63 ideas
23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: A world w' is accessible to a consistent world w if and only if w' is possible in w. Being 'inaccessible to' or 'possible relative to' a consistent world is simply being possible according to that world, nothing more and nothing less. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: More illuminating than just saying that w can 'see' w'. Accessibility is internal to worIds. It gives some connection to why we spend time examining modal logic. There is no more important metaphysical notion than what is possible according to actuality. |
14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Insofar as modal logic is concerned exclusively with the logic of metaphysical modality, ..T may well be the one and only (strongest) correct system of (first-order) propositional logic. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: This contrasts sharply with the orthodox view, that S5 (or at the very least S4) is the correct system for metaphysics. |
14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Even the conventionally accepted system B, which is weaker than S5 and independent of S4, has not been adequately justified as a fallacy-free system of reasoning about what might have been. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) |
14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: The characteristic of B has the form φ⊃□◊φ. ...Even if these axioms are necessarily true, it seems logically possible for p to be true while the proposition that p is necessarily possible is at the same time false. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) |
14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Friends of B modal logic commit themselves to the loaded claim that it is logically true that the property of possibly being realized (or being a way things might have been) is an essential property of the world. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V) | |
A reaction: I think this 'loaded' formulation captures quite nicely the dispositional view I favour, that the possibilities of the actual world are built into the actual world, and define its nature just as much as the 'categorial' facts do. |
14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: We can say of a wooden table that it would have been possible for it to have originated from some different matter, even though it is not actually possible. So what is necessary fails to be necessarily necessary, and S4 modal logic is fallacious. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: When we ignore accessibility altogether, we have finally zeroed in on S5 modal logic. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Believers in S5 as a correct system of propositional reasoning about what might have been must claim that it is an essential property of any way things might have been that things might have been that way. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V) | |
A reaction: Salmon is working in a view where you are probably safe to substitute 'necessary' for 'essential' without loss of meaning. |
14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Counterpart-theoretic modal semantics allows for the retention of S5 modal propositional logic, at a considerable cost. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V n18) | |
A reaction: See the other ideas in this paper by Salmon for his general attack on S5 as the appropriate system for metaphysical necessity. He favours the very modest System T. |
14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical modal logic concerns metaphysical (or alethic) necessity and metaphysical (alethic) possibility, or necessity and possibility tout court - as opposed to such other types of modality as physical necessity, epistemic necessity etc. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro n2) |
14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: By admitting possible worlds of unlimited variation and recombination, I simply abandon true metaphysical essentialism. By my lights, any property is attached to anything in some possible world or other. I am a closet radical anti-essentialist. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
A reaction: Salmon includes impossible worlds within his scheme of understanding. It strikes me that this is metaphysical system which tells us nothing about how things are: it is sort of 'logical idealist'. Later he talks of 'we essentialists'. |
14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Just as nomological possibility is a special kind of metaphysical possibility, so metaphysical possibility is a special kind of logical possibility. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view of how the three types of necessity are nested. He gives a possible counterexample in footnote 7. |
14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: The S5 theorist's miscontrual of English (in the meaning of 'possibly possible') makes nested modality unseen, but it does not make nested modality vanish. Inaccessible worlds are still worlds. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: It is held that it is the hallmark of metaphysical necessity is that it is completely unrestricted, the limiting case of restricted necessity, with no restrictions whatever. A proposition is necessary only if it is true in absolutely every world whatever. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
A reaction: This is the standard picture which leads to the claim that S5 modal logic is appropriate for metaphysical necessity, because there are no restrictions on accessibility. Salmon raises objections to this conventional view. |
14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Though there is a way things logically could be according to which I am a credit card account, there is no way things metaphysically might be according to which I am a credit card account. This illustrates the restricted nature of metaphysical modality. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
A reaction: His drift is that metaphyical modality is restricted, but expressing it in S5 modal logic (where all worlds see one another) makes it unrestricted, so S5 logic is wrong for metaphysics. I'm impressed by his arguments. |
14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: If one confines one's sights to genuinely possible worlds, disavowing the impossible worlds, then metaphysical modality emerges as the limiting case - the 'unrestricted' modality that takes account of 'every' world - and S5 emerges as its proper logic. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: He observes that this makes metaphysical modality 'restricted' simply because you have restricted what 'all worlds' means. Could there be non-maximal worlds? Are logical and metaphysical modality coextensive? I think I like the S5 view. |
14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: A mythology gave us the idea that metaphysical necessity is truth in every world whatsoever, without restriction. But the notion of metaphysical modality comes first, and, like every notion of modality, it is restricted. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: With its freedom from the constraint of metaphysical possibility, logical necessity may be construed as accommodating all the axioms and rules of S5. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
A reaction: He goes on to raise problems for this simple thought. The big question: what are the limits of what is actually possible? Compare: what are the limits of what is imaginable? what are the limits of what is meaningfully sayable? |
14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Intransitive relations are introduced into modal semantics for the purposes of interpreting various 'real' or restricted types of modalities, such as nomological necessity. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
A reaction: The point here is that the (so-called) 'laws of nature' are held to change from world to world, so necessity in one could peter out in some more remote world, rather than being carried over everywhere. A very Humean view of such things. |
14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: The real meanings of the simple modal terms 'necessary' and 'possible' are not the same as the concepts of actual necessity and actual possibility, necessity and possibility according to the actual world. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: If you were an 'actualist' (who denies everything except the actual world) then you are unlikely to agree with this. In unrestricted possible worlds, being true in one world makes it possible in all worlds. So actual necessity is possible everywhere. |
14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Total ways things cannot be are also 'worlds', or maximal ways for things to be. They are impossible worlds. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
A reaction: This unorthodox view doesn't sound too plausible to me. To think of a circular square as a 'way things could be' sounds pretty empty, and mere playing with words. The number 7 could be the Emperor of China? |
14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Every argument I am aware of against impossible worlds confuses ways for things to be with ways things might have been, or worse, confuses ways things cannot be with ways for things to be that cannot exist - or worse yet, commits both errors. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
A reaction: He is claiming that 'ways for things to be' allows impossible worlds, whereas 'ways things might have been' appears not to. (I think! Read the paragraph yourself!) |
14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: If one ignores impossible worlds, then ways things might have been are the only ways for things to be that are left. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: Impossible worlds are included in 'ways for things to be', but excluded from 'ways things might have been'. I struggle with a circle being square as a 'way for circles to be'. I suppose being the greatest philosopher is a way for me to be. |
14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: On my conception, the notions of metaphysical necessity and possibility are not defined or analyzed in terms of the apparatus of possible worlds. The order of analysis is just the reverse: possible worlds rely on the notion of what might have been. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: This view seems to be becoming the new orthodoxy, and I certainly agree with it. I have no idea how you can begin to talk about possible worlds if you don't already have some idea of what 'possible' means. |
14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: I conceive of possible worlds as certain sorts of maximal abstract entities according to which certain things (facts, states of affairs) obtain and certain other things do not obtain. They are total ways things might have been. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) |
14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: As far as I can tell, worlds need not be logically consistent. The only restriction on worlds is that they must be (in some sense) 'maximal' ways for things to be. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
A reaction: The normal idea of a maximal model is that it must contain either p or ¬p, and not both, so I don't think I understand this thought, but I pass it on. |
14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: It is not a good idea to think of possible worlds as sets of propositions, and at the same time to think of propositions as sets of possible worlds. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I n3) | |
A reaction: Salmon favours thinking of worlds as sets of propositions, and hence rejects the account of propositions as sets of worlds. He favours the 'Russellian' view of propositions, which seem to me to be the same as 'facts'. |
8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
Full Idea: To say that experiences have propositional content is not to say that experiences are beliefs. | |
From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4) | |
A reaction: This is important for opponents of foundationalism, because they will not allow a raw experience to act as a justification on its own. Even if concepts, or even propositions, are offered by experience, the crucial evaluation must preceded knowledge. |
8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
Full Idea: The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but from considering examples, such as I have a headache, I am raising my arm, I am imagining my grandmother, or seeing how dominoes could fill a chessboard. | |
From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §3) | |
A reaction: Most of his examples depend on the fact that they cannot be challenged by anyone else, because they are within his own mind. The dominoes require complex thought. The first two could be erroneous if he was dreaming. |
8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
Full Idea: Pure coherentists claim that a belief can only be justified by its relations to other beliefs; impure coherentists are willing to give some non-beliefs, such as perceptual experiences, a justifying role. | |
From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4) | |
A reaction: I think I would vote for the pure version. The distinction that is needed, I think, is between justification and evidence. You have to surmise causal links and explanations before you can see an experience as evidence, and then justification. |
8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
Full Idea: The Master Argument for coherentism is the claim that a justifier requires asserted propositional content, and that only beliefs represent propositions assertively. | |
From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4) | |
A reaction: I think this claim (which Pryor attacks) is correct. A key point is that almost any experience can be delusional, and in need of critical evaluation. We would even only accept an experience as being necessarily veridical after critical evaluation. |
8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
Full Idea: If you have reasons for your belief, they should be considerations you could in principle cite, or give, to someone who doubted or challenged the belief. You can't give some else a non-propositional state like a headache. | |
From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §6) | |
A reaction: On the whole I agree, but if someone asked you to justify your claim that there is a beautiful sunset over the harbour, you could just say 'Look!'. Headaches are too private. The person must still see that the sunset is red, and not the window. |
8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |
Full Idea: Ordinarily we make no intentional choices about what to believe, but one can choose to believe something, and then seek ways to get oneself to believe it. | |
From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §7) | |
A reaction: Deliberately reading the articles of a philosopher that you seem to agree with would be an example. Presumably the belief that this is a good belief and should be given support is not itself voluntarily chosen. Ultimately we are helpless. See Idea 1854. |
17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |