62 ideas
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e) |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a) |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71 | |
A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light. |
15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
Full Idea: Someone first distinguishes a person's limbs and parts and asks your agreement that all the parts are identical with that unity, then ridicules you that you have to admit one is many, and indefinitely many, and again that the many are only only one thing. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e) | |
A reaction: This is a passing aporia, but actually seems to approach the central mystery of the metaphysics of identity. A thing can't be a 'unity' if there are not things to unify? So what sorts of 'unification' are there? |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections' |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337 |
9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
Full Idea: It will be ridiculous if our student knows the definition of the circle and of the divine sphere itself, but cannot recognize the human sphere and these our circles, used in housebuilding. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 62a) | |
A reaction: This is the equivalent of being able to recite numbers, but not to count objects. It also resembles Molyneux's question (to Locke), of whether recognition by one sense entails recognition by others. Nice (and a bit anti-platonist!). |
9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
Full Idea: The arithmetic of the many computes sums of unequal units, such as two armies, or two herds, ..but philosopher's arithmetic computes when it is guaranteed that none of those infinitely many units differed in the least from any of the others. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 56d) | |
A reaction: But of course 'the many' are ironing out the differences too, when they say there are 'three armies'. Shocking snob, Plato. Even philosophers are interested in the difference between three armies and three platoons. |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a) | |
A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed. |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d) | |
A reaction: This seems to be rhetorical, rather a precise theory, given that the One is said to be eternal and unchanging. The One is not just what we call 'reality'. |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08 | |
A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God. |
14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
Full Idea: Any kind of mixture that does not ...possess measure or the nature of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself. For there would be no blending in such cases but really an unconnected medley, and ruin what contains it. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64d) | |
A reaction: My guess is that Plato is thinking of the decay of living things when they die, losing the proportions of psuché, and then applying this to the unity of inanimate objects as well. One might compare Leibniz's monads. |
15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
Full Idea: Any blend [mixture] which does not have measure or the nature of proportion in any way whatsoever, of necessity destroys both its ingredients and, primarily, itself. It is truly no blend at all, but a kind of unblended disaster. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64e) | |
A reaction: Obviously there can be chaotic mixtures, but I guess Plato is picking out mixtures about which we can say something |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c) | |
A reaction: These seems to thoroughly pre-empt Plato's Theory of Forms a century before he created it. Which shows (as Simone Weil says) that Plato was just part of a long tradition. |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If man is one, and the good is one, how are they supposed to exist? Do they stay the same even though they are found in many things at the same time, and are they then entirely separated from themselves, which seems most impossible of all? | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15a) | |
A reaction: Presumably Plato anguishes over this because he thinks Forms are self-predicating (the Good is good). Big mistake. The Good fathers good particulars which resemble itself, but are diluted? |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d) | |
A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism. |
15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is through discourse that the same thing flits around, becoming one and many in all sorts of ways. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15d) | |
A reaction: This is not scepticism about wholes on Plato's part, but a reminder of an obvious fact, that in thought we can break the world up and put it back together again. It is a touchstone of the debate, though. |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5 | |
A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something? |
374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
Full Idea: Someone can theoretically divide an object into constituent parts, concede that they are one object, and then claim that therefore the one is many and the many are one. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e) |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2 | |
A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships. |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies. |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts. |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically. |
389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Could we attribute certainty to studying aspects of the world, such as how it arose, or acts, or is acted upon, when none of them ever was or will be constant? Of course not. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 59b) |
390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
Full Idea: Moderation and proportion seem, in effect, to be beauty and excellence. So now this property we're looking for, goodness, has taken refuge in beauty. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64e) |
391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
Full Idea: If we are unable to net the good in a single concept, three must capture it: namely, beauty, proportion and truth. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 65a) | |
A reaction: Very interesting. More illuminating than the discussion of the Good in 'Republic'. Is a handsome and honest murderer good? Is beauty part of the nature of the good, or a hallmark of it? |
392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
Full Idea: Both intellect and pleasure are completely absolved of being the good itself, since they both lack independence, that is, sufficiency and perfection. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a) | |
A reaction: This seems to be Plato disagreeing with Socrates, who sees reason and intellect as central to morality. Presumable he means that the good should be a primitive. Why is pleasure not sufficient? |
393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
Full Idea: Good is supreme, followed by beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pure pleasure, then mixed pleasure. | |
From: report of Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: He tells us that pure pleasures are simple pleasures. Epicurus presumably read this. No mention of truth, unless that is part of reason. Why does he value beauty so highly? |
385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
Full Idea: Living beings experience pleasures and pains which seem, and indeed are, false. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 42c) | |
A reaction: The idea that there are 'authentic' pleasures and pains needs some investigation. Misguided anger is a false pain? Vanity is a false pleasure? |
387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
Full Idea: A tiny little pleasure is, if uncontaminated by pain, always more pleasant, truer and finer than a large amount. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 53b) | |
A reaction: More Platonic puritanism. Is a complete absence of pleasure the highest pleasure of all? I don't think I understand 'truer'. Why would a pleasure be false because it is intense? |
373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
Full Idea: The pleasantness of pleasure is not in dispute, but where we say the majority of pleasures are bad, though some are good, you are attributing goodness to all of them. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 13b) | |
A reaction: Bentham's plausible view is that the feeling of pleasure is always good, and the badness is in some other aspect of the event. Compare sadistic fantasy with sadistic action. |
382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is unlikely that the gods feel pleasure or the opposite. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 33b) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 383. |
379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
Full Idea: Neither pleasure nor intellect comprises the good. If it did it would have to be sufficient and perfect. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 22b) | |
A reaction: Seems sensible. I can't make sense of any vision of the good which consists of suppressing some aspect of human nature. (Hm. Our capacity for violence?) |
376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Try thinking about the life of pleasure without reason, and the life of reason without pleasure. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 20e) | |
A reaction: I suspect that we see the two as more deeply entangled that Plato did. It would be hard to motivate reasoning if we didn't enjoy it. Pleasure without reason sound dire. |
371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
Full Idea: My contention is that reason, intellect, memory - along with correct belief and true calculation - are far better than pleasure for all creatures capable of attaining them. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 11b) | |
A reaction: Why? Is it better to understand deeply, or to act well? Can we just say there is objective good and subjective good, and they have little in common? Depressed heroes. |
381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
Full Idea: When harmony is being restored, and the natural state of harmony is approached, then pleasure arises. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 31d) | |
A reaction: The supreme value of harmony was important to Plato, but most of us are less convinced, I suspect. The way to achieve harmony is to avoid anything stressful. |
386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
Full Idea: Intensity of pleasure and pain is to be found not in a good state of body and soul, but in a worthless one. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 45e) | |
A reaction: This just seems to be Plato's puritanism. How can you criticise someone for experience genuine intense pain? Experiencing intense pleasure is no crime, but pursuit of it might be. |
388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |
Full Idea: A hedonist must say that someone who happens to be feeling pain rather than pleasure is, as long as the pain lasts, a bad man, even if he is the most virtuous man in the world. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 55b) |
377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Would you, Protarchus, gladly live your whole life experiencing only the greatest pleasure? Would you think you were still lacking anything? | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 21a) | |
A reaction: the pleasure machine problem |
378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |
Full Idea: A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is not the life of a human being, but the life of a jellyfish. | |
From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 21c) |
21058 | Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm [Kant] |
Full Idea: The public use of man's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men; the private use of reason may quite often be very narrowly restricted (…in a particular civil post or office). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Answer to 'What is Enlightenment?' [1784], p.55) | |
A reaction: The private aspect seems to be the common restriction on speech by employees of the state. Does free speech have only instrumental value? Is the life of virtue possible without it? |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a) |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e) |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 231 |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b) |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 233. |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |