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All the ideas for 'Theaetetus', 'Concepts and Counting' and 'The Structure of Objects'

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57 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are always ready to change direction, if a topic crops up which is more attractive than the one to hand.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 172d)
     A reaction: Which sounds trivial, but it may be what God does.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato]
     Full Idea: A perfect grasp of any subject depends far more on knowing elements than on knowing complexes.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206b)
Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato]
     Full Idea: Either a syllable is not the same as its letters, in which case it cannot have the letters as parts of itself, or it is the same as its letters, in which case these basic elements are just as knowable as it is.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205b)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato]
     Full Idea: Just as primary elements are woven together, so their names may be woven together to produce a spoken account, because an account is essentially a weaving together of names.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b)
     A reaction: If justification requires 'logos', and logos is a 'weaving together of names', then Plato might be taken as endorsing the coherence account of justification. Or do the two 'weavings' correspond?
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato]
     Full Idea: Eristic discussions involve as many tricks and traps as possible, but dialectical discussions involve being serious and correcting the interlocutor's mistakes only when they are his own fault or the result of past conditioning.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167e)
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
     Full Idea: A primary element cannot be expressed in an account; it can only be named, for a name is all that it has. But with the things composed of these ...just as the elements are woven together, so the names can woven to become an account.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b01-3)
     A reaction: This is the beginning of what I see as Aristotle's metaphysics, as derived from his epistemology, that is, ontology is what explains, and what we can give an account [logos] of. Aristotle treats this under 'definitions'.
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The 'aggregative' objection to classical extensional mereology is that it assigns simply the wrong, set-like conditions of existence and spatio-temporal location to ordinary material objects.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 5.1)
     A reaction: [She attributes this to Kit Fine] The point is that there is more to a whole than just some parts, otherwise you could scatter the parts across the globe (or even across time) and claim that the object still existed. It's obvious really.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Two conceptions of logical consequence: a substitutional account, where no substitution of non-logical terms for others (of the right syntactic category) produce true premises and false conclusions; and model theory, where no interpretation can do it.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.3.2 n8)
     A reaction: [compressed]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' may be necessarily truth-preserving, but it would not be classified as logically valid by standard systems of logic.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.3.2)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: One requirement for a successful count is that double counting should be avoided: a single object should not be counted twice. ...but that is to make a knowledgeable judgement of distinctness - to resolve a question of identity in the negative.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (Concepts and Counting [2002], III)
     A reaction: He also notes later (p.65) that you must count all and only the right things.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: We hit trouble if we hear answers to some 'How many?' questions as predications about concepts. The correct answer to 'how many gallons of water are in the tank?' may be 'ten', but that doesn''t mean ten things instantiate 'gallon of water in the tank'.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (Concepts and Counting [2002], I)
     A reaction: Rumfitt makes the point that a huge number of things instantiate that concept in a ten gallon tank of water. No problem, says Rumfitt, because Frege wouldn't have counted that as a statement of number.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Those who hold that not all mathematical questions can be concerned with structural matters can point to 'why are π or e transcendental?' or 'how are the prime numbers distributed?' as questions about particular features in the domain.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.3.1 n6)
     A reaction: [She cites Mac Lane on this] The reply would have to be that we only have those particular notions because we have abstracted them from structures, as in deriving π for circles.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
     Full Idea: It must surely be true that a man who has completely mastered arithmetic knows all numbers? Because there are pieces of knowledge covering all numbers in his soul.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 198b)
     A reaction: This clearly views numbers as objects. Expectation of knowing them all is a bit startling! They also appear to be innate in us, and hence they appear to be Forms. See Aristotle's comment in Idea 645.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato]
     Full Idea: There are two kinds of change, I think: alteration and motion.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 181d)
     A reaction: Idea 1700 is better than this.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Structures make available positions or places for objects, and place restraints on the type of constituent, and on their configuration. ...These lead to restrictions on the number of objects, and on which parts of the structure are invariable.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.6)
     A reaction: [compressed] That's a pretty good first shot at saying what a structure is, which I have so far not discovered any other writer willing to do. I take this to be an exploration of what Aristotle meant by 'form'.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The 'categorical' properties are roughly those that concern what goes on in the actual world; the properties excluded from that family are the 'hypothetical' ones, which concern what goes on in other worlds.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 3.2.3.1)
     A reaction: The awkward guest at this little party is the 'dispositional' properties, which are held to exist in the actual world, but have implications for other worlds. I'm a fan of them.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: My project is to put the notion of structure or form squarely back at the center of any adequate account of the notion of part, whole and object.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: Excellent. It is the fault of logicians, who presumably can't cope with such elusive and complex concepts, that we have ended up with objects as lists of things or properties, or quantifications over them.
If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: If a whole is just a structure, we wonder how the guests could really be part of the dinner party seating structure, when the complex whole is fully exhausted by the structure that specifies the slots.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 4.2.2)
     A reaction: This cuts both ways. A dinner party may necessarily require guests, but the seating plan can be specified in the absence of any guests, who may never turn up. A seating plan is not a dinner party. Perhaps we have two objects here.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: That objects are compounds of matter and form yields a solution to the Problem of Constitution: the clay is merely a proper part of the statue (viz. its matter); the 'remainder' of the statue is its formal or structural components which distinguish it.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Info)
     A reaction: Thus philosophers have thought that it might consist of two objects because they have failed to grasp what an 'object' is. I would add that we need to mention 'essence', so that the statue can survive minor modifications. This is the solution!
Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The statue and the clay appear to differ in modal properties (such as being able to survive squashing), and temporal properties (coming into existence after the lump of clay), and in constitution (only the statue is constituted of the clay).
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2)
     A reaction: I think the modal properties are the biggest problem here. You can't say a thing and its constitution are different objects, as they are necessarily connected. Structure comes into existence at t, but the structure isn't the whole object.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The notion of structure or form, far from being a mysterious and causally inert invention of philosophers, lies at the very center of many scientific and other rigorous endeavours, such as mathematics, logic, linguistics, chemistry and music.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: This echoes my own belief exactly, and places Aristotle at the centre of the modern stage. Her list of subjects is intriguing, and will need a bit of thought.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The view that constitution is identity has many versions: eliminativism (van Inwagen), identity relative to time (Gallois), identity relativized to sort (Geach), four-dimensionalism (Lewis, Sider), contingent identity (Gibbard), dominant kinds (Burke).
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2 n17)
     A reaction: [she offers other names- useful footnote] Eliminativism says there is no identity. Gallois's view is Heraclitus. Geach seems to deny nature, since sorts are partly conventional. 4-D, nah! Gibbard: it could be the thing but lack its identity? Kinds wrong.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Parthood (for the three-dimensionalist) must be a three-place relation between pairs of objects and times, not the timeless two-place relation at work in the original Calculus of Individuals.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 2.2)
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: A building may be composed of proper parts which are themselves buildings; a particular pattern may be composed of proper parts which are themselves patterns (even the same pattern, on a smaller scale).
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.12)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a rather important observation, if you are (erroneously) trying to establish the identity of a thing simply by categorising its type.
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
     Full Idea: If a complex or a syllable has no parts and is a single identity, hasn't it turned out to be the same kind of thing as an element or letter?
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205d)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
     Full Idea: But this sum now - isn't it just when there is nothing lacking that it is a sum? Yes, necessarily. And won't this very same thing - that from which nothing is lacking - be a whole?
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205a)
     A reaction: This seems to be right, be rather too vague and potentially circular to be of much use. What is the criterion for deciding that nothing is lacking?
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole does not consist of parts; for it did, it would be all the parts and so would be the sum.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 204e)
     A reaction: That is, 'the whole is the sum of its parts' is a tautology! The claim that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts' gets into similar trouble. See Verity Harte on this.
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The modern theory of parts and wholes was intended primarily to replace set theory; in this way, wholes came out looking as much like sets as they possibly could, without set theory's commitment to an infinite hierarchy of abstract objects.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: A very nice clarificatory remark, which explains well this rather baffling phenomenon of people who think there is nothing more to a whole than a pile of parts, as if a scrap heap were the same as a fleet of motor cars.
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: A commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities that are numerically distinct from their parts (by Leibniz's Law, they don't share all of their properties - the parts typically exist, but the whole doesn't, prior to its creation).
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 3.1)
     A reaction: Presumably in classical mereology no act of 'creation' is needed, since all the parts in the universe already form all the possible wholes into which they might combine, however bizarrely.
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: In my approach (as in that of Plato and Aristotle), wholes are in no way identified with parts; rather, a commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities numerically distinct from their proper parts.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.11)
     A reaction: Calling the whole an 'entity' doesn't seem to capture it. She seems to think there are some extra parts, in addition to the material parts, that make something a whole. I think this might be a category mistake. A structure is an abstraction.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
     Full Idea: Things which are susceptible to a rational account are knowable.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201d)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
     Full Idea: A man has passed from mere judgment to expert knowledge of the being of a wagon when he has done so in virtue of having gone over the whole by means of the elements.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207c)
     A reaction: Plato is emphasising that the expert must know the hundred parts of a wagon, and not just the half dozen main components, but here the point is to go over the whole via the parts, and not just list the parts.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is impossible to believe something which is not the case.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167a)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
     Full Idea: If the object of a belief is what is not, the object of this belief is nothing; but if there is no object to a belief, then that is not belief at all.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 189a)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: Perception is always of something that is, and it is infallible, which suggests that it is knowledge.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 152c)
Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato]
     Full Idea: It would be peculiar if each of us were like a Trojan horse, with a whole bunch of senses sitting inside us, rather than that all these perceptions converge onto a single identity (mind, or whatever one ought to call it).
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 184d)
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato]
     Full Idea: With what physical faculty do we perceive being and not-being, similarity and dissimilarity, identity and difference, oneness and many, odd and even and other maths, ….fineness and goodness?
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 185d)
Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato]
     Full Idea: If you can't apprehend being you can't apprehend truth, and so a thing could not be known. Therefore knowledge is not located in immediate experience but in thinking about it, since the latter makes it possible to grasp being and truth.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 186c)
You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato]
     Full Idea: Sight or touch might make someone take eleven for twelve, but he could never form this mistaken belief about the contents of his mind.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 195e)
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato]
     Full Idea: If you don't know which letters belong together in the right syllables…it is possible for true belief to be accompanied by a rational account and still not be entitled to the name of knowledge.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208b)
     A reaction: In each case of justification there is a 'clinching' stage, for which there is never going to be a strict rule. It might be foundational, but equally it might be massive coherence, or no alternative.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato]
     Full Idea: Either a syllable and its letters are equally knowable and expressible in a rational account, or they are both equally unknowable and inexpressible.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205e)
     A reaction: Presumably you could explain the syllable by the letters, but not vice versa, but he must mean that the explanation is worthless without the letters being explained too. So all explanation is worthless?
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
     Full Idea: If I only have beliefs about Theaetetus when I don't know his distinguishing mark, how on earth were my beliefs about you rather than anyone else?
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 209b)
     A reaction: This is a rather intellectualist approach to mental activity. Presumably Theaetetus has lots of distinguishing marks, but they are not conscious. Must Socrates know everything?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
     Full Idea: A rational account might be forming an image of one's belief, as in a mirror or a pond.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206d)
     A reaction: Not promising, since the image is not going to be clearer than the original, or contain any new information. Maybe it would be clarified by being 'framed', instead of drifting in muddle.
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
     Full Idea: A third sort of rational account (after giving an image, or analysing elements) is being able to mention some mark which differentiates the object in question ('the sun is the brightest heavenly body').
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208c)
     A reaction: This is Plato's clearest statement of what would be involved in adding the necessary logos to your true belief. An image of it, or an analysis, or an individuation. How about a cause?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
     Full Idea: Maybe the primary elements of which things are composed are not susceptible to rational accounts. Each of them taken by itself can only be named, but nothing further can be said about it.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201e)
     A reaction: This still seems to be more or less the central issue in philosophy - which things should be treated as 'primitive', and which other things are analysed and explained using the primitive tools?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
     Full Idea: In the case of a wagon, we may only have correct belief, but someone who is able to explain what it is by going through its hundred parts has got hold of a rational account.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207b)
     A reaction: A wonderful example. In science, you know smoking correlates with cancer, but you only know it when you know the mechanism, the causal structure. This may be a general truth.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato]
     Full Idea: What evidence could be brought if we were asked at this very moment whether we are asleep and are dreaming all our thoughts?
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 158b)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato]
     Full Idea: In medicine, at least, most people are not self-sufficient at prescribing and effecting cures for themselves, and here some people are superior to others.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171e)
If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato]
     Full Idea: To say that everyone believes what is the case, is to concede the truth of the oppositions' beliefs; in other words, the person has to concede that he himself is wrong.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171a)
How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Does a relativist have any authority to decide about things which will happen in the future?
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 178c)
     A reaction: Nice question! It seems commonsense that such speculations are possible, but without a concept of truth they are ridiculous.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Theoretical terms such as 'mass', 'force', 'motion', 'species' and 'phlogiston' seem to indicate that the Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms is committed to an excessive amount of stability in the meaning and reference of such expressions.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.6.2)
     A reaction: This sounds right to me. The notion of 'rigid' designation gives a nice framework for modal logic, but it doesn't seem to fit the shifting patterns of scientific thought.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Natural kinds are said to stand out from other classifications because they support legitimate inductive inferences ...as when we observe that past samples of copper conduct electricity and infer that the next sample will too.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.3.1)
     A reaction: A slightly more precise version of the Upanishad definition of natural kinds which I favour (Idea 8153). If you can't predict the next one from the previous one, it isn't a natural kind. You can't quite predict the next tiger from the previous one.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Candidate species concepts can be intrinsic: morphological, physiological or genetic similarity; or relational: biology such as interbreeding and reproductive isolation, ecology, such as mate recognition in a niche, or phylogenetics (ancestor relations).
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.4.1)
     A reaction: She says the relational ones are more popular, but I gather they all hit problems. See John Dupré on the hopelessness of the whole task.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: It is controversial whether classificatory expressions from the vernacular should ever really be counted as genuine natural kind terms.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.2)
     A reaction: This is a similar confrontation between the folk and the scientific specialist as we find in folk psychology. There are good defences of folk psychology, and it looks plausible to defend the folk classifications as having priority.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: It has been observed that there are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.4.1)
     A reaction: The central concept of biology I take to be a 'mechanism'. and I suspect that this view of science is actually applicable in physics and chemistry, with so-called 'laws' being a merely superficial description of what is going on.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is impossible for God to be immoral and not to be the acme of morality; and the only way any of us can approximate to God is to become as moral as possible.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176c)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato]
     Full Idea: The elimination of evil is impossible, Theodorus; there must always be some force ranged against good.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176a)