21 ideas
13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An analysis of concepts such that we can reach primitive concepts...does not seem to be within human power. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], C513-14), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz | |
A reaction: Leibniz is nevertheless fully committed, I think, to the existence of such primitives, and is in the grip of the rationalist dream that thoughts can become completely clear, and completely well-founded. |
192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
Full Idea: To everything that admits of a contrary there is one contrary and no more. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 332c) | |
A reaction: The sort of thing for which a modern philosopher would demand a proof (and then reject when the proof couldn't be found), where a Greek is happy to assert it as self-evident. I can't think of a counterexample. |
5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A proposition is held to be true by us when our mind is ready to follow it and no reason for doubting it can be found. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], p.7) | |
A reaction: This follows on from Descartes' view, but it now sounds more like psychology than metaphysics. Clearly a false proposition could fit this desciption. Personally I follow propositions to which I can see no objection, without actually holding them true. |
15717 | Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The problem with the Axiom of Choice is that it allows an initiate (by an ingenious train of reasoning) to cut a golf ball into a finite number of pieces and put them together again to make a globe as big as the sun. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 9) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how this works (and I think it was proposed by the young Tarski), but it sounds like a real problem to me, for all the modern assumptions that Choice is fine. |
15712 | 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: You have 1 and 0, something and nothing. Adding gives us the naturals. Subtracting brings the negatives into light; dividing, the rationals; only with a new operation, taking of roots, do the irrationals show themselves. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 1 'Mind') | |
A reaction: The suggestion is constructivist, I suppose - that it is only operations that produce numbers. They go on to show that complex numbers don't quite fit the pattern. |
15711 | The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 1 'Nameless') | |
A reaction: Nice. That is, the rationals may be dense (you can always find another one in any gap), but the irrationals are continuous (no gaps). |
15714 | 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The 'commutative' laws say the order in which you add or multiply two numbers makes no difference; ...the 'associative' laws declare that regrouping couldn't change a sum or product (e.g. a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c ). | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Tablets') | |
A reaction: This seem utterly self-evident, but in more complex systems they can break down, so it is worth being conscious of them. |
15715 | 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The 'distributive' law says you will get the same result if you first add two numbers, and then multiply them by a third, or first multiply each by the third and then add the results (i.e. a · (b+c) = a · b + a · c ). | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Tablets') | |
A reaction: Obviously this will depend on getting the brackets right, to ensure you are indeed doing the same operations both ways. |
190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
Full Idea: If someone asked me 'Is justice itself just or unjust?' I should answer that it was just, wouldn't you? I agree. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 330c) |
20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: The only real kind of faring ill is the loss of knowledge. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 345b) | |
A reaction: This must crucially involve the intellectualist view (of Socrates) that virtuos behaviour results from knowledge, and moral wickedness is the result of ignorance. It is hard to see how forgetting a phone number is evil. |
20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: It would be shameful indeed to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful forces in human activity. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 352d) | |
A reaction: He lumps wisdom and knowledge together, and I think we can take 'knowledge' to mean something like understanding, because obviously mere atomistic propositional knowledge can be utterly trivial. |
15713 | The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The claim that no number is greater than a million is confirmed by the first million test cases. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Extrapolate from this, and you can have as large a number of cases as you could possibly think of failing to do the inductive job. Love it! Induction isn't about accumulations of cases. It is about explanation, which is about essence. Yes! |
191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything resembles everything else up to a point. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 331d) |
203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
Full Idea: Knowledge of what is and is not to be feared is courage. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 360d) |
202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
Full Idea: No one willingly goes to meet evil, or what he thinks is evil. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 358d) | |
A reaction: Presumably people who actively choose satanism can override this deep-seated attitude. But their adherence to evil usually seems to be rather restrained. A danger of tautology with ideas like this. |
193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
Full Idea: 'Do you mean by good those things that are beneficial to men?' 'Not only those. I call some things which are not beneficial good as well'. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 333e) | |
A reaction: Examples needed, but this would be bad news for utilitarians. Good health is not seen as beneficial if it is taken for granted. Not being deaf. |
197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
Full Idea: There are some pleasures which are not good, and some pains which are not evil. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 351d) | |
A reaction: Sadism and child birth. Though Bentham (I think) says that there is nothing good about the pain, since the event would obviously be better without it. |
200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
Full Idea: The only reason the common man disapproves of pleasures is if they lead to pain and deprive us of future pleasures. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 354a) | |
A reaction: Plato has a strong sense that some pleasures are just innately depraved and wicked. If those pleasure don't hurt anyone, it is very hard to pinpoint what is wrong with them. |
189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
Full Idea: Athenians inflict punishment on wrong-doers, which shows that they too think it possible to impart and teach goodness. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 324c) |
188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates: I do not believe that virtue can be taught. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 320b) |
204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates is contradicting himself by saying virtue is not teachable, and yet trying to demonstrate that every virtue is knowledge. | |
From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 361b) |