69 ideas
21406 | Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant] |
Full Idea: Considered objectively, there can only be one human reason, there cannot be many philosophies; in other words, there can only be one true philosophy from principles, in however many conflicting ways men have philosophised about the same proposition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Pref) | |
A reaction: An idea that embodies the Enlightenment ideal. I like the idea that there is one true philosophy, because there is only one world. Kant is talking of philosophy 'from principles', which means his transendental idealism. |
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The aim of analysis is to give us knowledge of all and only the platitudes surrounding our use of the concept that is up for analysis. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.10) | |
A reaction: His earlier specimen concept is 'redness'. For other concepts there might be considerable disagreement about which propositions are or are not the relevant platitudes. Smith emphasises that analysis need not be reductive. |
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e) |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a) |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71 | |
A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light. |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The discussion of colour concepts shows that permutation problems arise when a set of concepts, acquired inter alia via the presentation of paradigms, is largely interdefined. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: Smith says that our normative moral concepts are largely interdefined in this way. The 'permutation' problem is that they can change places in the definition set, and so their intrinsic individual character is not pinned down. Sounds right. |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections' |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337 |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a) | |
A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed. |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d) |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08 | |
A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God. |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c) |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d) | |
A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism. |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5 | |
A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something? |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2 | |
A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships. |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies. |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts. |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically. |
21081 | We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant] |
Full Idea: Reason has taken care that the understanding is as fully equipped as possible with a priori intuitions for the construction of the concept of right. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro E) | |
A reaction: A priori intuitions are not the same as innate knowledge or innate concepts, but they must require some sort of inbuilt inner resources. Further evidence that Kant is a rationalist philosopher (if we were unsure). |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: It would be a superhuman task just to write down an explicit, non-summary style, statement of the platitudes that capture our idea of what it is to be fully rational. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: Well said. Philosophers are inclined to make simplistic binary judgements about whether persons or animals are rational. A visit to YouTube will show fish acting extremely rationally. |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Only an agent's desires may constitute her having certain goals, and it follows from this that only her desires may constitute her motivating reasons. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.8) | |
A reaction: We might distinguish between reasons which direct us towards certain ends, and reasons which motivate us to pursue those ends. Most mornings I have a reason to get out of bed, which precedes my motivation to actually do it. |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: There is a minor proviso to Hume's view, which is that desires are subject to rational criticism, but only insofar as they are based on beliefs that are subject to rational criticism. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
A reaction: He says this is not a refutation of the basic Humean claim. He has in mind a desire such as to consume cyanide because you believe it will be good for you. |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: We should concede that a desire may be had in the absence of its being felt. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
A reaction: A nice observation. An example he gives is a father's desire that his child does well. Smith is discussing Hume's account of motivation in terms of desires and beliefs. |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: According to the standard picture of human psychology that we get from Hume, not only are desires not assessable in terms of truth and falsehood, they are not subject to any sort of rational criticism at all. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
A reaction: This is where action theory meets metaethics. The separation of facts from values underlies this, because a desire is a fact, but the wickedness of a desire is not. Surely a desire could be a failure of practical reason? |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: It is an adequacy constraint on any conception of desire that the epistemology of desire it recommends allows that subjects may be fallible about the desires they have. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [I do wish authors would write my short versions instead of their rambling sentences!] Even after the event we may be unsure why we did something. If someone observes self-interest when I thought my action was altruistic, I don't know how to respond. |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Humeans claim that agents who believe they should act may nevertheless lack the desire to do so, where anti-Humeans must say the two go together, and someone with the belief thereby has the desire. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.7) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] A very helpful distinction about the classic debates over the motivations of action. Smith defends the Humean view, and makes it very plausible. No mere sense of rightness or duty can compel us to act. |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Even if we assume that reason prefers harmony between first- and second-order desires, there is no reason to assume that reason is on the side of achieving that harmony by changing first-order desires to suit second-order, rather than vice versa. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.7) | |
A reaction: [Smith is discussing David Lewis 1989 on second-order desires] Smith says that on the Humean view the rational winner should simply be the stronger of the two. Since this sounds like an endorsement for weakness of will, Smith relies on beliefs. |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: One way to decide what we have normative reasons to do …is by trying to find a set of desires that is systematically justifiable, which is our best assessment of the desires we would have under conditions of full rationality. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: This is Smith accepting the Humean view that desires are essential for motivation, but trying to find a marriage of desires with reason to produce the more objective aspects of morality. An interesting aspiration… |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: There are motivating reasons for action, which are psychological states, and normative reasons, which are propositions of the general form 'a person's doing this is desirable or required'. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Motivating reasons are locatable entities in minds, whereas normative reasons are either abstract, or perhaps motivating reasons expressed by other people. Smith says the two types are unconnected. |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The distinctive Humean view of normative reasons for action is that the rational thing for an agent to do is simply to act so as to maximally satisfy her desires, whatever the content of those desires. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Smith disagrees with this view (though he agrees with Hume about motivating reasons). An obvious problem for the Humean view would be a strong desire to do something excessively dangerous. |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: We cannot expect that, even under conditions of full rationality, agents would all converge on the same desires about what is to be done in the various circumstances they might face. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: A very good argument in favour of the Humean view that desires are an essential part of moral motivation. Possible convergence of view is a standard hallmark of communal rationality. |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The 'externalist' view of morality says either that judgements of rightness are motives but not reasons, or (more strongly) that they are neither, meaning that moral judgements do not have practical implications. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [Philippa Foot's untypical 1972 article is cited for the strong view. Hare and Blackburn are typical of the first view]. I would say that such judgements are both reasons and motives - but not necessarily for me! 'Someone should do something about this!'. |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Amoralists make moral judgements without being motivated accordingly, and without suffering any sort of practical irrationality either; the practicality requirement of moral judgement is thus false. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.3) | |
A reaction: It is hard to imagine an immoralist with this nihilistic attitude bothering to make any moral judgements at all. Why would someone indifferent to art make aesthetic judgements? What could a 'judgement of rightness' mean to an amoralist? |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Moral 'internalism' says if an agent judges an action as right in some circumstance, then they are either thereby motivated to do it, or they are irrational (e.g. their will is weak). | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [Somewhat reworded] So the motivation comes from an internal judgement, not from external factors. Is it not tautological that 'this is the right thing to do' means it should be done (ceteris paribus)? |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Moral 'rationalism' says if an action is right for agents in some circumstances, then there is a reason for the agents to do it. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: That is, there is not merely a motivation to act (the 'internalist' view), but there is a reason to act. Smith calls both views the 'practicality requirement' of normal moral judgements. Smith defends the rationalist view. |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The pro- and con- attitudes of the expressivists count as 'moral' only if they are had towards particular people, actions or states of affairs in virtue of their natural features, ….rather than in virtue of being the particulars that they are. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 2.4) | |
A reaction: So whereas emotivists don't have to have any reasons for their moral feelings, other expressivists seem to require reasons (i.e. indicating features of things) to endorse their attitudes. What of reasonless emotionless attitudes? |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: What is it to value something? That is, equivalently, what is it to accept that we have a normative reason to do something? In Hume's terms, is it a matter of believing? Or is it a matter of desiring? We seem to face a dilemma. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Smith is discussing moral motivation, and there is obviously more to valuing something than acting on it. Nice question, though. Personally I value St Paul's Cathedral, but I don't desire it. I value heart surgeons, but don't want to emulate them. |
21082 | A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant] |
Full Idea: The state of nature need not be a state of injustice merely because those who live in it treat one another in terms of power. But it is devoid of justice, for if a dispute over right occurs in it, there is no competent judge to give valid decisions. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §44) | |
A reaction: Could you not achieve justice by means of personal violence? Might not a revered older person have been accepted as a judge? |
21089 | Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant] |
Full Idea: A monarch has the highest power, while an autocrat or absolute ruler is one who has all the power. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §51) | |
A reaction: If society is strictly hierarchical (like an army) then the monarch also has all the power. At the other extreme the one holding the highest power may have very little power, because so many others have their share of the power. |
21086 | Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant] |
Full Idea: A hereditary nobility is a distinction bestowed before it is earned, and since it gives no ground for hoping that it will be earned, it is wholly unreal and fanciful. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen D) | |
A reaction: As the controller of the region of a country, a hereditary noble is the embodiment of a ruling family, which is a well established way of running things. Daft, perhaps, but there are probably worse ways of doing it. Single combat, for example. |
21080 | Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant] |
Full Idea: Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro C) | |
A reaction: This idea shows the moral basis for Kant's liberalism in politics. If all individuals acted without contact or reference to other individuals (a race of hermits) then that would appear to be optimum moral right, by this standard. |
21083 | Women have no role in politics [Kant] |
Full Idea: Women in general …have no civil personality. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §46) | |
A reaction: In case you were wondering. This is five years after Mary Wollstonecraft's book. |
21407 | Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant] |
Full Idea: Our innate equality is independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Div B) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem to capture the whole concept. The two of us may be unequally oppressed by a third. We are unequal with the third, but also with one another, though with no binding relationships. |
21084 | In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant] |
Full Idea: By the original contract all members of the people give up their external freedom in order to receive it back at once as members of a commonweath. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §47) | |
A reaction: This tries to give the impression that absolutely nothing is lost in the original alienation of rights. It is probably better to say that you give up one set of freedoms, which are replaced by a different (and presumably superior) set. |
21090 | If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant] |
Full Idea: Whatever someone has himself substantially made is his own undisputed property. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §55) | |
A reaction: To this extent Kant offers clear agreement with Locke about a self-evident property right. Ownership of land is the controversial bit. |
21087 | Human life is pointless without justice [Kant] |
Full Idea: If justice perishes, there is no further point in men living on earth. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen E) | |
A reaction: I suspect that human life is also pointless if it only involves justice, and nothing else worthwhile. Are there other things so good that we might sacrifice justice to achieve them? How about maximal utilitarian happiness? |
21088 | Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant] |
Full Idea: All murderers …must suffer the death penalty. This is what justice, as the idea of judicial power, wills in accordance with universal laws of a priori origin. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen E) | |
A reaction: Illustration of how giving a principle an a priori origin puts it beyond dispute. Kant is adamant that mercy mustn't interfere with the enactment of justice. And Kant obviously rejects any consequentialist approach. Remind me what is wrong with murder? |
21085 | The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant] |
Full Idea: The church [as opposed to religion] fulfils a genuine political necessity, for it enables the people to regard themselves as subjects of an invisible supreme power to which they must pay homage. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen C) | |
A reaction: I'm sure I remember Marx putting a different spin on this point… This idea captures the conservative attitude to established religion, at least in the UK. |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a) |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e) |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 231 |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b) |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 233. |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |