Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Clitophon', 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy' and 'Moral Beliefs'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
21757 Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
     A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
23683 Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her early work she defends the objectivity of moral norms, demonstrating their essential connection to facts about what is good for human beings.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: I don't think she ever gave up this idea, which strikes me as thoroughly Aristotelian. The issue is how to understand what is good for us.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23684 Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.
23690 We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
     A reaction: The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
1590 The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato]
     Full Idea: First, Socrates, you told me justice is harming your enemies and helping your friends. But later it seemed that the just man, since everything he does is for someone's benefit, never harms anyone.
     From: Plato (Clitophon [c.372 BCE], 410b)
     A reaction: Socrates certainly didn't subscribe to the first view, which is the traditional consensus in Greek culture. In general Socrates agreed with the views later promoted by Jesus.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
22379 The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
     Full Idea: There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
     A reaction: I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.