8 ideas
9540 | A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell] |
Full Idea: A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0. | |
From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: In the interpreted version of the logic, 1 and 0 would become T (true) and F (false). The procedure seems to be called nowadays a 'valuation'. |
9541 | The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell] |
Full Idea: The Law of Transposition says that (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P). | |
From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: That is, if the consequent (Q) of a conditional is false, then the antecedent (P) must have been false. |
9543 | The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell] |
Full Idea: An axiomatic system is most naturally consistent iff no thesis is the negation of another thesis. It can be shown that every axiom is valid, that the transformation rules are validity-preserving, and if a wff α is valid, then ¬α is not valid. | |
From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: [The labels 'soundness' and 'consistency' seem interchangeable here, with the former nowadays preferred] |
9544 | A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell] |
Full Idea: To say that an axiom system is 'weakly complete' is to say that every valid wff of the system is derivable as a thesis. ..The system is 'strongly complete' if it cannot have any more theses than it has without falling into inconsistency. | |
From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: [They go on to say that Propositional Logic is strongly complete, but Modal Logic is not] |
335 | Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Do the gods too hold different opinions about what is right, and similarly about what is honourable and dishonourable, good and bad? | |
From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 07e) |
8478 | Dewey argued long before Wittgenstein that there could not seriously be a private language [Dewey, by Orenstein] |
Full Idea: Dewey argued in the twenties that there could not be, in any serious sense, a private language. Wittgenstein also, years later, came to appreciate this point. | |
From: report of John Dewey (works [1926]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.6 | |
A reaction: A nice historical footnote to perhaps the most famous argument in twentieth century philosophy. Can anyone send me the Dewey reference? |
336 | Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? | |
From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10a) | |
A reaction: The famous Euthyphro Question, the key question about the supposed religious basis of morality. The answer of Socrates is Idea 337. |
337 | It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato] |
Full Idea: So things are loved by the gods because they are pious, and not pious because they are loved? It seems so. | |
From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10e) | |
A reaction: Socrates' answer to the Euthyphro Question (see Idea 336). The form of piety precedes the gods. |