16 ideas
| 291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age. | |
| From: Plato (Laches [c.381 BCE], 188b) | |
| A reaction: I have taught teenagers who seemed to me wiser than nearly all the adults I have ever met. |
| 5311 | If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: When the observer shifts his attention from one level of organisation to the next, as from physics to chemistry, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to state a necessary condition of reduction, but not a sufficient one. Wilson points out that new phenomena emerge at higher levels. This principle is similar to Hume's argument against miracles. You don't easily overthrow basic laws. |
| 5312 | A child first sees objects as distinct, and later as members of groups [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: From a single-minded effort to move objects a child's activity grows into a detached reflection on the movements themselves. The objects are first perceived as distinct entities, and then as members of groups to be classified. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This does not, of course, prove anything about the philosophical problems of universals, but it does seem to pinpoint the stage in human development when 'universals' are perceived. The basis seems to be groups or sets, but how do we spot those? |
| 5309 | Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: How does he know this proposition which he asserts so confidently? Obvious counterexamples seem to be utterly trivial beliefs, and self-destructive beliefs. What is the evolutionary value of low self-esteem? Still, you see his point. |
| 22040 | Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Actual freedom is not something immediately existent in mindedness, but is something to be produced by the mind's own activity. It is thus as the producer of its freedom that we have to consider mindedness in philosophy. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III) [1817], §382, Zusatz), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11 | |
| A reaction: Pinkard glosses this as an agent being free by being the centre of a group of social responsibilities. Hence I presume small children have no freedom. Presumably we could deprive citizens of all responsibility, and hence of metaphysical freedom. |
| 22039 | Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| Full Idea: Hegel argued that it was the impossibility of a naturalistic account of normativity that distinguished Geist from nature, not Geist's being any kind of metaphysical substance. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III) [1817]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11 | |
| A reaction: Hegel always seems to want to have his cake and eat it. Without a mental substance, how can Geist not be part of nature? What is Geist made of? Is his view functionalist? But that is usually naturalistic. Is normativity magic? |
| 5310 | Philosophers study the consequences of ethics instead of its origins [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers examine the precepts of ethical systems with reference to their consequences and not their origins. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: He is interested in biological origins, but it strikes me that every moral theory has some account of the origins of morality, be it pure reason, or the love of pleasure, or human nature, or eternal ideas, or the will of God, or selfish desires. |
| 5313 | The rules of human decision-making converge and overlap in a 'human nature' [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: The rules followed in human decision-making are tight enough to produce a broad overlap in the decisions taken by all individuals, and hence a convergence powerful enough to be labelled 'human nature'. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice empirical criterion for asserting the existence of human nature, and it seems right to examine decisions, rather than more thoughtless or conformist behaviour. Existentialists dream of new possibilities, but the old ways always seem best… |
| 5316 | We undermine altruism by rewarding it, but we reward it to encourage it [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: By sanctifying altruism in order to reward it we make it less true, but by that means we promote its recurrence in others. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: So is my preference for not rewarding (or even noticing) altruism an anti-social tendency. The very conspicuous charity of sponsorship seems somehow inferior to the truly anonymous gift. Or super-altruism is very public, to encourage it in others? |
| 5318 | Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: By 'hard-core' he means suicidally self-sacrificing, rather than extensive. This seems a good thesis. It strikes me that the development of civil society is often impeded by family loyalty, such as in the case of the Mafia. |
| 5317 | The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: This is a key element of social contract theory. It shows why natural selection of truly altruistic traits might be beneficial to individuals, provided they are surrounded by possible recipricators. We trust those who are genuine and sincere. |
| 293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |
| Full Idea: To be unafraid (like a small child who doesn't understand the danger) and to be brave are two quite different things. | |
| From: Plato (Laches [c.381 BCE], 197b) |
| 5308 | The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: No species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This invites the question of what that purpose is perceived to be. Some people feel an imperative to play the piano all day, so presumably genetic history has created that feeling. Presumably we can also choose a purpose, even extinction. |
| 5314 | Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and fast, biological evolution is Darwinian and slow [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and very fast, whereas biological evolution is Darwinian and usually very slow. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: An intriguing point, given how discredited Lamarckian evolution is. It links with the Dawkins idea of 'memes' - cultural ideas which spread very fast. Is biological evolution suddenly about to become Lamarckian, as culture influences biology? |
| 5315 | Over 99 percent of human evolution has been in the hunter-gatherer phase [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Selection pressures of hunter-gatherer existence have persisted for over 99 percent of human genetic evolution. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems a key point to bear in mind when assessing human nature. Hunter-gathering isn't just one tendency in our genetics; it more or less constitutes everything we are. |
| 5320 | It is estimated that mankind has produced 100,000 religions [Wilson,EO] |
| Full Idea: Since the first recorded religion (in Iraq 60,000 years ago) it is estimated that mankind has produced in the order of one hundred thousand religions. | |
| From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: If asked to guess the number, I would probably have said '200'! This staggering figure seems to argue both ways - it suggest a certain arbitrariness in the details of religions, but an extremely intense drive to have some sort of religious belief. |