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8329
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Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
There is a fundamental choice between the realist approach to causation which says that the relation is immediately given in experience, and the view that causation is a theoretical relation, and so not directly observable.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
Even if immediate experience is involved, there is a step of abstraction in calling it a cause, and picking out events. A 'theoretical relation' is not of much interest there if no observations are involved. I don't think a choice is required here.
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12759
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There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk [moles], that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §11)
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A reaction:
Leibniz has a constant battle for the rest of his career to explain what these 'atoms of substance' are, since they have location but no extension, they are self-sufficient yet generate force, and are non-physical but interact with matter.
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12718
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Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
I understand matter as either secondary or primary. Secondary matter is, indeed, a complete substance, but it is not merely passive; primary matter is merely passive, but it is not a complete substance. So we must add a soul or form...
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §12), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
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A reaction:
It sounds as if primary matter is redundant, but Garber suggests that secondary matter is just the combination of primary matter with form.
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8324
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The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
Causal states of affairs encompass causal laws, and causal relations between events or states of affairs; two key questions concern the relation between causal laws and causal relations, and the relation between these and non-causal affairs.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
This is the agenda for modern analytical philosophy. I'm not quite clear what would count as an answer. When have you 'explained' a relation? Does calling it 'gravity', or finding an equation, explain that relation? Do gravitinos explain it?
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8328
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Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
The temporal parts of an electron (for example) are causally related, but this relation does not involve any transfer of energy or momentum. Causation cannot be identified with physical energy relations, and physicalist reductions look unpromising.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
This idea, plus Idea 8327, are their grounds for rejecting Fair's proposal (Idea 8326). It feels like a different use of 'cause' when we say 'the existence of x was caused by its existence yesterday'. It is more like inertia. Destruction needs energy.
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8325
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The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
The dominant view is that causal laws are more basic than causal relations, with relations being logically supervenient on causal laws, and on properties and event relations; some, though, defend the singularist view, in which events alone can be related.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
I am deeply suspicious about laws (see Idea 5470). I suspect that the laws are merely descriptions of the regularities that arise from the single instances of causation. We won't explain the single instances, but then laws don't 'explain' them either.
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11854
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If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
If the law of God does indeed leave some vestige of him expressed in things...then it must be granted that there is a certain efficacy residing in things, a form or force such as we usually designate by the name of nature, from which the phenomena follow.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §06)
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A reaction:
I wouldn't rate this as a very promising theory of powers, but it seems to me important that Leibniz recognises the innate power in things as needing explanation. If you remove divine power, you are left with unexplained intrinsic powers.
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12758
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It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
If we attribute an inherent force to our mind, a force acting immanently, then nothing forbids us to suppose that the same force would be found in other souls or forms, or, if you prefer, in the nature of substances.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §10)
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A reaction:
This is the kind of bizarre idea that you are driven to, once you start thinking that God must have a will outside nature, and then that we have the same thing. Why shouldn't such a thing pop up all over the place? Only Leibniz spots the slippery slope.
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19408
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To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
To say that nature itself or the substance of all things is God is a pernicious doctrine, recently introduced into the world or renewed by a subtle or profane author.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], 8)
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A reaction:
The dastardly profane author is, of course, Spinoza, whom Leibniz had met in 1676. The doctrine may be pernicious to religious orthodoxy, but to me it is rather baffling, since in my understanding nature and God have almost nothing in common.
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