74 ideas
| 23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
| A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
| 14519 | It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: To show reverence for a wise man is itself a great good for him who reveres [the wise man]. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 32) | |
| A reaction: It is characteristic of Epicurus to move up a level in his thinking, and not merely respect wisdom, but ask after the value of his own respect. Compare Idea 14517. Nice. |
| 3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
| 14518 | In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: In philosophy the pleasure accompanies the knowledge. For the enjoyment does not come after the learning but the learning and the enjoyment are simultaneous. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 27) |
| 8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: There are three ways to give an account: 1) 'I deny it' - this earns a failing mark if the fact is really Moorean. 2) 'I analyse it thus'. 3) 'I accept it as primitive'. Not every account is an analysis. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], '1 Ov Many') | |
| A reaction: I prefer Shoemaker's view (Idea 8559). Personally I think 1) should be employed more often than it is (it is a very misunderstood approach). 3) has been overused in recent years (e.g. by Davidson and McGinn). |
| 23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
| A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
| 8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Supervenience is a stripped down form of reductionism, unencumbered by dubious denials of existence, claims of ontological priority, or claims of translatability. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
| A reaction: Interesting. It implies that the honest reductionist (i.e. me) should begin by asserting supervience, and only at a second stage go on to deny a bit of existence, loudly affirm priorities, and offer translations. Honest toil. |
| 8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
| A reaction: Not everyone agrees on this. This says if either A or B change, the change is reflected in the other one. But the other view is of one-way dependence. A only changes if B changes, but B can also make changes that don't affect A. |
| 8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Final definition of 'Materialism': Among worlds where no natural properties alien to our world are instantiated, no two differ without differing physically; and two such worlds that are exactly alike physically are duplicates. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat') | |
| A reaction: This would presumably allow for an anomalous monist/property dualist view of mind, but not full dualism. But if there are no psychophysical laws, what stops the mental changing while the physical remains the same? |
| 14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
| A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
| 8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Universals and properties are different because a universal is supposed to be wholly present wherever it is instantiated. A property, by contrast, is spread around. The property of being a donkey is partly present wherever there is a donkey. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: No mention of tropes. The claim that universals are widespread, and yet must be instantiated, is dealt with by Lewis's commitment to the existence of possible donkeys. |
| 10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Lewis argues that there are natural properties, which makes various analyses possible, especially of similarity in intrinsic respects. Naturalness comes in degrees, with perfectly natural properties being the limiting case. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 4 | |
| A reaction: This sounds to be the wrong way round. We don't start with similarities and work back to natural properties. We encounter natural properties (through their causal action), and these give rise to the similarities. |
| 16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
| Full Idea: For Lewis natural properties are important for their role in making language and thought determinate: principles of charity or humanity tell us to attribute natural properties to predicates wherever possible, break underdetermination of their reference. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 3.8 | |
| A reaction: Lewis always seems to find reasons in semantics or logic for his metaphysics, instead of in the science. Lewis ends up with 'folk' natural properties, instead of accurate ones. |
| 8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Where my cat (Bruce) ends, there the density of matter, the relative abundance of chemical elements, abruptly change. Bruce is also a locus of causal chains, which traces back to natural properties. Natural properties belong to well demarcated things. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: This is an amazingly convoluted way to define natural properties in terms of the classes they generate, but it seems obvious to me that the properties are logically prior to the classes. |
| 8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Reference consists in part of what we do in language or thought when we refer, but in part it consists in eligibility of the referent. And this eligibility to be referred to is a matter of natural properties. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: This is a surprising conclusion for Lewis to reach, having started from properties as any old set members (see Idea 8572). There are references to intentional objects, such as 'there should have been someone on duty'. |
| 8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: One thing that makes for naturalness of a property is that it is a property belonging exclusively to well-demarcated things (like my cat Bruce, who is a locus of causal chains). | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 8557. Well-demarcated things may also have gerrymandered properties that are parts of 'arbitrary Boolean compounds' (Lewis). Why not make use of the causal chains to identify the properties? |
| 8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The reason natural properties feature in the contents of our attitudes is that naturalness is part of what it is to feature therein. We aren't built to take a special interest in natural properties, or that we call them natural if they are interesting. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: Evolution never features in Lewis's metaphysics. I would have thought we were very much built to focus on natural properties. This sounds odd, and gives no help in distinguishing natural properties from all our other daft contents. |
| 15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Lewis proposed that all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], p.355-7) by David Lewis - Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) IX | |
| A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'natural', 'property' and 'intrinsic'! Presumably there are natural extrinsic facts, in naturally necessary relationships. If all natural properties are powers, they would have to be intrinsic. Extrinsics would be derivative. |
| 15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps we could call a property 'perfectly' natural if its members are all and only those things that share some one universal, ...where the natural properties would be the ones whose sharing makes for resemblance, and the ones relevant to causal powers. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: This is Lewis fishing for an account of properties that does a bit better than the mere recourse to set theory (which he intuitively favours) seems to do. He remains neutral about the ontological status of a universal (though he prefers nominalism). |
| 7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
| Full Idea: David Lewis has produced an important theory of properties as sets of actual and possible objects. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §12.2 | |
| A reaction: The notion that a property is an 'object' sounds wrong, as it is too passive. It also seems to allow for the possibility of uninstantiated properties existing, where properties are presumably always 'of' something. |
| 8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Any class of things, be it ever so gerrymandered and miscellaneous and indescribable in thought and language, and be it ever so superfluous in characterizing the world, is nevertheless a property. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: I much prefer, at the very least, the sparse approach of Armstrong, and in fact would vote for Shoemaker's highly physical view. Lewis proceeds after this to try to pick out the properties that really matter. |
| 18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: There are so many properties that those specifiable in English, or in the brain's language of synaptic interconnections and neural spikes, could only be an infinitesimal minority. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: Thus there are innumerable properties that must lack predicates. But there are also innumerable predicates that correspond to no real properties. I conclude that properties and predicates have very little in common. Job done. |
| 8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: We need properties, sometimes natural and sometimes not, to provide an adequate supply of semantic values for linguistic expressions. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: A characteristically twentieth century approach, which I find puzzling. We don't need a Loch Ness Monster in order to use the term 'Loch Ness Monster'. Lewis appears to have been a pupil of Quine... He was not, though, a Predicate Nominalist. |
| 14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Lewis has a preference for a nominalist conception of properties as classes of possible and actual concrete particulars. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects II.3 | |
| A reaction: I'm sympathetic to nominalism, but still can't swallow the idea that a property like redness is nothing more than a collection of particulars, the red things. This class will include all sorts of non-red features. |
| 15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
| Full Idea: According to Lewis's conception, the causal powers of a property are constituted by its patterned relations to other properties in the particular Humean mosaic that is the actual world. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by John Hawthorne - Causal Structuralism Intro | |
| A reaction: I just can't grasp this as a serious proposal. Relations cannot be the bottom line in explanation of the world. What are the relata? I take powers to be primitive. |
| 8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Properties do nothing to capture the causal powers of things. Almost all properties are causally irrelevant, and there is nothing to make the relevant ones stand out from the crowd. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: Shoemaker, who endorses a causal account of properties, has a go at this problem in Idea 8557. The property of being massive is more likely to be causal than existing fifty years after D-Day. Lewis attempts later to address the problem. |
| 8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: I suspend judgement about universals themselves; I only insist that, one way or another, their work must be done. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: This seems surprising (but admirable) in a great metaphysician, but I suppose it is symptomatic of the Humean approach to metaphysics. In the light of Ideas 3989 and 3990, I would have expected Lewis to deny universals. He probably did. |
| 21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: For Lewis, we can see the purpose of physics as being to discover what universals there actually are. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics Intro | |
| A reaction: It seems that Lewis uses the word 'property' to mean predicates, which consist of a multitude of sets, while universals are the properties that naturally exist and cut nature at the joints . Infuriating, because the other way around seems better. |
| 20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
| A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
| 17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
| 3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
| 556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
| 563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
| 565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
| 557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
| 8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The transformed problem of One over Many (in terms of predication, rather than sameness of type) deserves our neglect. The ostrich that will not look at it is a wise bird indeed. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], '1 Ov Many') | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at Armstrong, and defends Quine. The remark moves Ostrich Nominalism from the category of joke to the category of respectable. I think I side with Armstrong. How is predication primitive if it has two components? |
| 8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things. (Note: this resembles the doctrine of Class Nominalism, but I do not claim to solve the One Over Many problem by this means, far from it). | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
| A reaction: Lewis remains neutral about the traditional question of whether universals exist. What does he mean by "is" in his assertion? Identity, predication or class membership? I think Lewis is open to many of the objections to Class Nominalism. |
| 8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Moderate Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism (in its present form) seem to me to be a single theory presented in different styles. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop' n9) | |
| A reaction: Lewis has earlier endorsed a cautious form of Class Nominalism (Idea 8570). Which comes first, having a resemblance, or being in a class? Quine seems to make resemblance basic (Idea 8486), but Lewis seems to make the class basic (Idea 8572). |
| 9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
| Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
| 13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
| A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
| 14524 | Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Epicurus said that body was conceived as an aggregate of shape and size and resistance and weight. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE]) | |
| A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.257] Note that this is how we 'conceive' them. They might be intrinsically different, except that Epicurus is pretty much a phenomenalist. |
| 13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
| 13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
| A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
| 593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
| 13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
| A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
| 11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
| 11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
| 17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
| Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
| A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
| 14521 | If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: He who claims that everything occurs by necessity has no complaint against him who claims that everything does not occur by necessity. For he makes the very claim in question by necessity. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 40) |
| 8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Psychophysical identity is a two-way street: if all mental properties are physical, then some physical properties are mental; but then all physical properties might be mental, or every property of everything might be both physical and mental. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat') | |
| A reaction: I suspect that this is the thought that has impressed Galen Strawson. The whole story seems to include the existence of 'mental properties' as a distinct category. This line of thought strikes me as a serious misunderstanding. |
| 1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
| A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
| 3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
| A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
| 8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Unlike principles of crude charity, sophisticated principles of charity call for imputations of error in the subject if he has lived in deceptive conditions. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: This begs lots of questions about how you decide conditions are 'deceptive' if you have not yet embarked on your radical interpretation of the subject. Davidson's point still stands, that imputing truth must be the normal procedure. |
| 8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: We need natural properties, so that the principle of charity will impute a bias towards believing that things are green rather than grue, and towards a basic desire for long life, rather than long-life-unless-one-was-born-on-a-Monday.... | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: Lewis always seems to be approaching things from the wrong end. We don't need properties so that we can attribute charity, so that we can interpret. We interpret, because we can be charitable, because we all experience natural properties. |
| 7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
| Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
| A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
| 2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
| A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
| 9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
| Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
| A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
| 94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
| A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
| 14522 | What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: One should bring this question to bear on all one's desires: what will happen to me if what is sought by desire is achieved, and what will happen if it is not? | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 71) | |
| A reaction: Yet another example of Epicurus moving up a level in his thinking about ethical issues, as in Idea 14517 and Idea 14519. The mark of a true philosopher. This seems to be a key idea for wisdom - to think further ahead than merely what you desire. |
| 17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
| A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
| 3563 | Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: It is not possible to live pleasantly without living intelligently and finely and justly, nor to live intelligently and finely and justly without living pleasantly. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 5), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16 | |
| A reaction: A person with all these virtues might still suffer from depression. And I don't see why having limited intelligence should stop someone from living pleasantly. Just be warm-hearted. |
| 3560 | Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: There is no such things as justice in itself; in people's relations with one another in any place and at any time it is a contract about not harming or being harmed. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 33), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 13.2 |
| 6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
| Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
| A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
| 14517 | We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: We value our characters as our own personal possessions, whether they are good and envied by men or not. We must regard our neighbours' characters thus too, if they are respectable. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 15) | |
| A reaction: I like this because it introduces a metaethical dimension to the whole problem of virtue. We should value our own character - so should we try to improve it? Should we improve so much as to become unrecognisable? |
| 14513 | Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, neither to harm one another nor to be harmed. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 31) | |
| A reaction: Notice that justice is not just reciprocal usefulness, but a 'pledge' to that effect. This implies a metaethical value of trust and honesty in keeping the pledge. Is it better to live by the pledge, or to be always spontaneously useful? |
| 2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
| 14515 | A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: If someone passes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in mutual associations, this no longer possesses the nature of justice. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 37) |
| 14520 | It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: He is utterly small-minded for whom there are many plausible reasons for committing suicide. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 38) | |
| A reaction: It is a pity that the insult of 'small-minded' has slipped out of philosophy. The Greeks use it all the time, and know exactly what it means. We all recognise small-mindedness, and it is a great (and subtle) vice. |
| 8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A counterfactual can be said to 'backtrack' if it can be said that if the present were different a different past would have led up to it (rather than if the present were different, the same past would have had a different outcome). | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
| A reaction: A nice clear definition of a concept which is important in Lewis's analysis of causation. In the current context he is concerned with elucidation of determinism and materialism. I would say (intuitively) that all counterfactuals backtrack. |
| 8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: My counterfactual analysis of causation needs counterfactuals that avoid backtracking; else the analysis faces fatal counterexamples involving epiphenomenal side-effects or cases of causal preemption. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Laws and C') | |
| A reaction: The concept of true epiphenomena (absolutely no causal powers) strikes me as bogus. |
| 8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Physics must not just discover laws and causal explanations. In putting forward as comprehensive theories that recognise only a limited range of natural properties, physics proposes inventories of the natural properties instantiated in our world. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat') | |
| A reaction: Physics does this job extremely well, offering things like force, spin, charge that are the building blocks for their theories. There is metaphysics at the heart of physics, unavoidably. |
| 15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Physics aspires to give an inventory of natural properties. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
| A reaction: The sort of beautifully simple remark by which philosophers ought to earn a good living in the intellectual community. Come on physicists - this is all we want! Presumably the inventory will include an account of how they all work. |
| 8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system (or, in case of ties, in every ideal system). | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Laws and C') | |
| A reaction: Reminiscent of Peirce's view of truth (Idea 7661). This wouldn't seem to eliminate the danger of regularities with underlying causes ending up as laws (day causes night). Or very trivial regularities ending up as laws. |
| 1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |