Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Protagoras', 'Internalism and Externalism: a History' and 'De rebus naturalibus'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
     Full Idea: To everything that admits of a contrary there is one contrary and no more.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 332c)
     A reaction: The sort of thing for which a modern philosopher would demand a proof (and then reject when the proof couldn't be found), where a Greek is happy to assert it as self-evident. I can't think of a counterexample.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
     Full Idea: A power is not the cause of an operation, but only the cause's aptitude for operating.
     From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], De fac anim 4:col 692), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5
     A reaction: His example is the power of running, which is actually caused by the soul (or whatever), which generates the power. A power is a very superficial thing.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
     Full Idea: If someone asked me 'Is justice itself just or unjust?' I should answer that it was just, wouldn't you? I agree.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 330c)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: It would be shameful indeed to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful forces in human activity.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 352d)
     A reaction: He lumps wisdom and knowledge together, and I think we can take 'knowledge' to mean something like understanding, because obviously mere atomistic propositional knowledge can be utterly trivial.
The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only real kind of faring ill is the loss of knowledge.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 345b)
     A reaction: This must crucially involve the intellectualist view (of Socrates) that virtuos behaviour results from knowledge, and moral wickedness is the result of ignorance. It is hard to see how forgetting a phone number is evil.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalist accounts of knowledge do not require the traditional sort of justification [Kornblith]
     Full Idea: What is distinctive about externalist accounts of knowledge is that they do not require justification, at least in the traditional sense.
     From: Hilary Kornblith (Internalism and Externalism: a History [2001], p.2)
     A reaction: At least this gives animals the chance to know things, but I suspect that they never get beyond true beliefs. I'm sure humans have 'better' knowledge than animals.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
     Full Idea: Everything resembles everything else up to a point.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 331d)
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
     Full Idea: Knowledge of what is and is not to be feared is courage.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 360d)
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
     Full Idea: No one willingly goes to meet evil, or what he thinks is evil.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 358d)
     A reaction: Presumably people who actively choose satanism can override this deep-seated attitude. But their adherence to evil usually seems to be rather restrained. A danger of tautology with ideas like this.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
     Full Idea: 'Do you mean by good those things that are beneficial to men?' 'Not only those. I call some things which are not beneficial good as well'.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 333e)
     A reaction: Examples needed, but this would be bad news for utilitarians. Good health is not seen as beneficial if it is taken for granted. Not being deaf.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
     Full Idea: There are some pleasures which are not good, and some pains which are not evil.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 351d)
     A reaction: Sadism and child birth. Though Bentham (I think) says that there is nothing good about the pain, since the event would obviously be better without it.
People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only reason the common man disapproves of pleasures is if they lead to pain and deprive us of future pleasures.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 354a)
     A reaction: Plato has a strong sense that some pleasures are just innately depraved and wicked. If those pleasure don't hurt anyone, it is very hard to pinpoint what is wrong with them.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates: I do not believe that virtue can be taught.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 320b)
Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: Socrates is contradicting himself by saying virtue is not teachable, and yet trying to demonstrate that every virtue is knowledge.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 361b)
If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]
     Full Idea: Athenians inflict punishment on wrong-doers, which shows that they too think it possible to impart and teach goodness.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 324c)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is exceptionally obscure [Zabarella]
     Full Idea: Nothing in the natural world seems to be more obscure and difficult to grasp than the prime matter of things.
     From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], I.1 col 133), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 2.1
     A reaction: This spells the beginning of the end for 'prime matter', since a late scholastic is doubting it, even before the scientists got to work. Most modern Aristotelians slide quietly past prime matter, as unhelpful.