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All the ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' and 'What Does It Take to Refer?'

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76 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato]
     Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e)
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato]
     Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a)
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic.
     From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71
     A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light.
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
     Full Idea: Unlike standard first-order logic, free logic can allow empty names, but still has to deny existence by either representing it as a predicate, or invoke some dubious distinction such as between existence and being.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1)
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
     Full Idea: In standard logic we can't straightforwardly say that n exists. We have to resort to using a formula like '∃x(x=n)', but we can't deny n's existence by negating that formula, because standard first-order logic disallows empty names.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1)
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
     Full Idea: In standard first-order logic the role of proper names is played by individual constants.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1)
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
     Full Idea: Like it or not, proper names have non-referential uses, including not only attributive but even predicate uses.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1)
     A reaction: 'He's a right little Hitler'. 'You're doing a George Bush again'. 'Try to live up to the name of Churchill'.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
     Full Idea: The familiar problems with the Millian view of names are the problem of positive and negative existential statements, empty names, identity sentences, and propositional attitude ascription.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1)
     A reaction: I take this combination of problems to make an overwhelming case against the daft idea that the semantics of a name amounts to the actual object it picks out. It is a category mistake to attempt to insert a person into a sentence.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
     Full Idea: An object can be described without being referred to.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: I'm not clear how this is possible for a well-known object, though it is clearly possible for a speculative object, such as a gadget I would like to buy. In the former case reference seems to occur even if the speaker is trying to avoid it.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
     Full Idea: If Russell is, as I believe, basically right, then definite descriptions are the paradigm of singular terms that can be used to refer but are not linguistically (semantically) referential.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s5)
     A reaction: I'm not sure that we can decide what is 'semantically referential'. Most of the things we refer to don't have names. We don't then 'use' definite descriptions (I'm thinking) - they actually DO the job. If we use them, we can 'use' names too?
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle]
     Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections'
Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made.
     From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
     Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a)
     A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
     Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d)
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
     A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
     Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
     Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c)
You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
     Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
     Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d)
The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
     Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e)
If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d)
If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
     Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c)
Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
     Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e)
Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
     A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
     Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c)
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a)
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
     Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a)
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
     Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b)
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
     Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a)
If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
     Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a)
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
     Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d)
     A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
     Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5
     A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
     Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2
     A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships.
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
     A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
     Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2
     A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
     Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: If we have a 'fixedly' operator F, then a sentence is fixedly actually true if it is true no matter which world is designated as actual (which 'he actually won in 2008' fails to be). Maybe '□' is superficial necessity, and FA is 'deep' necessity.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.2.2)
     A reaction: Gareth Evans distinguishes 'deep' from 'superficial' necessity. Humberstone and others introduced 'F'. Presumably FA is deeper because it has to pass a tougher test.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: It seems apriori coherent that there could be a necessarily existing god, and that there could be no such god - but they can't both be true. Other examples include unprovable mathematical necessities
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.3.4)
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: Generalized 2D semantics is meant to vindicate the traditional idea that we have apriori access to our own meanings through armchair reflection.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.1)
     A reaction: The idea is to split meaning in two, so that we know one part of it a priori. It is an unfashionably internalist view of meaning (which doesn't make it wrong!).
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: Your verdicts about whether the stuff on Twin Earth counts as water depends on whether you think of Twin Earth as a hypothesis about your actual environment or as a purely counterfactual possibility.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.2.3)
     A reaction: This is the 'two-dimensional semantics' approach to the Twin Earth problem, which splits meaning into two components. Whether you start from the actual world or from Twin Earth, you will rigidly designate the local wet stuff as 'water'.
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: In rationalist views of meaning, based on the 'golden triangle', to be competent with an expression is to be in an internal cognitive state that puts one in a position to identify its extension in any possible world based only on apriori reflection.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.3.1)
     A reaction: This looks like a proper fight-back against modern rampant externalism about meaning. All my intuitions are with internalism, which I think points to a more coherent overall philosophy. Well done, David Chalmers! Even if he is wrong.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: Internalists take the notion of meaning to capture an aspect of an individual's current state of understanding, while externalists take the notion of meaning to reflect how an individual is embedded within her social and physical environment.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.4.3)
     A reaction: This idea also occurs in discussions of concepts (filed here under 'Thought').
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
     Full Idea: We must distinguish 'reference' in a fiction from reference outside the fiction to fictional entities.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1)
     A reaction: This may be more semantically than ontologically significant. It is perhaps best explicated by Coleridge's distinction over whether or not I am 'suspending my disbelief' when I am discussing a character.
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
     Full Idea: If fictional entities, such as characters in a play, are real, albeit abstract entities, then we can genuinely refer to them.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1)
     A reaction: [He cites Nathan Salmon 1998] Personally I would prefer to say that abstract entities are fictions. Fictional characters have uncertain identity conditions. Do they all have a pancreas, if this is never mentioned?
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
     Full Idea: If you say 'a special person is coming to visit', you are not referring to but merely 'alluding to' that individual. This does not count as referring because you are not expressing a singular proposition about it.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s2)
     A reaction: If you add 'I hope he doesn't wear his red suit, but I hope he plays his tuba', you seem to be expressing singular propositions about the person. Bach seems to want a very strict notion of reference, as really attaching listeners to individuals.
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
     Full Idea: Philosophers agree that some expressions refer, but disagree over which ones. Few include indefinite descriptions, but some include definite descriptions, or only demonstrative descriptions. Some like proper names, some only indexicals and demonstratives.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: My initial prejudice is rather Strawsonian - that people refer, not language, and it can be done in all sorts of ways. But Bach argues well that only language intrinsically does it. Even pointing fails without linguistic support.
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
     Full Idea: We can refer to things which change over time, which suggests that in thinking of and in referring to an individual we are not constrained to represent it as that which has certain properties.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1)
     A reaction: This seems a good argument against the descriptive theory of reference which is not (I think) in Kripke. Problems like vagueness and the Ship of Theseus rear their heads.
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
     Full Idea: Being able to think of an individual does not require being able to identify that individual by means of a uniquely characterizing description.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s1)
     A reaction: There is a bit of an equivocation over 'recognise' here. His example is 'the first child born in the 4th century'. We can't visually recognise such people, but the description does fix them, and a records office might give us 'recognition'.
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
     Full Idea: If one is referring to whatever happens to satisfy a description, and one would be referring to something else were it to have satisfied the description instead, this is known as 'weak' reference,...but surely this is not reference at all.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s7)
     A reaction: Bach wants a precise notion of reference, as success in getting the audience to focus on the correct object. He talks of this case as 'singling out' some unfixed thing, and he also has 'alluding to' an unstated thing. Plausible view.
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
     Full Idea: An embarrassingly simple argument is that most expressions can be used literally but not referentially, no variation in meaning explains this fact, so its meaning is compatible with being non-referential, so no expression is inherently referential.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L2)
     A reaction: I think I have decided that no expression is 'inherently referential', and that it is all pragmatics.
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
     Full Idea: Much of what speakers do that passes for referring is merely alluding or describing. ...It is one thing for a speaker to express a thought about a certain object using an expression, and quite another for the expression to stand for that object.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.3)
     A reaction: Bach builds up a persuasive case for this view. If the question, though, is 'what are you talking about?', then saying what is being alluded to or singled out or described seems fine. Bach is being rather stipulative.
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
     Full Idea: Context does not determine or constitute reference; rather, it is something for the speaker to exploit to enable the listener to determine the intended reference.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L3)
     A reaction: Bach thinks linguistic reference is a matter of speaker's intentions, and I think he is right. And this idea is right too. The domain of quantification constantly shifts in a conversation, and good speakers and listeners are sensitive to this.
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
     Full Idea: If one ducks starts quacking furiously, and you say 'that duck is excited', it isn't context that makes me take it that you are referring to the quacking duck. You could be referring to a quiet duck you recognise by its distinctive colour.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L3)
     A reaction: A persuasive example to make his point against the significance of context in conversational reference. Speaker's intended reference must always trump any apparent reference suggested by context.
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
     Full Idea: To illustrate speakers' intentions, consider the anaphoric reference using pronouns in these: "A cop arrested a robber; he was wearing a badge", and "A cop arrested a robber; he was wearing a mask". The natural supposition is not the inevitable one.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L4)
     A reaction: I am a convert to speakers' intentions as the source of all reference, and this example seems to illustrate it very well. 'He said..' 'Who said?'
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
     Full Idea: It is a fallacy that all the information in an utterance must come from its interpretation, which ignores the essentially pragmatic fact that the speaker is making the utterance.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L4)
     A reaction: [He cites Barwise and Perry 1983:34] This is blatantly obvious in indexical remarks like 'I am tired', where the words don't tell you who is tired. But also 'the car has broken down, dear'.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: A semantic theory assigns semantic values (meanings) to particular expressions of the language. In contrast, a metasemantic theory explains why expressions have those semantic values, appealing to facts about speakers and communities.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 3.4)
     A reaction: Presumably some people only want the metasemantic version. I assume that the two are entangled, but I would vote for both.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: Semantic theories explain how the truth or falsity of whole sentences depends on the meanings of their parts by stating rules governing the interpretation of subsentential expressions and their modes of combination.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1)
     A reaction: Somehow it looks as if the mystery of the whole business will still be missing if this project is ever successfully completed. Also one suspects that such a theory would be a fiction, rather than a description of actuality, which is too complex.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: The simplest semantic frameworks assign extensions as semantic values of particular expressions. The extension of a name is the thing, of 'cool' is the set of cool things, and sets of ordered pairs for 2-place predicates. The sentence has T or F.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1)
     A reaction: The immediate well-known problem is different predicates with the same extensions, such as 'renate' and 'cordate'. Possible worlds semantics is supposed to be an improvement to cover this, and to give a semantics for modal talk as well. Sounds good.
'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: A simple extensional semantics will assign the same semantic value to 'Roger Federer' and 'world's best tennis player', but they clearly differ in meaning, and if events had unfolded differently they would pick out different people.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1)
     A reaction: You would think that this would be too obvious to need pointing out, but it is clearly a view that had a lot of popularity before the arrival of possible worlds.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: In standard possible worlds semantics, the semantic value of an expression is an 'intension', a function that assigns an extension to the expression 'at' every possible world. ...It keeps track of the 'modal profiles' of objects, kinds and properties.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1)
     A reaction: Personally I just don't buy a semantics which is entirely based on extensions, even if this has sorted out some more obvious problems of extensionality. When I say someone is 'my hero', I don't just mean to pick out a particular person.
Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: In standard possible worlds semantics the semantic value of Hllary Clinton's utterance of 'I' will be the same as her utterance of 'Hillary Clinton'. But clearly the English word 'I' is not synonymous with the name 'Hillary Clinton'.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1)
     A reaction: This problem was spotted by Kaplan, and it has been a chief motivator for the creation of two-dimensional semantics, which some people have then extended into a complete semantic theory. No purely extensional semantics can be right.
Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: In standard possible world semantics an expression's intension reflects the modal profile of an object, kind or property, which would establish an important constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.3.1)
     A reaction: The central question becomes 'do you need to know a thing's modal profile in order to have a decent understanding of it?', but if you express it that way (my way), then what counts as 'decent' will be relative to all sorts of things.
In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: A problem for a standard possible worlds analysis is that all necessary truths have precisely the same content (the function mapping every world to the True). Hesperus=Phosphorus has the same content as Hesperus=Hesperus-and-2+2=4.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 3.3)
     A reaction: If this is supposed to be a theory of meaning then it has gone very badly wrong indeed. Has modern semantics taken a wrong turning somewhere? Two-dimensionalism is meant to address some of these problems.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: In a two-dimensional matrix we array possible circumstances of evaluation (worlds) along the horizontal axis, and possible contexts of utterance (world, person, time) along the vertical axis.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.2)
     A reaction: This is due to Stalnaker 1978, and is clearest in operation when applied to an indexical such as 'I' in 'I am President'. 'I' is a rigid designator, but depends on context. The grid is filled in with T or F for each utterance in each world.
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: At first glance necessity and possibility can be fully expressed by quantifying over all possible worlds, but this cannot capture 'Possibly everything actually red is also shiny'. This needs a double-indexed framework, with worlds playing two roles.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.2.1)
     A reaction: She points out that this also applies to tense logic, for the notion of 'now'. The point is that we not only need a set of possible worlds, but we also need a procedure (the 'Actuality' operator A or @) for picking out one of the worlds as special.
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: Perhaps our best way of understanding names and natural kind terms is that we have apriori access to currently associated reference-fixing criterion, but only a posteriori access to the associated modal profile.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.1)
     A reaction: This is the 'generalized' view of 2D semantics (covering everything, not just modals and indexicals). I know apriori what something is, but only study will reveal its possibilities. The actual world is easy to talk about, but possible worlds are harder.
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: Supporters of generalized two-dimensional semantics agree to defend apriori conceptual analysis in metaphysics, and that 2D captures meaning and not just belief-patterns, and it gives a broadly internalist approach to reference determination.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.3.4)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I can evaluate this, but I sort of like conceptual analysis, and the concept of meaning, and fairly internalist views of reference, so I am ripe for the picking.
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]
     Full Idea: It is objected to 2D semantics that it cannot explain Kripke's cases of contingent apriori truths, for there is no single proposition (construed as a set of possible worlds) that is both apriori and contingent.
     From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.4.2)
     A reaction: This sounds like a rather large objection to the whole 2D plan, if it implies that when we say something there is no single proposition that is being expressed.
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
     Full Idea: People slide from contextual variability to context relativity to context sensitivity to context dependence to contextual determination.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L3)
     A reaction: This is reminiscent of the epistemological slide from cultural or individual relativity of some observed things, to a huge metaphysical denial of truth. Bach's warning applies to me, as I have been drifting down his slope lately. Nice.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato]
     Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato]
     Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Some things do not partake of the One [Plato]
     Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 231
The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato]
     Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b)
Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato]
     Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 233.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato]
     Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d)