6 ideas
16659 | Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi] |
Full Idea: It does not seem that a relation adds anything real to that on which it is founded, but only makes for another real aspect belonging to the same thing. It is real since an aspect exists in re, not solely in the intellect, but it is not another thing. | |
From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II.54), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.4 |
16673 | Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi] |
Full Idea: Quantity or extension adds absolutely nothing really distinct to the quantified matter or to the extended and quantified form, except perhaps the union and location and position of those parts. | |
From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II:58,II:440), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.1 | |
A reaction: Other views seem to say that the Quantity provides the extension, but he seems to take that as given. |
1590 | The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato] |
Full Idea: First, Socrates, you told me justice is harming your enemies and helping your friends. But later it seemed that the just man, since everything he does is for someone's benefit, never harms anyone. | |
From: Plato (Clitophon [c.372 BCE], 410b) | |
A reaction: Socrates certainly didn't subscribe to the first view, which is the traditional consensus in Greek culture. In general Socrates agreed with the views later promoted by Jesus. |
11945 | In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It isn't sufficient to say that God has made a general law, for in addition to the decree there has also to be a natural way of carrying it out. It is necessary, that is, that what happens should be explicable in terms of the God-given nature of things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter to the Editor about Bayle [1698], p.205) | |
A reaction: Thus Leibniz is an ancestor of scientific essentialism, but he was too frightened to take the next step, which is to see that once God has endowed the natures, he doesn't need to wield his laws as well. The natures will do the whole job. |
19348 | All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: As for motion, what is real in it is force or power; that is to say, what there is in the present state which carries with it a change in the future. The rest is only phenomena and relations. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter to the Editor about Bayle [1698], §13) | |
A reaction: This presumably contradicts Newton's concept of inertia, which allows constant motion without force. I always like a reference to powers. What is 'kinetic energy' in this context? |
16663 | Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi] |
Full Idea: A subject is limited by its species to certain modes of being. | |
From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], I:586-7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2 | |
A reaction: I think this is so very the wrong way round. Species characteristics are generalisations about similar individual creatures. The 'species' doesn't do anything at all. It is a classification. See ring species, for example. |