19 ideas
| 7662 | Romanticism is the greatest change in the consciousness of the West [Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Romanticism seems to me the greatest single shift in the consciousness of the West that has occurred. | |
| From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Far be it from me to challenge Berlin on such things, but I think that the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century (though acting more slowly and less dramatically than romanticism) may well be more significant in the long run. Ideas filter down. |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: Coherence involves the logical, explanatory and probabilistic relations among one's beliefs, but it could not do to attain a tightly iterrelated system by lopping off whatever beliefs refuse to fit. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.4) | |
| A reaction: This is clearly right, so the coherentist has to distinguish between lopping off a belief because it is inconvenient (fundamentalists rejecting textual contradictions), and lopping it off because it is wrong (chemists rejecting phlogiston). |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: You could detect the absence of an eleven-dot pattern without having counted the dots, so your phenomenal concept of that array is not an arithmetical concept, and its content will not yield that its dots do indeed number eleven. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.3) | |
| A reaction: Sosa is discussing foundational epistemology, but this draws attention to the gulf that has to be leaped by structuralists. If eleven is not derived from the pattern, where does it come from? Presumably two eleven-dotters are needed, to map them. |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: I am quite flexible on epistemic terminology, and am even willing to grant that a supermarket door can 'know' that someone is approaching. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.6) | |
| A reaction: I take this amazing admission to be a hallmark of externalism. Sosa must extend this to thermostats. So flowers know the sun has come out. This is knowledge without belief. Could the door ever be 'wrong'? |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: In trying to reduce arithmetic to self-evident logical axioms, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.7) | |
| A reaction: I have heard Frege called "the greatest of all rationalist philosophers". However, the apparent reduction of arithmetic to analytic truths played into the hands of logical positivists, who could then marginalise arithmetic. |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: Almost nothing that one knows of history or geography or science has adequate sensory support, present or even recalled. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.7) | |
| A reaction: This seems a bit glib, and may be false. The main issue to which this refers is, of course, induction, which (almost by definition) is a supposedly empirical process which goes beyond the empirical evidence. |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: There is a difference between having just an indexical concept which one can apply to a perceptual characteristic (just saying 'this is thus'), and having a thicker perceptual concept of that characteristic. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.2) | |
| A reaction: Both of these, of course, would precede any categorial concepts that enabled one to identify the characteristic or the object. This is a ladder foundationalists must climb if they are to reach the cellar of basic beliefs. |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: Are foundationally justified beliefs perhaps those that result from attending to our experience and to features of it or in it? | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.3) | |
| A reaction: A promising suggestion. I do think our ideas acquire a different epistmological status once we have given them our full attention, though is that merely full consciousness, or full thoughtful evaluation? The latter I take to be what matters. Cf Idea 2414. |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: Some intrinsic features of our thoughts are attributable to them directly, or foundationally, while others are attributable only based on counting or inference. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.5) | |
| A reaction: In practice the brain combines the two at a speed which makes the distinction impossible. I'll show you ten dot-patterns: you pick out the sixer. The foundationalist problem is that only those drained of meaning could be foundational. |
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: Much of our propositional knowledge is not easily formulable, as when a witness looking at a police lineup may know what the culprit's face looks like. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.1) | |
| A reaction: This is actually a very helpful defence of foundationalism, because it shows that we will accept perceptual experiences as knowledge when they are not expressed as explicit propositions. Davidson (Idea 8801), for example, must deal with this difficulty. |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: One's beliefs can be comprehensively coherent without amounting to knowledge. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.6) | |
| A reaction: Beliefs that are fully foundational or reliably sourced may also fail to be knowledge. I take it that any epistemological theory must be fallibilist (Idea 6898). Rational coherentism will clearly be sensitive to error. |
| 335 | Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Do the gods too hold different opinions about what is right, and similarly about what is honourable and dishonourable, good and bad? | |
| From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 07e) |
| 7665 | Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that virtue consists ultimately in knowledge [Berlin] |
| Full Idea: What is common to most of the main thinker of the Enlightenment is the view that virtue consists ultimately in knowledge. | |
| From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: I have always found this view (which seems to originate with Socrates) rather sympathetic. What is so frustrating about cheerful optimists who smoke cigarettes is not the weakness of will or strong desires, but their apparent failure of understanding. |
| 7676 | If we are essentially free wills, authenticity and sincerity are the highest virtues [Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Since (for romantics) we are wills, and we must be free, in the Kantian sense, controllable motives count more than consequences, and the greatest virtue of all is what existentialists call 'authenticity' and what romantics called 'sincerity'. | |
| From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: The case of the sincere or authentic Nazi shows the problems with this. However, I agree that sincerity is a key virtue, perhaps the crucial preliminary to all the other virtues. It is hard to imagine a flow of other virtues from an insincere person. |
| 7664 | The Greeks have no notion of obligation or duty [Berlin] |
| Full Idea: There is an absence among the Greeks of a notion of obligation, and hence of duty, which is difficult to grasp for people who read the Greeks through spectacles partly affected by the jews. | |
| From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't quite fit early section of 'Republic', in which morality is a mutual agreement not to do harm. Presumably the Greek word 'deon' refers to what needs to be done, rather than to anyone's obligation to do it(?). Contracts need duty? Cf. 4133 |
| 7677 | Central to existentialism is the romantic idea that there is nothing to lean on [Berlin] |
| Full Idea: The central sermon of existentialism is essentially a romantic one, namely, that there is in the world nothing to lean on. | |
| From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: He tracks this back to Kant's view that our knowledge of the world arises out of our own minds. So what is there to lean on? Rational consistency? Natural human excellence? God? Pleasure? Anonymous duty? I like the second one. |
| 336 | Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? | |
| From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10a) | |
| A reaction: The famous Euthyphro Question, the key question about the supposed religious basis of morality. The answer of Socrates is Idea 337. |
| 337 | It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato] |
| Full Idea: So things are loved by the gods because they are pious, and not pious because they are loved? It seems so. | |
| From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10e) | |
| A reaction: Socrates' answer to the Euthyphro Question (see Idea 336). The form of piety precedes the gods. |
| 7663 | Judaism and Christianity views are based on paternal, family and tribal relations [Berlin] |
| Full Idea: The notion from which both Judaism and Christianity to a large degree sprang is the notion of family life, the relations of father and son, perhaps the relations of members of a tribe to one another. | |
| From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: He compares this with Plato's mathematical view of reality. Key stories would be Abraham and Isaac, and Jesus being the 'son' of God, which both touch the killing of the child. Berlin means that the universe is explained this way. |