6 ideas
| 19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: The fictionalist offers the option that your simulated beliefs and assertions may be tracking a realm of genuine facts, or a realm of what you take to be facts. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 13) | |
| A reaction: This means that fictionalism does not have to be an error theory. That is, we aren't mistakenly believing something that we actually made up. Instead we are sensibly believing something we know to be not literally true. Love it. |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: The governing fiction of possible worlds theory says that whenever something is possible, there is a world where it happens. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 05) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like the only sensible attitude to possible worlds I can think of. |
| 335 | Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Do the gods too hold different opinions about what is right, and similarly about what is honourable and dishonourable, good and bad? | |
| From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 07e) |
| 22063 | Effective individuals must posit a specific material body for themselves [Fichte] |
| Full Idea: Rational beings cannot posit themselves as effective individuals without ascribing to themselves a material body and determining it in doing so. | |
| From: Johann Fichte (The Science of Rights [1797], p.87), quoted by Ludwig Siep - Fichte | |
| A reaction: To be free entails a belief that one is 'effective', and a body is our only concept for that. This seems to be a transcendental proof that the body must exist, which is a neat inverted move! The Self sustains the body, for Fichte. |
| 336 | Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? | |
| From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10a) | |
| A reaction: The famous Euthyphro Question, the key question about the supposed religious basis of morality. The answer of Socrates is Idea 337. |
| 337 | It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato] |
| Full Idea: So things are loved by the gods because they are pious, and not pious because they are loved? It seems so. | |
| From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10e) | |
| A reaction: Socrates' answer to the Euthyphro Question (see Idea 336). The form of piety precedes the gods. |