108 ideas
21422 | Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant] |
Full Idea: Moral self-knowledge, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one's heart that are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 441 I.I) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear what I am supposed to be looking for on this quest. I'm guessing that being completely honest about one's own maxims in moral action would be a good start. And maybe confronting one's murkier desires. |
21408 | For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant] |
Full Idea: A philosophy of any subject (a system of rational knowledge from concepts) requires a system of pure rational concepts independent of any conditions of intuition, that is, a metaphysics. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 375 Pref) | |
A reaction: 'Pure rational concepts' must be a priori, and (in Kant's case) transcendental - i.e. discovered from the study of presuppositions. Does this actually say that the philosophies of science, biology, psychology, economics etc each needs a metaphysics? |
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e) |
21416 | Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant] |
Full Idea: It is a highly unphilosophic expedient to resort to a number of proofs for one and the same proposition, consoling oneself that the multitude of reasons makes up for the inadequacy of any one of them taken by itself. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 403 Intro XIII) | |
A reaction: This makes philosophical proofs sound very mathematical in character, whereas I think most reasons for a proposition given in philosophy are more like evidence, which can clearly accumulate in a rational way. Some maths proofs are better than others. |
19767 | Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Reason is what engenders egocentrism ...turns man in upon himself ...and separates him from all that troubles him and afflicts him. Philosophy is what ...moves him to say at the sight of a suffering man 'Perish if you will; I am safe and sound'. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: He goes on to observe that fights in the marketplace are stopped by women, while the philosophers have all run away! This thinking leads to the sentimental movement, and then to romanticism. |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a) |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71 | |
A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light. |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections' |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337 |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a) | |
A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed. |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d) | |
A reaction: This seems to be rhetorical, rather a precise theory, given that the One is said to be eternal and unchanging. The One is not just what we call 'reality'. |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08 | |
A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God. |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c) | |
A reaction: These seems to thoroughly pre-empt Plato's Theory of Forms a century before he created it. Which shows (as Simone Weil says) that Plato was just part of a long tradition. |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d) | |
A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism. |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5 | |
A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something? |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2 | |
A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships. |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies. |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts. |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically. |
21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
Full Idea: That the concept of a thing is possible (not self-contradictory) is not yet sufficient for assuming the possibility of the thing itself (the objective reality of the concept). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 382 Intro I) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an inkling of Kripke's a posteriori scientific necessities, which place far greater restrictions on the possibilies of what we seem to have conceived, in addition to the mere need for consistency. |
19757 | No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: We seek to know only because we desire to find enjoyment; and it is impossible to conceive why someon who had neither desires nor fears would go to the bother reasoning. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: This appears to be an echo of Hume's pessimism about the autonomy of reason. This downgrading of reason is a striking feature of the Enlightenment, which presumably culminates in the romantic movement. |
19760 | General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Every general idea is purely intellectual. The least involvement of the imagination thereupon makes the idea particular. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: This thought is in Berkeley, who seemed to think that general ideas were impossible, because imagination was always required. Rousseau is certainly an improvement on that. |
19759 | Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: General ideas can be introduced into the mind only with the aid of words. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Hm. How did humanity manage to invent general words. Do animals not have general thoughts, e.g. about food, shelter, predators? Roussea goes on to deny that monkeys see nuts as a 'type' of fruit. |
21421 | Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant] |
Full Idea: In the system of nature, man is a being of slight importance ....but man regarded as a person, that is as the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any price. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 434 I.I) | |
A reaction: See what you've done, John Locke? You've given yet another ground for claiming that humans are angels or demi-gods, exalted far above our animal cousins. |
19758 | Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: If men needed speech in order to learn to think, they had a still greater need for knowing how to think in order to discover the art of speaking. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: I take language to be a consequence of the emergence of meta-thought in humanity, so I thoroughly endorse Rousseau's view. The idea that rationality, and even consciousness, are mainly facilitated by language strikes me as quite wrong. |
19773 | Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Where there is no love, what use is beauty? | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Rousseau seems to be thinking of sexual attractiveness, but the aphorism seems to have universal application. |
21415 | Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant] |
Full Idea: Moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbour, and respect for oneself (self-esteem). There is no obligation to have these, because they lie at the basis of morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 399 Intro XII) | |
A reaction: A bit of a revelation, this one, because I thought the only precondition for Kantian morality was rationality. Turns out that he agrees with Aristotle (Idea 46) that you can't started in morality if your heart isn't in the right place. |
19769 | Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Although it might be appropriate for Socrates and minds of his stature to acquire virtue through reason, the human race would long ago have ceased to exist, if its preservation had depended solely on the reasonings of its members. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: He takes our natural compassion to be the basis of morality. Hume combines that with a natural social prudence. Apes live successfully together in groups, without a Socrates. See MacIntyre on the failure of reasoned morality. |
21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
Full Idea: No moral principle is based on any feeling whatsoever. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 376 Pref) | |
A reaction: If all emotions were erased from my morality, I might still retain some principles (in a Kantian way), but my values would be entirely different. |
21431 | The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant] |
Full Idea: Love of man is required by itself, in order to present the world as a beautiful moral whole in its full perfection, even if no account is taken of advantages (of happiness). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 458 I.II) | |
A reaction: For me, this illustrates the basic problem with Kant. In the Groundwork he presents morality as arising from pure reason, deriving moral maxims from contradictions, but here we find a totally ungrounded assertion of grand traditional values. |
21437 | All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant] |
Full Idea: All moral relations of rational beings, which involve a principle of the harmony of the will of one with another, can be reduced to love and respect. Love reduces one's will to another's end, and respect to another's right. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 488 II) | |
A reaction: It all comes out too neat and tidy in Kant. Love doesn't merely focus on another person's 'ends', and respect should be for a lot more than another person's mere 'rights'. They'd have to be natural rights, because some societies restrict rights. |
21429 | The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant] |
Full Idea: The duty of love for one's neighbour can be expressed as the duty to make others' ends my own (provided they are not immoral). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 449 I.II) | |
A reaction: An interesting idea. Kant's remarks on love and respect seem distorted, to shoehorn them into his system of end/means and maxims. If I love someone, should I continually enquire what their current ends are? |
19752 | If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: If I am obliged not to do any harm to my fellow man, it is less because he is a rational being than because he is a sentient being. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Pref) | |
A reaction: How should sentience and rationality be weighted here? Kant demands instrinsic respect for beings on the grounds of their rationality. What could ever justify doing needless harm to anything? An open goal for virtue theory here. |
19768 | The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Instead of the sublime maxim of reasoned justice 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you', pity inspires a less perfect but perhaps more useful one: 'Do what is good for you with as little harm as possible to others'. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: His revised maxim is like J.S. Mill's formula for liberalism. The first maxim seems more contractarian, the second more utilitarian. |
21411 | A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant] |
Full Idea: Only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue. ....[385] The necessary ends are one's own perfection, and the happiness of others. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 383 Intro II) | |
A reaction: So virtues are a subset of duties. I don't think an Aristotelian virtue is anything like a duty. A soldier might do his duty, with no virtue at all. An even a Kantian categorical imperative duty can be formed without right feeling or good character. |
21413 | Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant] |
Full Idea: Virtue is the strength of man's maxims in fulfilling his duty. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 394 Intro IX) | |
A reaction: So virtue is just strong moral commitment. So what are we to make of the lists of distinctive virtues, found in every culture? How do they differ? Only in the areas of duty to which they refer? How do we possess some virtues without others? |
21414 | The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant] |
Full Idea: The supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: Act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 395 Intro IX) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that any end can be a universal law. I certainly don't expect everyone to study philosophy. I suppose basic human ends, such as kindness and avoidance of suicide, are what he means. He's even more conformist than Aristotle! |
21436 | We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant] |
Full Idea: Affability, sociability, courtesy, hospitality and gentleness in argument ...are merely the manners one is obliged to show in social intercourse, ...and so they promote a virtuous disposition by at least making virtue fashionable. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 473-4 I.II App) | |
A reaction: His emphasis on rational duty forces him to diminish virtue, making it sound hypocritical. He needs Aristotle's distinction between the controlled [enkratic] man and the man of true virtue (which is rational and whole-hearted). |
21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
Full Idea: If the practice of virtue were to become a habit the subject would suffer loss to that freedom in adopting his maxims which distinguishes an action done from duty. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 409 Intro XVI) | |
A reaction: Looks like a misunderstanding of Aristotle, who always promotes the role of 'phronesis' [practical reason], and never advocates unthinking virtuous habits. I think Aristotle would ask how you select your maxim, if you lack the virtues. |
21417 | How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant] |
Full Idea: Who will specify for me this mean between the two extremes? What distinguishes avarice (as a vice) from thrift (as a virtue) is not that avarice carries thift too far but that avarice has an entirely different principle (maxim). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 404n Intro XIII) | |
A reaction: He says one concerns enjoyment of possessions, and the other their mere possession. Similarly, reckless courage may aim at glory, while cowardice aims at survival. Aristotle is looking at circumstances, Kant at mental states. |
21420 | If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant] |
Full Idea: If the mean between prodigality and avarice is supposed to be one of degree, then one vice would pass over into the opposite vice only through the virtue. So virtue would simply be a diminished, or rather a vanishing vice. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 432 I.I) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but not convincing. Doesn't the thought equally show that vice is a vanishing virtue? Aristotle gives the example of the quantity of food we eat, which obviously passes from starvation to appropriate diet to gluttony. |
21418 | There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant] |
Full Idea: To think of several virtues (as one unavoidably does) is nothing other than to think of the various moral objects to which the will is led by the one principle of virtue. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 406 Intro XIII) | |
A reaction: So Kant commits to the Greek ideal of the unity of virtue - but not for Greek reasons. The unity of duty is what concerns Kant. |
19766 | The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Every day one sees in our theatres someone affected and weeping at the ills of some unfortunate person ...Nature, in giving men tears, bears witness that she gave the human race the softest hearts. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Lovely. Of course, tears in infants are for their own misfortunes, but adults more commonly weep over the sufferings of others. But we somewhat laugh at people who easily cry over dramas about suffering. |
21425 | We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant] |
Full Idea: One can love one's neighbour though he might deserve but little respect, and can show him the respect necessary for every man regardless of the fact that he would hardly be judged worthy of love. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 448 I.II) | |
A reaction: Not sure about this. Respect seems much clearer than love. You can train yourself and others to show respect, but you can't switch on love. Personally, I don't love strangers, but I try hard to respect them. |
21428 | Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant] |
Full Idea: A duty of free respect towards others is only a negative one (of not exalting oneself above others) and is thus analogous to the duty of Right not to encroach upon what belongs to anyone. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 449 I.II) | |
A reaction: Not good enough. He seems to think belongings are the main issue. By referring to one's own modesty, he has no way to indicate equality of respect (among races, ages, genders, religions, animals etc). Being humble does not entail being respectful. |
21426 | Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant] |
Full Idea: The principle of mutual love admonishes men constantly to come closer to one another; that of the respect they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from one another. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 449 I.II) | |
A reaction: It might be a situation where it is right to invoke the Golden Rule. Do we want others to be close to us all the time? Probably not. Respect wins, and love loses! Kant's makes a nice distinction. Respect is a virtue, and love is not. |
21427 | Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant] |
Full Idea: Respect ...is to be understood as the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 449 I.II) | |
A reaction: I can't see any direct connection between my own self-esteem and my respect for others, though in practice great vanity makes us neglect others. I also don't find the concept of 'dignity' very helpful. I think we should respect plants. |
21430 | Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant] |
Full Idea: The duty of respect for my neighbour is contained in the maxim not to degrade any other man to a mere means to my ends (not to demand that another throw himself away in order to slave for my end). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 449 I.II) | |
A reaction: A weirdly narrow concept of respect. Is enslavement the only way to show disrespect? What about sneering at people, or ignoring them, or prejudicially depriving them of some benefit? |
21434 | We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant] |
Full Idea: I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a man; I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a man, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 463 I.II) | |
A reaction: The obvious way to find some respect for a vicious criminal is to ask how they got that way. Their state is almost certainly self-destructive, and not what they would ever have wished for. Would they choose eternal recurrence? |
19756 | Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: It is not so much understanding which causes the specific distinction of man from all other animals as it is his being a free agent. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how deep Rousseau takes 'free' to go. Having little enthusiasm for free will, I would say that we are distinguished by the complexity of our decision making. But I attribute that to meta-thought, the mark of humanity. |
21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
Full Idea: The capacity to set oneself an end - any end whatsoever - is what characterises humanity (as distinguished from animality). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 392 Intro VIII) | |
A reaction: This appears to exclude animals which hunt, or build nests - but we have now hugely closed the gap between humans and other animals. I like this, because it chimes in with Sandel's Idea 21045. |
21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
Full Idea: Man is a being meant for society (though he is also an unsociable one). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 471 I.II) | |
A reaction: A striking contrast with Aristotle in Idea 5133. It is the difference between the communitarian and the liberal views of society. The latter values privacy and good fences. |
19755 | Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Most of our ills are of our own making, and we could have avoided nearly all of them by preserving the simple, regular and solitary lifestyle prescribed to us by nature. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: It is important that he is not really disagreeing with Hobbes's pessimistic view of natural life as 'nasty'. Rousseau attributes that to a later stage, when people are ineptly beginning to emerge from the state of nature. I'm an optimist here. |
19762 | Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Which was more necessary: an already formed society for the invention of languages, or an already invented language for the establishment of society? | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Rousseau declines to attempt an answer. Ants and bees seem to do well, but have some means of communication. Ape colonies are quite sophisticated. |
19763 | I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: I ask if anyone has ever heard tell of a savage who was living in liberty ever dreaming of complaining about his life and of killing himself. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Rousseau's state of nature is much too remote from any current tribal life for this to be tested. It is a nice speculation. Do apes ever attempt suicide? |
19765 | Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: We could say that savages are not evil because they do not know what is good; for it is neither enlightenment nor legal restraint, but the calm of the passions and the ignorance of vice which prevents them from doing evil. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Suggests one of my favourite ideas (Idea 519). While his hopes for savages and the state of nature may be optimistic, the idea that you won't do evil if it never crosses your mind (and it won't if you are a calm person) is very powerful. |
19779 | Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: This summarises Rousseau's view of the earliest stage of mankind, when there was little rivalry, and little motivation or opportunity for viciousness. |
19771 | Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Imagination, which wreaks so much havoc among us, does not speak to savage hearts; each man peacefully awaits the impetus of nature, gives himself over to it without choice, and with more pleasure than frenzy; then all desire is snuffed out. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Interesting to identify imagination as a source of trouble. The idea that the savage lacks imagination seems implausible. Better to say that modern imagination has been poisoned by competition. |
19778 | Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: People developed leisure pursuits, and wanted esteem, which was the first step towards inequality, and at the same time towards vice. Vanity, contempt, shame and envy were born, and acts of revenge. This is the stage of savage people we know of. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] This is important in understanding Rousseau, because his happier 'state of nature' is prior to what is described here, which is the violent warlike state which impressed Hobbes. |
19751 | Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: One principle prior to reason makes us ardently interested in our well-being and self-preservation; the other inspires a natural repugnance to seeing any sentient being, especially our fellow man, perish or suffer. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is strikingly like Hume's nascent utilitarianism. These two principles are the key to Rousseau's vision of the state of nature, from which the union around a general will leads to the formation of a state. Note that animals get included here. |
19774 | A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: A savage man could well lay hold of the fruit another has gathered, the cave that served as his shelter. But how will he ever succeed in making himself obeyed? What can be the chain of dependence among men who possess nothing? | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: You'd certainly need language to express an enduring threat, like excluding someone from all of the local caves. You need to be able to say 'I'll be back', which animals can't say. Huge muscular men must have dominated in some way. |
19772 | In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: There must be much less difference between one man and another in the state of nature than in that of society, and natural inequality must increase in the human species through inequality occasioned by social institutions. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: This is the main idea of his essay - the answer to the question set by the essay prize. Slavery is common in fairly basic societies, but that is at a much more advanced stage than Rousseau is thinking of. It's hard to disagree with him. |
19789 | It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: It is obviously contrary to the law of nature, however it is defined, for a child to command an old man, for an imbecile to lead a wise man, and for a handful of people to gorge themselves on superfluities while the starving multitude lack necessities. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: I wonder if gregarious animals ever starve to death during a time of plenty, because of social exclusion? I bet this idea was quoted widely in 1780s Paris. The massive inequality is not just nasty, but 'contrary to the law of nature'. |
19787 | People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Citizens allow themselves to be oppressed only insofar as they are driven by blind ambition; ...they consent to wear chains in order to be able to give them in turn to others. It is difficult to reduce to obedience someone who does not wish to command. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: Beautiful. This produces what I call the 'military model of management', where people love tree diagrams showing chains of command, and their place in the hierarchy. Life becomes 'either give orders, or obey'. I like democratic teams. |
19780 | We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Evidence confirms that the savage state is the youth of the world, and all subsequent progress has been in appearance so many steps toward the perfection of the individual, and in fact toward the decay of the species. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as an attack on the new rising philosophy of liberalism, and a plea for communitarianism. We should judge humanity as a whole, and not just look at some individual lives which seem to be going well. |
19747 | Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: If people try to shake off a yoke, they put more distance between themselves and liberty, because in mistaking for liberty an unbridled licence which is its opposite, their revolutions usually deliver them over to seducers who make their chains heavier. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Intro letter) | |
A reaction: This 'Animal Farm' thought was presumably ignored in 1789 and 1917. There must be basic rules for revolutionaries, of which priorities they must never drop from sight, and which priorities are dangerous and misleading. |
19748 | Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: I would not approve of plebiscites like those of the Romans where the state's leaders and those most interested in its preservation were excluded from the deliberations on which its safety often depended. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Intro letter) | |
A reaction: I wish David Cameron had read this before 2016. This is exactly what happened with the Brexit referendum, where the people voted for an action entirely opposed to the preference of the majority of their elected representatives. Chaos ensued. |
19749 | In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: In order to stop ...the dangerous innovations that finally ruined Athens, no one would have the power to propose new laws according to his fancy; this right belongs exclusively to the magistrates. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Intro letter) | |
A reaction: Aristotle says (somewhere!) that control of the agenda for meetings is the key issue in democracies. I assume any citizen can propose a law, but only a magistrate can put it on the agenda. Maybe a separate 'citizen's committee' could filter suggestions. |
19775 | People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to enslave a man without having first put him in the position of being incapable of doing without another. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Ah yes. The key to running a slave plantation is not the threat of violence, but control of the shelter and food supply. |
19784 | Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Enslaved peoples do nothing but boast of the peace and tranquillity they enjoy in their chains and they give the name 'peace' to the most miserable slavery. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: It seems to be a sad truth that enslaved peoples are less upset about their condition than outside observers are, especially in modern times, where slavery is usually deemed unacceptable. Slavery might be the best you can hope for. |
19785 | If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: The jurists who have gravely pronounced that the child of a slave woman is born a slave, have decided, in other words, that a man is not born a man. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: The hidden premise of this enthymeme is that man is born free. A key issue of liberalism is the status of children. Are the children of religious believers automatically members of that sect? Can I be born a West Ham supporter? |
19746 | Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Liberty is like those solid foods or full-bodied wines appropriate for strengthening robust constitutions that are used to them, but which overpower, ruin and intoxicate the weak and delicate who are not suited to them. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Intro letter) | |
A reaction: Rousseau vision of a successful society involves robustly self-sufficient citizens (as in the American ideal), rather than people who are free, but easily led into dependence (in a 'nanny state'). |
19786 | Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Stage one gives law and property (producing inequalities of rich and poor), stage two gives a magistracy (producing weak and strong), and stage three is legitimate power becoming arbitrary (producing master and slave). | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: This is the final answer to the prize essay question (with Idea 19772). What a beautiful analysis - and he didn't even win the prize this time! |
19788 | The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: If one sees a handful of powerful and rich men at the height of greatness and fortune while the mob grovels in obscurity and misery, it is because the former prize the things they enjoy only to the extent that the others are deprived of them. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: This seems to be an accurate picture of ancien régime France, and it still applies to modern plutocrats. The pleasure of a nice house is not that it is very good, but that it is better than other houses. Inequality gives a lot of pleasure! |
19777 | Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say 'this is mine' and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: A wonderful riposte to Locke, who thought political legitimacy was based on property! Locke is way too simplistic about whether someone has a true right to their property. Highy dubious claims become ossified after a generation or two. |
19782 | What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to conceive of the idea of property arising from anything but manual labour, for it is not clear what man can add, beyond his own labour, in order to appropriate things he has not made. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: A thorough endorsement of Locke's labour theory of value. It is not clear to me why you have to 'add' something in order to achieve ownership. Don't you own firewood just by picking it up? Golfers give ownership of a lost ball to the first one to see it. |
19781 | Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: From the cultivation of land, there necessarily followed the division of land; and from property once recognised, the first rules of justice. For in order to render everyone what is his, it is necessary that everyone can have something. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: This looks rather obviously correct. You don't plant crops if you are not protected in your right to reap what you have sown, and you would expect to re-sow from the proceeds. Other people will want you to do this. |
19754 | If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Others have spoken of the natural right that everyone has to preserve what belongs to him, without explaining what they mean by 'belonging'. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Locke. What Marxists will challenge is the legitimacy of property ownership, granted by patronage, enclosure, exploitation and conquest. These start as injustices, but that fades after a few generations. Locke has a labour-theory. |
19750 | Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Writers begin by seeking the rules on which, for the common utility, it would be appropriate for men to agree among themselves; they then give the name of 'natural law' to these rules, with no other proof than their presumed good results. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Pref) | |
A reaction: The arguments for natural law strike me as quite good, but pinning down its content looks incredibly elusive, and at the mercy of cultural influences. |
19770 | Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: More primitive men regarded the acts of violence that could befall them as an easily redressed evil and not as an offence that must be punished; they did not even dream of vengeance, except as a knee-jerk response. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: This may be Rousseau at his most optimistic, trying to deny a rather more aggressive streak in people, seen in children's playgrounds. |
21433 | Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant] |
Full Idea: Every deed that violates a man's right deserves punishment, the function of which is to avenge a crime on the one who committed it (not merely to make good the harm done). ...but no punishment may be inflicted out of hatred. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 460-1 I.II) | |
A reaction: A fairly hideous idea, confirming the image of Kant as someone who coldly perfoms ruthless duties. I don't think Kant ever offers any clarity for the concepts of 'deserving' or of 'avenging'. What is the appropriate vengeance for theft? |
19783 | A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: The conqueror and conquered peoples always remain in a state of war with one another, unless the nation, returned to full liberty, were to choose voluntarily its conqueror as leader. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: Tricky if part of the conquered nation accepts the conqueror, and the other part doesn't, as in France in 1940. In a permanent conquest the state of war seems to fade away, as in England in 1066. |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a) |
19753 | Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Since being sentient is common to both animals and men, that should at least give the former the right not to be needlessly mistreated by the latter. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is why utilitarianism led to the founding of the RSPCA in Britain. There is a disturbing picture of people smashing up animals for fun, if they can only persuade themselves that the animals are not sentient. I've heard fishermen claim that. |
21423 | Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant] |
Full Idea: Man has duties only to men, ...since his duty to any other subject is moral constraint by that's subject's will. Hence the constraining (binding) subject must first be a person. Man can therefore have no duty to any beings other than men. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 442 I.I) | |
A reaction: This is good for illuminating why I am not a Kantian. It is not just that animals are ruled out - it is that whether you show respect depends on whether the recipient passes some test or other. Humans with brain damage may fail the test. |
21424 | Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant] |
Full Idea: Cruel treatment of animals is intimately opposed to man's duty to himself; ...for it dulls his shared feeling of their pain and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in relations with other men. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 443 I.I) | |
A reaction: This idea is quite shocking. Kant's rough contemporary Bentham was far more enlightened. If we could be certain that our feelings of empathy for pain were not dulled by cruelty to animals, then it would be fine. |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e) |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 231 |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 233. |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b) |
19761 | Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Men at first unduly multiplied the names of individual things, owing to their failure to know the genera and species, but later made too few genera and species, owing to their failure to have considered beings in all their differences. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: The fact that two leopards differ is not a good enough reason to assign them to two different general terms. Adjectives can do all the necessary modification. The single general term acknowledges something important. |
19776 | Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Negligible causes may have surprising power when they act without interruption. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: A wonderfully simple observation that is a key idea of the theory of evolution. If life was created 6,000 years ago, evolution is impossible. If it appeared 500,000,000 years ago, how could evolution NOT occur? Little changes must occur. |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |