals, resting as it does upon the idea that some single type of entity is picked out by expressions of such radically different logical types as predicates and abstract nouns, is of doubtful coherence. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3 Intro) | |
| A reaction: A striking case of linguistic metaphysics in action. I don't believe in universals, but I don't find this persuasive, as our capacity to express the same proposition by means of extremely varied syntax is obvious. Is 'horse' an abstract noun? |
| 20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
| A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
| 3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
| 17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
| 556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
| 563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
| 565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
| 557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
| 10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Objections to Frege's argument for abstract objects: that the objects would not have the right sort of independence; that we could have no knowledge of them; that the singular term statements can't be had; that thoughts of abstracta can't be identified. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] [See Idea 10309 for the original argument] It is helpful to have this list, even if Hale rejects them all. They are also created but then indestructible, and exist in unlimited profusion, and seem relative to a language. Etc! |
| 9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
| Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
| 10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
| Full Idea: While a shape or a direction is necessarily of something, games, musical compositions or dance routines are not of anything at all. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.II) | |
| A reaction: This seems important, because Frege's abstraction principle works nicely for abstractions 'of' some objects, but is not so clear for abstracta that are sui generis. |
| 10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
| Full Idea: There are many plausible example of abstract objects which, though non-spatial, do not appear to satisfy the suggested requirement of atemporality, such as chess, or the English language. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.1) | |
| A reaction: Given the point that modern physics is committed to 'space-time', with no conceivable separation of them, this looks dubious. Though I think the physics could be challenged. Try Idea 7621, for example. |
| 10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: If mental events are genuinely non-spatial, but not atemporal, its effect is to classify them as abstract; the distinction between the abstract and the mental simply collapses. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.1) | |
| A reaction: This is important. You can't discuss this sort of metaphysics in isolation from debates about the ontology of mind. Functionalists do treat mental events as abstractions. |
| 10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The abstract/concrete distinction is, roughly, between those sortals whose grounding relations can hold between abstract things which are spatially but not temporally separated, those concrete things whose grounding relations cannot so hold. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: Thus being a father is based on 'begat', which does not involve spatial separation, and so is concrete. The relation is one of equivalence. |
| 10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The notion of an 'object' first introduced by Frege is much broader than that of most comparable ordinary uses of 'object', and is now fairly standard and familiar. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This makes it very difficult to get to grips with the metaphysical issues involved, since the ontological claims disappear into a mist of semantic vagueness. |
| 10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Onotological outrage at such objects as the 'whereabouts of the Prime Minister' derives from the fact that we seem beggared for any convincing answer to the question 'What kind of objects are they?' | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: I go further and ask of any object 'what is it made of?' When I receive the answer that I am being silly, and that abstract objects are not 'made' of anything, I am tempted to become sarcastic, and say 'thank you - that makes it much clearer'. |
| 13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
| A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
| 13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
| 13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
| A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
| 593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
| 13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
| A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
| 11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
| 11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
| 10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The relations which are featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: This will only apply to strict identity. If I say 'a is almost identical to b', this will obviously not be endlessly transitive (as when we get to k we may have lost the near-identity to a). Are 'two threes' identical to 'three twos'? |
| 10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Not every (apparent) judgement of identity involves application of anything properly describable as a criterion of identity, ...such as being able to pronounce that mercy is the quality of being merciful. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: This suggests some distinction between internal criteria (e.g. grammatical, conceptual) and external criteria (existent, sensed). |
| 12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
| Full Idea: The fact that different standards are routinely applied in making an evaluative judgement does not imply the correctness of semantic contextualism about the contents of judgements. ..We can't infer different truth conditions from differing standards. | |
| From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.51) | |
| A reaction: This is the basic objection to contextualism from the 'invariantist' camp, which says there are facts about good judgement and justification, despite contextual shifts. My sympathies are with the contextualists (on this one). |
| 12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
| Full Idea: Maybe every issue about knowledge (Gettier problem, scientific knowledge, justification, scepticism) has been discussed solely in the single 'really and truly' context. | |
| From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.53) | |
| A reaction: This seems not to be true, if we contrast Descartes' desire for total certainty with Peirce's fallibilism. It seems to me that modern philosophy has deliberately relaxed the standard, in order to make some sort of knowledge possible. Cf. Idea 12894. |
| 17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
| Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
| A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
| 1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
| A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
| 3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
| A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
| 7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
| Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
| A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
| 2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
| A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
| 9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
| Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
| A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
| 94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
| A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
| 17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
| A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
| 6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
| Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
| A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
| 2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
| 1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |