10 ideas
16614 | Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus] |
Full Idea: From matter and form comes one thing per se. This is not so for subject and accident. Matter and form are instrinsic causes of a composite being, but whiteness and a human being are not. Humans can exist without whiteness, so it is one thing per accidens. | |
From: John Duns Scotus (Oxford Commentary on Sentences [1301], II.12.1.14), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 | |
A reaction: This isn't much of a theory, but at least it is focusing on an interesting question, and the distinction between genuinely unified, and unified by chance. Compare a loving couple with siblings who hate each other. |
1590 | The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato] |
Full Idea: First, Socrates, you told me justice is harming your enemies and helping your friends. But later it seemed that the just man, since everything he does is for someone's benefit, never harms anyone. | |
From: Plato (Clitophon [c.372 BCE], 410b) | |
A reaction: Socrates certainly didn't subscribe to the first view, which is the traditional consensus in Greek culture. In general Socrates agreed with the views later promoted by Jesus. |
3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel] |
Full Idea: I believe the general form of moral reasoning is to put yourself in other people's shoes. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §9) |
3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel] |
Full Idea: What makes a system egalitarian is the priority it gives to the claims of those whose overall life prospects put them at the bottom. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Egalitarianism was once opposed to aristocratic values, but now it is opposed by adherents of two non-aristocratic values: utility (increase benefit, even if unequally) and individual rights (which redistribution violates). | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §8) |
3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
Full Idea: In assessing equality of claims, it must be decided whether to use a single, objective standard, or whether interests should be ranked by the person's own estimation. Also should they balance momentary or long-term needs? | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The communitarian defence of equality says it is good for society as a whole, whereas the individualistic defence defends equality as a correct distributive principle. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Contemporary political debate recognises four types of equality: political, social, legal and economic. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §1) | |
A reaction: Meaning equality of 1) power and influence, 2) status and respect, 3) rights and justice, 4) wealth. |
3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The morality of rights tends to be a limited, even minimal, morality. It leaves a great deal of human life ungoverned by moral restrictions or requirements. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §5) |