57 ideas
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e) |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a) |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71 | |
A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light. |
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' can be taken as true without have any truthmaker. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: There might be an equivocation over 'true' here. 'What, really really true that he IS a fictional mouse?' |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: No truth predicate is ever indispensable, because Tarski biconditionals, the equivalences between sentences and explicit truth ascriptions to those sentences, allow us to replace explicit truth ascriptions with the sentences themselves. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Holding a sentence to be true isn't the same as saying that it is true, and it isn't the same as saying the sentence, because one might say it in an ironic tone of voice. |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: My take on truth is a fairly deflationary one: The role of the truth predicate is to enable us to assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Intro) | |
A reaction: Clearly this is a role for truth, as in 'I forget what he said, but I know it was true', but it isn't remotely what most people understand by true. We use 'true' about totally explicit sentences all the time. |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: Names function the same way (semantically and grammatically) regardless of whether or not there's an object that they refer to. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3 n55) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a fairly clear rebuttal of the 'Fido'-Fido view of names (that the meaning of the name IS the dog), which never seems to quite go away. A name is a peg on which description may be hung, seems a good slogan to me. |
13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Frege (1893) considered a definite description to be a genuine singular term (as we do), so that a sentence like 'The present King of France is bald' would have the same logical form as 'Harry Truman is bald'. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic | |
A reaction: The difficulty is what the term refers to, and they embrace a degree of Meinongianism - that is that non-existent objects can still have properties attributed to them, and so can be allowed some sort of 'existence'. |
9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
Full Idea: The contradiction in Frege's system is due to the presence of second-order quantification, ..and Frege's explanation of the second-order quantifier, unlike that which he provides for the first-order one, appears to be substitutional rather than objectual. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893], §25) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.17 | |
A reaction: In Idea 9871 Dummett adds the further point that Frege lacks a clear notion of the domain of quantification. At this stage I don't fully understand this idea, but it is clearly of significance, so I will return to it. |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections' |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337 |
18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
Full Idea: If 'number' is the referent of a numerical symbol, a real number is the same as a ratio of quantities. ...A length can have to another length the same ratio as a mass to another mass. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893], III.1.73), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 21 'Frege's' | |
A reaction: This is part of a critique of Cantor and the Cauchy series approach. Interesting that Frege, who is in the platonist camp, is keen to connect the real numbers with natural phenomena. He is always keen to keep touch with the application of mathematics. |
18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
Full Idea: It cannot be demanded that everything be proved, because that is impossible; but we can require that all propositions used without proof be expressly declared as such, so that we can see distinctly what the whole structure rests upon. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893], p.2), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What' |
10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: Frege opts for his famous definition of numbers in terms of extensions of the concept 'equal to the concept F', but he then (in 'Grundgesetze') needs a theory of extensions or classes, which he provided by means of Basic Law V. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by B Hale / C Wright - Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' §1 |
9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
Full Idea: Cantor pointed out explicitly to Frege that it is a mistake to take the notion of a set (i.e. of that which has a cardinal number) to simply mean the extension of a concept. ...Frege's later assumption of this was an act of recklessness. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by William W. Tait - Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind III | |
A reaction: ['recklessness' is on p.61] Tait has no sympathy with the image of Frege as an intellectual martyr. Frege had insufficient respect for a great genius. Cantor, crucially, understood infinity much better than Frege. |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a) | |
A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed. |
18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
Full Idea: I hold that my Basic Law V is a law of pure logic. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893], p.4), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.1 | |
A reaction: This is, of course, the notorious law which fell foul of Russell's Paradox. It is said to be pure logic, even though it refers to things that are F and things that are G. |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d) | |
A reaction: This seems to be rhetorical, rather a precise theory, given that the One is said to be eternal and unchanging. The One is not just what we call 'reality'. |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08 | |
A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God. |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: If the argument isn't that, metaphysically speaking, anything that exists must have causal powers - how on earth would we show that? - rather, the claim is an epistemic one. Any thing we're in a position to know about we must causally interact with. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: A very good point. I am attracted to causal power as a criterion for existence, but Azzouni's distinction is vital. Maybe there is just no point in even talking about things which exist but have no causal powers. |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c) | |
A reaction: These seems to thoroughly pre-empt Plato's Theory of Forms a century before he created it. Which shows (as Simone Weil says) that Plato was just part of a long tradition. |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: It's robustly part of common sense that fictional objects don't exist in any sense at all, and this means they aren't abstracta either. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Nice. It is so easy to have some philosopher dilute and equivocate over the word 'object' until you find yourself committed to all sorts of daft things as somehow having objectual existence. We can discuss things which don't exist in any way at all. |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: It is widespread in contemporary metaphysics to extract commitments to various types of object on the basis of the logical form of certain sentences. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I'm with Azzouni in thinking that this procedure is a very bad idea. I'm increasingly inclined towards the wild view that people are only ontologically committed to things if they explicitly say that they are so committed. |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: The argument that objectual quantifiers are ontologically committing has the crucial and unnoticed presupposition that the language in which the semantics for the objectual quantifiers is couched (the 'metalanguage') also has quantifiers with commitment. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: That is, presumably we find ourselves ontologically committed to the existence of quantifiers, and are also looking at an infinite regress. See Idea 12439. |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: There are no linguistic devices, no idioms (not 'there is', not 'exists') that unequivocally indicate ontological commitment in the vernacular. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems right, since people talk in such ways about soap opera, while understanding the ontological situation perfectly well. Presumably Quine is seeking higher standards than the vernacular, if we are doing science. |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: A slogan: One can't read ontological commitments from semantic conditions unless one has already smuggled into those semantic conditions the ontology one would like to read off. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The arguments supporting this are subtle, but it's good enough for me, as I never thought anyone was ontologically committed just because they used the vagueries of language to try to say what's going on around here. |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: Things that don't exist don't have any properties. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Sounds reasonable! I totally agree, but that is because my notion of properties is sparse and naturalistic. If you identify properties with predicates (which some weird people seem to), then non-existents can have properties like 'absence' or 'nullity'. |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d) | |
A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism. |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5 | |
A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something? |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2 | |
A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships. |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies. |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts. |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically. |
9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: In later Frege, a concept could be taken as a particular case of a function, mapping every object on to one of the truth-values (T or F), according as to whether, as we should ordinarily say, that object fell under the concept or not. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 3.5 | |
A reaction: As so often in these attempts at explanation, this sounds circular. You can't decide whether an object truly falls under a concept, if you haven't already got the concept. His troubles all arise (I say) because he scorns abstractionist accounts. |
13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Frege took the study of concepts and their extensions to be within logic. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 7.1 | |
A reaction: This is part of the plan to make logic a universal language (see Idea 13664). I disagree with this, and with the general logicist view of the position of logic. The logical approach thins concepts out. See Deleuze/Guattari's horror at this. |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a) |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e) |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 231 |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b) |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 233. |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |
Full Idea: The periodic table not only governs what elements there can be, with their properties, but also explicitly excludes others sorts of elements, because the elements are individuated by the number of discrete protons in their nuclei. | |
From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: It has to be central to the thesis of scientific essentialism that the possibilities in nature are far more restricted than is normally thought, and this observation illustrates the view nicely. He makes a similar point about subatomic particles. |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |