88 ideas
19608 | Wisdom is just the last gasp of a dying civilization [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is the last word of an expiring civilization, the nimbus of historic twilights, fatigue transfigured into a vision of the world, the last tolerance before the advent of newer gods, and of barbarism. A vain attempt at melody among the death rattles. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Twilight') | |
A reaction: I didn't quite get what he said there, but I picked up the tone all right. But I thought wisdom was something sought in the early stages of western civilization, and now relegated to the wings as an idle dream? |
19624 | Intelligence only fully flourishes at the end of a historical period [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Intelligence flourishes only in the ages when beliefs wither. ...Every period's ending is the mind's paradise, for the mind regains its play and its whims only within an organism in utter dissolution. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Felicity') | |
A reaction: I wouldn't have thought that the facts of history supported this very well. The golden ages of philosophy are the Age of Pericles, the Aristotelian Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the early twentieth century. |
19599 | Ideas are neutral, but people fill them with passion and weakness [Cioran] |
Full Idea: In itself, every idea is neutral, or should be; but man animates ideas, projects his flames and flaws into them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Genealogy') | |
A reaction: If it isn't neutral (if, say, it expresses love or hatred) then presumably it doesn't qualify as an 'idea'. Are ideas as neutral as mathematical theorems. It's a nice remark, and a good epigraph for a book on the history of ideas. |
19631 | The history of ideas (and deeds) occurs in a meaningless environment [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The history of ideas, like that of deeds, unfolds in a meaningless climate. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This is the 'Tory' view of the history of ideas (as opposed to the 'Whig' view of directedness - a distinction made by historians). I would say there are periods where a certain inevitable sequence is worked out, but then there are dislocations. |
19645 | Some thinkers would have been just as dynamic, no matter when they had lived [Cioran] |
Full Idea: A Kierkegaard, a Nietzsche, had they appeared in the most anodyne age, would have had no less tremulous, no less incendiary an inspiration. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Truths') | |
A reaction: He is saying that some (only some) thinkers are independent of the age and culture in which they live. Personally I think of those two as distinctive products of a romantic age. Diogenes of Sinope seems a bit of a misfit! |
19629 | A nation gives expression to its sum of values, and is then exhausted [Cioran] |
Full Idea: A nation cannot create indefinitely. It is called upon to give expression and meaning to a sum of values which are exhausted with the soul which has begotten them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This phenomenon is obvious. Is it the people who run out of steam, or the ideas and values to which their nation is giving expression? Is this a reason to break up nations every few centuries, and re-form them differently? Break up the UK! |
19618 | I abandoned philosophy because it didn't acknowledge melancholy and human weakness [Cioran] |
Full Idea: I turned away from philosophy when it became impossible to discover in Kant any human weakness, any authentic accent of melancholy; in Kant and in all the philosophers. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: An interesting challenge, but if I set out to develop a philosophy based on human weakness I'm not sure where I would start, once I had settled the 'akrasia' [weakness of will] problem. |
19621 | Originality in philosophy is just the invention of terms [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The philosopher's originality comes down to inventing terms. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: Analytic philosophers are just as obsessed with inventing terms as their continental rivals. Kit Fine, for example. It can't be wrong to invent terms. Scientists do it too. |
19607 | The mind is superficial, only concerned with the arrangement of events, not their significance [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The mind in itself can be only superficial, its nature being uniquely concerned with the arrangement of conceptual events, and not with their implications in the spheres the signify. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 'The Abstract') | |
A reaction: This may be excessively pessimistic, and any decent philosopher must partially concede the point. Thoughts about the significance of historical events just recede into the mist. |
19638 | Metaphysics is a universalisation of physical anguish [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Every metaphysic begins with an anguish of the body, which then becomes universal. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Underside') | |
A reaction: Not sure if I understand this, but anyone who registers the physical aspect of abstract thought gets a nod of approval from me. |
19620 | Great systems of philosophy are just brilliant tautologies [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The great philosophical systems are no more than brilliant tautologies. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: This makes them sound pointless, but the terms used in the system all have some kind of reference, so the systems are in some way about the world, and not mere private games. At the very least, they are a wonderful branch of poetry. |
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e) |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a) |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71 | |
A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light. |
19630 | No great idea ever emerged from a dialogue [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Nothing monumental has ever emerged from dialogue, nothing explosive, nothing 'great'. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This may be an argument in favour of dialogue! It smacks of the creepier side of Nietzsche's thinking. I suspect individuals have had many great ideas during dialogues, though not as part of them. Greek schools were all dialogue. |
19636 | Truth is just an error insufficiently experienced [Cioran] |
Full Idea: What we call truth is an error insufficiently experienced. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how to go about refuting that claim! Turn the tables, I suppose. 'Tell me, Cioran, are you claiming that this idea is true?' |
19642 | Eventually every 'truth' is guaranteed by the police [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Once a belief is established the police will guarantee its 'truth' sooner or later. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Views') |
19632 | An axiom has no more authority than a frenzy [Cioran] |
Full Idea: This earth is a place where can confirm anything with an equal likelihood: here axioms and frenzies are interchangeable. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: A perceptive and poetic expression of the modern anti-Euclidean and anti-Fregean view of axioms, as purely formal features of a model or system. |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections' |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337 |
23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is by the natural light that the axioms of mathematics are recognised. If we take away the same quantity from two equal things, …a thing we can easily predict without having experienced it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], p.189) | |
A reaction: He also says two equal weights will keep a balance level. Plato thinks his slave boy understands halving an area by the natural light, but that is just as likely to be experience. It is too easy to attribut thoughts to a 'natural light'. |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a) | |
A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed. |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d) |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08 | |
A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God. |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d) | |
A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism. |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5 | |
A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something? |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2 | |
A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships. |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies. |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts. |
13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: That which is necessary for something does not constitute its essence. Air is necessary for our life, but our life is something other than air. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: Bravo. Why can't modern philosophers hang on to this distinction? They seem to think that because they don't believe in traditional essences they can purloin the word for something else. Same with the word 'abstraction'. |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically. |
19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Intelligible truth is independent of the truth or of the existence outside us of sensible and material things. ....It is generally true that we only know necessary truths by the natural light [of reason] | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: A nice quotation summarising a view for which Leibniz is famous - that there is a tight correlation between necessary truths and our a priori knowledge of them. The obvious challenge comes from Kripke's claim that scientists can discover necessities. |
19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We use the external senses ...to make us know their particular objects ...but they do not make us know what those sensible qualities are ...whether red is small revolving globules causing light, heat a whirling of dust, or sound is waves in air. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: These seems to be exactly the concept of secondary qualities which Locke was promoting. They are unreliable information about the objects we perceive. Primary qualities are reliable information. I like that distinction. |
19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It can be said that there is nothing in the understanding which does not come from the senses, except the understanding itself, or that which understands. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: Given that Leibniz is labelled as a 'rationalist', this is awfully close to empiricism. Not Locke's 'tabula rasa' perhaps, but Hume's experiences plus associations. Leibniz has a much loftier notion of understanding and reason than Hume does. |
19626 | Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness! [Cioran] |
Full Idea: How much our instincts must have had to be blunted and their functioning slackened before consciousness extended its control over the sum of our actions and our thoughts! | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Coming') | |
A reaction: Modern wisdom, founded in neuroscience, seems to tell us that the role of consciousness even now is far less than Cioran believed. Once you digest that wisdom, I believe introspection supports it. Still, instinct in animals is much stronger than ours. |
19633 | We use concepts to master our fears; saying 'death' releases us from confronting it [Cioran] |
Full Idea: It is the use of concepts which makes us master of our fears. We say: Death - and this abstraction releases us from experiencing its infinity, its horror. By baptising events and things, we elude the inexplicable. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: I like this idea. I'm struck by how weird our lives would become if people no longer had names. They are so deeply embedded in our experience that we don't notice them. Imagine if it were taboo to ever name death. |
19615 | I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran] |
Full Idea: I want to suppress in myself the reasons men invoke in order to exist, in order to act. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Gamut') | |
A reaction: So much of our inner and moral life concerns not what we think or feel, but what we want to think or feel. The theory of action (if there can be such a thing) must account for these metareasons, which hover over us while we act. |
19628 | At a civilisation's peak values are all that matters, and people unconsciously live by them [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Epochs of apogee cultivate values for their own sake: life is only a means of realising them; the individual is not aware of living - he lives. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a very Nietzschean thought. Mind you, a crazed and dangerous crowd exhibits the same absorption in simple values. |
19646 | Values don't accumulate; they are ruthlessly replaced [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Values do not accumulate: a generation contributes something new only by trampling on what was unique in the preceding generation. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'We') | |
A reaction: That may seem true for a Frenchman or a Romanian, but it doesn't feel true of British culture, which seems to me to have accumulated values over the last five hundred years. Before 1500 it seems to me to be a foreign country. We may be near the end! |
19614 | Lovers are hateful, apart from their hovering awareness of death [Cioran] |
Full Idea: As for lovers, they would be hateful if among their grimaces the presentiment of death did not hover. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Gamut') | |
A reaction: A nice existential corrective, if you were planning to build an ethical system around a rather sentimental idea of love! If you are not gripped by a latent fear that your beloved may die, I doubt whether you are in love. |
19634 | Man is never himself; he always aims at less than life, or more than life [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Able to live only beyond and short of life, man is a prey to two temptation: imbecility and sanctity: sub-man and superman, never himself. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 4 'Threat') | |
A reaction: To me, Taoism embodies imbecility, and spiritual religions embody the superman idea. [This is not Nietzsche's übermensch]. |
19619 | To live authentically, we must see that philosophy is totally useless [Cioran] |
Full Idea: We begin to live authentically only where philosophy ends, at its wreck, when we have understood its terrible nullity, when we have understood that it was futile to resort to it, that it is no help. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: The existentialist dream of trying to find an 'authentic' way of life. That idea means nothing to me. You would need to be utterly immersed in the life of a community with which you identified to live authentically, and that life has almost vanished. |
19622 | The pointlessness of our motives and irrelevance of our gestures reveals our vacuity [Cioran] |
Full Idea: When we realise that no human motive is compatible with infinity, and that no gesture is worth the trouble of making it, our heart, by its very beating, can no longer conceal its vacuity. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Disintoxication') | |
A reaction: An interesting choice of reasons. Nihilism in comparison with infinity, and in comparison with the vastness of society? If you were immortal, and there were only fifty other humans, would that help? |
19617 | Evidence suggests that humans do not have a purpose [Cioran] |
Full Idea: By all evidence, we are in the world to do nothing. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Militant') | |
A reaction: I'm not clear what evidence there could be. Other animals are all enmeshed in a particular environment. As soon as homo sapiens left Africa, it became a baffling phenonomen. I'm not sure what an alligator is in the world for, either. |
19612 | The universe is dirty and fragile, as if a scandal in nothingness had produced its matter [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Everything which is done and undone in the universe bears the stamp of a filthy fragility, as if matter were the fruit of a scandal at the core of nothingness. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Reactionary') | |
A reaction: A gloriously imagined idea, worthy of Shakespeare. By 'scandal' I suppose he implies that the universe is the bastard child of a horrible relationship. A prize exhibit for my 'Nihilism' collection. True nihilists, of course, don't write books. |
19604 | Unlike other creatures, mankind seems lost in nature [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Whereas all beings have their place in nature, man remains a metaphysically straying creature, lost in Life, a stranger to the Creation. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Indirect5') | |
A reaction: Nice challenge to the Aristotelian idea that we can identify the nature and function of man, and derive an ethics from it. This idea seems to state the essence of existentialism, perhaps better than anything in Sartre. We should have stayed in Africa? |
19606 | We can only live because our imagination and memory are poor [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Life is possible only by the deficiencies of our imagination and our memory | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Key') | |
A reaction: Does this mean that we should actually aspire to limit our imaginations and memories? Or are we mercifully intrinsically limited, so that massive intellectual ambition will do no harm? We should be told these things, Cioran! |
19601 | Life is now more dreaded than death [Cioran] |
Full Idea: By dint of accumulating non-mysteries and monopolizing non-meanings, life inspires more dread than death; it is life which is the Great Unknown. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Variations') | |
A reaction: This is the sort of remark we pay continental philosophers to make. |
19640 | No one is brave enough to say they don't want to do anything; we despise such a view [Cioran] |
Full Idea: No one has the audacity to exclaim: 'I don't want to do anything!' - we are more indulgent with a murderer than with a mind emancipated from actions. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'The Architect') | |
A reaction: Perhaps this should be the anti-epigraph for this website. I've slogged away at this project for nineteen years, probably for no other reason than that inactivity appears to be wicked. If I abandoned it, I would invent another project. Sad. |
19602 | You are stuck in the past if you don't know boredom [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The man who knows nothing of ennui is still in the world's childhood. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Dislocation') | |
A reaction: Boredom well may be the central experience of existentialism, rather than angst, or nihilism, or the temptations of suicide. |
19644 | History is the bloody rejection of boredom [Cioran] |
Full Idea: History is the bloody product of the rejection of boredom. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Views') | |
A reaction: How many absurd and horrible things have been done by people who could not stand being bored? But also, almost everything wonderful has the same source. How did Bach and Shakespeare and Rembrandt feel about boredom? |
19641 | If you lack beliefs, boredom is your martyrdom [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Ennui is the martyrdom of those who live and die for no belief. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Obsequies') |
19613 | It is pointless to refuse or accept the social order; we must endure it like the weather [Cioran] |
Full Idea: It is equally futile to refuse or to accept the social order: we must endure its changes for the better or the worse with a despairing conformism, as we endure birth, love, the weather, and death. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Reactionary') |
19627 | Opportunists can save a nation, and heroes can ruin it [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Opportunists have saved nations; heroes have ruined them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Defense') | |
A reaction: Siegfried smashes the staff of Wotan. Napoleon looks like a hero, but he increasingly looks like the single most disastrous figure ever to have emerged in Europe. It took the Germans till 1940 to avenge what he did. |
19625 | The ideal is to impose a religion by force, and then live in doubt about its beliefs [Cioran] |
Full Idea: To belong to a church uncertain of its god - after once imposing that god by fire and sword - should be the ideal of every detached mind. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Felicity') | |
A reaction: I'm trying hard to think of an adequate response to this. I'll get back to you.... |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a) |
19605 | Despite endless suggestions, no one has found a goal for history [Cioran] |
Full Idea: No one has found a valid goal for history; but everyone has proposed one. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Indirect') | |
A reaction: This seems to be an attack on the Hegelian idea of destiny that suffused both marxism and fascism in the 1930s. |
19637 | History is wonderfully devoid of meaning [Cioran] |
Full Idea: That History has no meaning is what should delight our hearts. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: I have just read a history of the Wars of the Roses, and I wholeheartedly endorse Cioran's view. |
19610 | Religions see suicide as insubordination [Cioran] |
Full Idea: If the religions have forbidden us to die by our own hand, it is because they saw that such practices set an example of insubordination which humiliated temples and gods alike. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Resources') | |
A reaction: Has anyone ever committed suicide in a cathedral (even during a service)? How many bishops, cardinals, rabbis etc have committed suicide? It is not uncommon among priests in the lower echelons. |
19611 | No one has ever found a good argument against suicide [Cioran] |
Full Idea: No church, no civil institution has as yet invented a single argument valid against suicide. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Resources') | |
A reaction: Suicide in young people usually looks like an error of judgement (in quiet moments of history). You need more inductive evidence that life is going to be irremediably awful. But if life is fine but they choose suicide anyway, what can you say? |
19609 | If you have not contemplated suicide, you are a miserable worm [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The man who has never imagined his own annihilation, who has not anticipated recourse to the rope, the bullet, poison, or the sea, is a degraded galley slave or a worm crawling upon the cosmic carrion. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1'Resources') | |
A reaction: I guess by this date everyone in Paris had read Camus' 'The Myth of Sisyphus', so suicide was the main topic in the cafés. I sort of agree with it. The possibility of suicide is part of the examined life. |
19639 | We all need sexual secrets! [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Woe to those who have no sexual secrets! | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Wonders') |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e) |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 231 |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b) |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 233. |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |
19603 | Why is God so boring, and why does God resemble humanity so little? [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Why is God so dull, so feeble, so inadequately picturesque? Why does He lack interest, vigor, actuality and resemble us so little? Is there any image less anthropomorphic and more gratuitously remote? | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Devil') | |
A reaction: This seems to be directed at those like Feuerbach who said that we had merely created God as a glorified image of humanity. |
19616 | As the perfect wisdom of detachment, philosophy offers no rivals to Taoism [Cioran] |
Full Idea: China alone long since arrived at a refined wisdom superior to philosophy: Taoism surpasses all the mind has conceived by way of detachment. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Militant') | |
A reaction: Personally I dislike Taoism, which seems to advocate a sort of suicide within life. But given Cioran's evident state of mind, I can see its attractions. If this country deteriorates any further [I write on 4th July 2016], I may turn to Taoism. |
19600 | When man abandons religion, he then follows new fake gods and mythologies [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Even when he turns from religion, man remains subject to it; depleting himself to create fake gods, he then feverishly adopts them: his need for fiction, for mythology triumphs over evidence and absurdity alike. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Genealogy') | |
A reaction: Cioran had just lived through the high water mark of communism and fascism. I don't think modern atheists fit this description very well. |
19643 | A religion needs to motivate killings, and cannot tolerate rivals [Cioran] |
Full Idea: A religion dies when it tolerates truths which exclude it; and the god in whose name one no longer kills is dead indeed. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Views') | |
A reaction: I fear that in our time we have people who are killing in the name of their religion as a last resort to try to convince themselves that their religion is not dying. It is startlingly how religion can now be publicly mocked. Unthinkable 50 years ago. |
19623 | Circles of hell are ridiculous; all that matters is to be there [Cioran] |
Full Idea: What a preposterous notion, to draw circles in hell, to make the intensity of the flames vary in its compartments, to hierarchise its torments! The important thing is to be there. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], '1 'La Perduta') |