42 ideas
354 | Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is wisdom that makes possible courage and self-control and integrity or, in a word, true goodness. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 069b) | |
A reaction: Aristotle also says that prudence (phronesis) makes virtue possible. |
370 | Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato] |
Full Idea: Souls which have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy will live after death without bodies. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 114b) | |
A reaction: Purifying it of what? Error, or desire, or narrow-mindedness, or the physical? |
2956 | There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.73) | |
A reaction: [Idea of Varro] Just as unreliable witnesses are the bane of a murder enquiry, so bad philosophers throw a cloud of obscurity roundphilosophy. If 9999 people thought 2+2=4, but there is always one who thinks something different. |
2963 | There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Perhaps notions of necessary and sufficient conditions, and counterfactual considerations, are in some way grounded in awareness of ourselves as active interveners and experimenters in the world, not passive spectators. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.155) |
2958 | No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: I cannot think of a single philosophically interesting concept that has been successfully and nontrivially analysed to most people's satisfaction. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.121) |
350 | In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato] |
Full Idea: When philosophers investigate with the help of the body they are led astray, but through reflection the soul gets a clear view of the facts. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 065c) |
362 | The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato] |
Full Idea: No greater misfortune could happen to anyone than developing a dislike for argument. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 089d) |
2959 | If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Do the statements 'Sir Percy Blakeney is in Paris' and 'The Scarlet Pimpernel is in Paris' express different facts, or the same fact under different modes of presentation? | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.129) |
13155 | If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato] |
Full Idea: I cannot convince myself that when you add one to one either the first or the second one becomes two, or they both become two by the addition of the one to the other, ...or that when you divide one, the cause of becoming two is now the division. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097d) | |
A reaction: Lovely questions, all leading to the conclusion that two consists of partaking in duality, to which you can come by several different routes. |
2969 | How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: It is one thing to see a building, and another to see it as a building, and yet another to see it as Buckingham Palace. How does the commonsense realist think that this is accomplished? | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.302) |
21347 | If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato] |
Full Idea: When you say Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, so you mean there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness? - I do. ...But surely he is not taller than Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the tallness he happens to have? | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102b-c) | |
A reaction: He adds that both people must be cited. This appears to be what we now call a rejection relative height as an 'internal' relation, which is it would presumably be if it was a feature of one or of both men. |
360 | We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: We must have some previous knowledge of equality, before the time when we saw equal things, but realised that they fell short of it. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 075a) |
1 | There is only one source for all beauty [Plato] |
Full Idea: If anything is beautiful other than beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason but because it participates in that beautiful. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 100c) | |
A reaction: The Greek word will be 'kalon' (beautiful, fine, noble). Like Aristotle, I find it baffling that such diversity could have a single source. Beautiful things have diverse aims. |
368 | Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato] |
Full Idea: The reason why other things are called after the forms is that they participate in the forms. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102a) |
16516 | The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato] |
Full Idea: The day before the trial the prow of the ship that the Athenians send to Delos had been crowned with garlands. - Which ship is that? - It is the ship in which, the Athenians say, Theseus once sailed to Crete, taking the victims. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 058a) | |
A reaction: Not philosophical, but this is the Ship of Theseus whose subsequent identity, Plutarch tells us, became a matter of dispute. |
2970 | Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Dogs surely have beliefs, and beliefs call for some concepts or other. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.312) |
357 | People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato] |
Full Idea: The way in which people react to a geometrical diagram or anything like that is unmistakable proof of the theory of recollection. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 073a) |
359 | If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato] |
Full Idea: If someone sees a resemblance, but feels that it falls far short of the original, they must therefore have a recollection of the original. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 074e) |
9343 | To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: We are convinced that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul by itself. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 066c) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the original ideal which motivates the devotion to a priori knowledge - that it will lead to a 'pure' knowledge, which in Plato's case will be eternal and necessary knowledge, like taking lessons from the gods. Wrong. |
2961 | Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Empiricism is not just a theory of knowledge; it is also a theory meaning. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.149) |
2960 | Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Commonsense realism has to account for the subjective similarity of the genuine perception of a green surface and the experience of, say, an after-image. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.142) |
15859 | To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. Then it befitted a man to investigate only ...what is best. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097d) | |
A reaction: A reversal of the modern idea of 'best explanation'. Socrates is citing Anaxagoras's proposal to understand things by interpreting the workings of a supreme Mind. It is the religious version of best explanation. |
13154 | Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is it with the blood that we think, or with the air or the fire that is in us? Or is it none of these, but the brain that supplies our senses of hearing and sight and smell. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097a) | |
A reaction: In retrospect it seems surprising that such clever people hadn't worked this one out, given the evidence of anatomy, in animals and people, and given brain injuries. By the time of Galen they appear to have got the answer. |
2952 | A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: It is estimated by Gierer (1988) that the human cerebral cortex alone contains about 300,000,000,000,000 synaptic junctions. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.46) | |
A reaction: As we grasp the vastness of this number, and the fact that the junctions are all active, the idea that a brain does something astonishing is not quite so surprising. |
2964 | How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Anyone who thinks phenomenal qualities are inseparable from our awareness of them, must think subconscious mental states are totally devoid of phenomenal qualities! So how can these states cause behaviour in the way conscious states do? | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.166) | |
A reaction: I agree with this thought, though it is beautifully unprovable. We would need to respond to a red traffic light, without having consciously registered its presence. It is is just increasingly clear that we register information pre-consciously. |
2951 | Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: I cannot make intuitive sense of there existing a being who possessed genuine beliefs and desires, but who, or which, lacked the capacity for consciousness altogether. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.44) | |
A reaction: This is part of the recent move (which strikes me as correct) to see qualia and intentionality as inseparable. We might well, though, need to adopt the 'intentional stance' to a sophisticated robot. But am I aware of all of my beliefs? |
2953 | Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: If one asks 'what does the world look like to a fish?' the answer may be 'it doesn't look like anything; fish find their way about by blindsight.' | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.56) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a real possibility, not just a wild speculation. It seems pretty obvious to me that I operate by blindsight in many aspects of my behaviour. Piano-playing would be impossible if all qualia had to be processed. |
2967 | We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: I am suggesting that introspective psychology might have a contribution to make to fundamental physics. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.176) | |
A reaction: I'm a fan of introspection, as a source of genuine information. |
364 | One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is one soul, even minutely, more or less of a soul than another? Not in the least. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 093b) | |
A reaction: This idea is attractive because unconsciousness and death seem to be abrupt procedures, and so appear to be all-or-nothing, but I would personally view extreme Alzheimer's as an erasing of the soul, though a minimum level of it seems all-or-nothing. |
2966 | Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Halting the slide into panpsychism is the major advantage of holding that phenomenal qualities can exist unsensed. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.170) | |
A reaction: Presumably unsensed phenomenal qualities would explain the discovery that we seem to make decisions before we are conscious of what we intend to do. That result certainly implied that consciousness had no real function. |
2955 | If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: If we assume that mental events are located in time, then it follows immediately, given special relativity, that they are also in space. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.73) | |
A reaction: A powerful point. Of course, there might (you never know) be something which exists in time but not space (and thoughts clearly exist in time), but (as in Hume's argument against miracles), dualism will overthrow your other basic beliefs about nature. |
2950 | Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Philosophical behaviourism is an absurd theory. Practically the only philosophers who ever held it, at any rate in its crude form, were certain logical positivists. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.25) | |
A reaction: I presume Lockwood's target here is eliminativist behaviourism, as opposed to methodological behaviourism (which is a reasonable practice to adopt), and 'black box' behaviourism (which has been superseded by functionalism). |
2954 | Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: A favourite example of identity theorists is the identification of flashes of lightning with electrical discharges. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.71) | |
A reaction: Personally I prefer the analogy of the mind being like a waterfall - a non-mysterious physical process which has dramatic properties of its own. If minds must keep busy in order to be minds, they must be processes. |
2971 | Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: If the logical positivists established anything it is that there is no way of demarcating science from metaphysics. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.313) | |
A reaction: So many problems arise for philosophers because of the passion for 'demarcating' things. Close study, experiments, statistics and measurements occur in every walk of life. |
7517 | I could take a healthy infant and train it up to be any type of specialist I choose [Watson,JB] |
Full Idea: Give me a dozen healthy infants, and my own specified world to bring them up in, and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select - doctor, artist, beggar, thief - regardless of his ancestry. | |
From: J.B. Watson (Behaviorism [1924], Ch.2), quoted by Steven Pinker - The Blank Slate | |
A reaction: This was a famous pronouncement rejecting the concept of human nature as in any way fixed - a total assertion of nurture over nature. Modern research seems to be suggesting that Watson is (alas?) wrong. |
361 | It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato] |
Full Idea: When anyone's soul feels a keen pleasure or pain it cannot help supposing that whatever causes the most violent emotion is the plainest and truest reality - which it is not. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 084c) | |
A reaction: Do people think that? Most people distinguish subjective from objective. Wounded soldiers are also aware of victory or defeat. |
351 | War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato] |
Full Idea: All wars are undertaken for the acquisition of wealth, and we want this because of the body, to which we are slave. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 066c) |
13156 | Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato] |
Full Idea: Fancy being unable to distinguish between the cause of a thing, and the condition without which it could not be a cause. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 099c) | |
A reaction: Not as simple as he thinks. It seems fairly easy to construct a case where the immediately impacting event remains constant, and the background condition is changed. Even worse when negligence is held to be the cause. |
2962 | Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: It is tempting to see the concept of causation as a product of reason rather than of perception or introspection; something that reason brings to bear on the data of sense, by way of imposing an explanatory order on them. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.154) |
2949 | We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Somehow we have got it into our heads that time itself is a process of change. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.12) |
369 | If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the earth is spherical and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither air nor force to keep it from falling. The uniformity of heaven and equilibrium of earth are sufficient support. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 108e) |
363 | Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato] |
Full Idea: The theory that our soul exists even before it enters the body surely stands or falls with the soul's possession of the ultimate standard of reality. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 092d) |