72 ideas
2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are always ready to change direction, if a topic crops up which is more attractive than the one to hand. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 172d) | |
A reaction: Which sounds trivial, but it may be what God does. |
2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
Full Idea: A perfect grasp of any subject depends far more on knowing elements than on knowing complexes. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206b) |
2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
Full Idea: Either a syllable is not the same as its letters, in which case it cannot have the letters as parts of itself, or it is the same as its letters, in which case these basic elements are just as knowable as it is. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205b) |
22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
Full Idea: Being-in-the-world is a phenomenon of 'care' with a tripartite structure: a) projection towards its possibilities, b) thrownness among those possibilities, so Dasein is not free, and c) fallenness among worldly possibilities, to neglect of its own. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227 | |
A reaction: Sounds a bit Californian to me. Just living among the world's possibilities is evidently a bad thing, because you could be concentrating on yourself and your own development instead? |
22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: 'Phenomenology' can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!' It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings, and to conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated. It is opposed to traditiona' pseudo-problems. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro II.07) | |
A reaction: It sounds as if we are invited to look at the world the way a dog might look at it. I am not at all clear what it to be gained from this approach. |
15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Heidegger concludes that 'logos' essentially means 'making something manifest'. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 56/33) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§7 | |
A reaction: It would at least seem to involve revealing the truth of something, though truth doesn't seem to be central to Heidegger's thought. 'Logos' is often translated as 'an account', as well as a 'reason', so Heidegger may be right. |
2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as primary elements are woven together, so their names may be woven together to produce a spoken account, because an account is essentially a weaving together of names. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b) | |
A reaction: If justification requires 'logos', and logos is a 'weaving together of names', then Plato might be taken as endorsing the coherence account of justification. Or do the two 'weavings' correspond? |
2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: Eristic discussions involve as many tricks and traps as possible, but dialectical discussions involve being serious and correcting the interlocutor's mistakes only when they are his own fault or the result of past conditioning. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167e) |
15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
Full Idea: A primary element cannot be expressed in an account; it can only be named, for a name is all that it has. But with the things composed of these ...just as the elements are woven together, so the names can woven to become an account. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b01-3) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of what I see as Aristotle's metaphysics, as derived from his epistemology, that is, ontology is what explains, and what we can give an account [logos] of. Aristotle treats this under 'definitions'. |
15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Heidegger is a relentless enemy of ahistorical, absolutist concepts of truth. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 1 | |
A reaction: I presume that if truth is not absolute then it must be relative, but Polt is a little coy about saying so. For me, anyone who says truth is relative doesn't understand the concept, and is talking about something else. |
10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: It must surely be true that a man who has completely mastered arithmetic knows all numbers? Because there are pieces of knowledge covering all numbers in his soul. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 198b) | |
A reaction: This clearly views numbers as objects. Expectation of knowing them all is a bit startling! They also appear to be innate in us, and hence they appear to be Forms. See Aristotle's comment in Idea 645. |
21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
Full Idea: Continental philosophers, following Heidegger, see in the attempt to reduce the question of being to that of beings a symptom of an age that is too ready to accept the terms in which science conceives the world. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04 | |
A reaction: Interesting. I take the idea that this is a failing of the modern age to be ridiculous, since I take it to be the key metaphysical move made by Aristotle. Neverthless, Aristotle is closely in tune with modern science. For 'beings', read 'objects'. |
15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: We are Dasein - the entity who possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 34/13), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§4 | |
A reaction: This seems to connect to the emerging 'externalist' view of mind that comes with the external view of content coming from Purnam's Twin Earth idea. |
9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Heidegger turns to 'Being' for the same reason that Christians turn to God - to affirm the unique place of humans in the world. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.4 | |
A reaction: This is the first remark I have encountered that makes sense of Heidegger's Being to me! It places Heidegger as a modernist philosopher, trying to grapple with the decline of religion. I'll stick with Bertrand Russell on that. |
22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro I.04) | |
A reaction: How do you distinguish the Being of normal humans from the Being of someone in a deep coma, who has no existential issues? Has that Dasein ceased to be? Why does angst create a new mode of Being, but flying doesn't? |
8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole is: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6 41) | |
A reaction: If you find that thought really illuminating, you are probably on the wrong website. However, the thought that we exist 'ahead of ourselves' might be a fruitful line for existentialists to explore. |
21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the others', in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.164), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 5 | |
A reaction: He seems to be describing the psychology of someone who joins a small crowd which gradually increases in size. I take this relation to others to be the basic existential dilemma, of retaining individual authenticity within a community. |
20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: When we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein' we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.297), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology' | |
A reaction: Presumably analytic discussions of persons try to be too objective. Heidegger is trying to capture the thought at the heart of Kierkegaard's existentialism. Objectivity and subjectivity are never in conflict. Is there really a different mode of existence? |
8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Heidegger borrows a common German word 'dasein', meaning 'being' or 'existence', to refer both to 'the manner of Being which... man... possesses', and to the creature which possesses it. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.32) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This just strikes me as an elementary ontological mistake. Because something has startling properties it doesn't follow that we have a different type of Being. Magnets don't have a different type of being from ordinary iron. |
8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: We each of us not only have Dasein (our kind of Being), but we can lay claim to it. Also the Dasein of a thing 'is an issue for it' - we care about the kinds of creatures we can make ourselves into. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.67) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Heidegger says other more puzzling things about Dasein. The second half of the idea is what makes Heidegger an existentialist, and an inspiration for Sartre. |
21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which, in its very being, comports itself understandingly towards that being. ...Mineness belongs to an existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.78), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1 | |
A reaction: He might eventually persuade me that Dasein is so different from mere material being that it deserves a category of its own. But a reductive account of mind is also a reductive account of being. |
7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.31), quoted by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Jacquette argues against this claim. The idea seems to be the ultimate extension of Kant, and it is not a big move to say that the only real phenomenology we can discuss is our semantics. Wrong, wrong, wrong. |
2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: There are two kinds of change, I think: alteration and motion. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 181d) | |
A reaction: Idea 1700 is better than this. |
22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15) | |
A reaction: I assume this is a direct reference to the problem idealists had with the thing-in-itself. It seems that the reality of a thing consists of the strengthened relationship it has with Dasein, which sounds fairly idealist to me. |
2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a complex or a syllable has no parts and is a single identity, hasn't it turned out to be the same kind of thing as an element or letter? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205d) |
15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
Full Idea: But this sum now - isn't it just when there is nothing lacking that it is a sum? Yes, necessarily. And won't this very same thing - that from which nothing is lacking - be a whole? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205a) | |
A reaction: This seems to be right, be rather too vague and potentially circular to be of much use. What is the criterion for deciding that nothing is lacking? |
15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole does not consist of parts; for it did, it would be all the parts and so would be the sum. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 204e) | |
A reaction: That is, 'the whole is the sum of its parts' is a tautology! The claim that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts' gets into similar trouble. See Verity Harte on this. |
15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Heidegger tries to develop a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' ('wesen' as a verb). | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§25-7 |
2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Things which are susceptible to a rational account are knowable. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201d) |
16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
Full Idea: A man has passed from mere judgment to expert knowledge of the being of a wagon when he has done so in virtue of having gone over the whole by means of the elements. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207c) | |
A reaction: Plato is emphasising that the expert must know the hundred parts of a wagon, and not just the half dozen main components, but here the point is to go over the whole via the parts, and not just list the parts. |
15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Propositions are not a good clue to the essence of understanding, because we must already understand things before we formulate propositions about them. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.31) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
A reaction: I like this, because I think the most important aspects of our thought and understanding are entirely non-verbal - even in cases where they seem to be highly specific and verbal. We don't understand ourselves at all! |
2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to believe something which is not the case. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167a) |
2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the object of a belief is what is not, the object of this belief is nothing; but if there is no object to a belief, then that is not belief at all. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 189a) |
22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an 'I' or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.1.10) | |
A reaction: Descartes had thrown doubt on the informativeness of the phenomena, so presumably your phenomenologist is not interested in whether they reveal any truth. So why are unreliable phenomena of any interest? |
22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become. ...The kind of Being which equipment possesses... we call 'readiness-to-hand' [Zuhandenheit]. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15) | |
A reaction: This example would be well at home in the writings of the pragmatists. It is also an important example for existentialists. In analytic philosophy we might say the experience combines perception with direct exerience of causation. |
2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: Perception is always of something that is, and it is infallible, which suggests that it is knowledge. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 152c) |
2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
Full Idea: It would be peculiar if each of us were like a Trojan horse, with a whole bunch of senses sitting inside us, rather than that all these perceptions converge onto a single identity (mind, or whatever one ought to call it). | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 184d) |
15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: We always take a noise as the sound of something; we always take a hue as the color of something. We simply do not experience raw, uninterpreted sense-data - these are the inventions of philosophers. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 207/163-4), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
A reaction: This is something like the modern view of sense-data as promoted by John McDowell, rather than the experiential atoms of Russell and Moore. Experience is holistic, but that doesn't mean we can't analyse it into components. |
20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Perceptual' | |
A reaction: Sounds like our knowledge of electrons. Nice point. Standard analytic discussions of perceiving a glass always treat it in isolation, when it is on an expensive table near a brandy bottle. Or near a hammer. |
2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
Full Idea: Sight or touch might make someone take eleven for twelve, but he could never form this mistaken belief about the contents of his mind. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 195e) |
2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
Full Idea: With what physical faculty do we perceive being and not-being, similarity and dissimilarity, identity and difference, oneness and many, odd and even and other maths, ….fineness and goodness? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 185d) |
2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you can't apprehend being you can't apprehend truth, and so a thing could not be known. Therefore knowledge is not located in immediate experience but in thinking about it, since the latter makes it possible to grasp being and truth. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 186c) |
2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you don't know which letters belong together in the right syllables…it is possible for true belief to be accompanied by a rational account and still not be entitled to the name of knowledge. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208b) | |
A reaction: In each case of justification there is a 'clinching' stage, for which there is never going to be a strict rule. It might be foundational, but equally it might be massive coherence, or no alternative. |
2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
Full Idea: Either a syllable and its letters are equally knowable and expressible in a rational account, or they are both equally unknowable and inexpressible. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205e) | |
A reaction: Presumably you could explain the syllable by the letters, but not vice versa, but he must mean that the explanation is worthless without the letters being explained too. So all explanation is worthless? |
2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If I only have beliefs about Theaetetus when I don't know his distinguishing mark, how on earth were my beliefs about you rather than anyone else? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 209b) | |
A reaction: This is a rather intellectualist approach to mental activity. Presumably Theaetetus has lots of distinguishing marks, but they are not conscious. Must Socrates know everything? |
2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
Full Idea: A rational account might be forming an image of one's belief, as in a mirror or a pond. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206d) | |
A reaction: Not promising, since the image is not going to be clearer than the original, or contain any new information. Maybe it would be clarified by being 'framed', instead of drifting in muddle. |
2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
Full Idea: A third sort of rational account (after giving an image, or analysing elements) is being able to mention some mark which differentiates the object in question ('the sun is the brightest heavenly body'). | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208c) | |
A reaction: This is Plato's clearest statement of what would be involved in adding the necessary logos to your true belief. An image of it, or an analysis, or an individuation. How about a cause? |
2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
Full Idea: Maybe the primary elements of which things are composed are not susceptible to rational accounts. Each of them taken by itself can only be named, but nothing further can be said about it. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201e) | |
A reaction: This still seems to be more or less the central issue in philosophy - which things should be treated as 'primitive', and which other things are analysed and explained using the primitive tools? |
2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
Full Idea: In the case of a wagon, we may only have correct belief, but someone who is able to explain what it is by going through its hundred parts has got hold of a rational account. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207b) | |
A reaction: A wonderful example. In science, you know smoking correlates with cancer, but you only know it when you know the mechanism, the causal structure. This may be a general truth. |
2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
Full Idea: What evidence could be brought if we were asked at this very moment whether we are asleep and are dreaming all our thoughts? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 158b) |
22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof [of external things] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. ...The kind of Being of the entity which does the proving has not been made definite enough. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.43a) | |
A reaction: The 'scandal' was a remark of Kant's. Presumably Heidegger's exploration of Dasein aims to establish the Being of the prover sufficiently to solve this problem (via phenomenology). |
2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
Full Idea: In medicine, at least, most people are not self-sufficient at prescribing and effecting cures for themselves, and here some people are superior to others. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171e) |
2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Does a relativist have any authority to decide about things which will happen in the future? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 178c) | |
A reaction: Nice question! It seems commonsense that such speculations are possible, but without a concept of truth they are ridiculous. |
2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
Full Idea: To say that everyone believes what is the case, is to concede the truth of the oppositions' beliefs; in other words, the person has to concede that he himself is wrong. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171a) |
2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
Full Idea: Bayesianism can explain the fact that in science surprising predictions have greater evidential value, as the equation produces a higher degree of confirmation. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.42) |
2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
Full Idea: Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E). | |
From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41) |
21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
Full Idea: Heidegger argues that having thoughts and feelings is only possible for entity that is actually engaged in the world. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1 | |
A reaction: This seems to be an a priori exclusion of the possibility of a brain in a vat. I guess the ancestor of this idea is Schopenhauer. |
22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
Full Idea: The world is a world shared with others, so that far from being a solipsistic ego ...Dasein finds itself already amongst others. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.226 | |
A reaction: Phenomenologists don't seem bothered about the problem of knowing other minds. If you take something for granted, it ceases to be a problem to be solved! |
8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: How do I know that other people have minds? The question is a bad one. Precisely because I encounter them at work, play and the like, it is guaranteed that they, too, are Dasein, intelligent agents. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.153-) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
A reaction: I've seen film of someone playing peek-a-boo with a bonobo ape, so presumably they have Dasein. It might be easier for the AI community to aim at building a robot with Dasein, than one which was simply conscious. |
22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.2.13) | |
A reaction: This is the first plausible fruit of phenomenology I have been able to discover. Analysing the passive mind is not very promising, but seeing what happens when we become more proactive is revealing. |
22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the authentic self - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) | |
A reaction: To a novice this sounds like a requirement for increased self-consciousness during daily activity. 'Be a good animal, true to your animal self' said one of Lawrence's characters. |
20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Everyone is other, and no one is himself. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.165), quoted by Rüdiger Safranski - Nietzsche: a philosophical biography 09 | |
A reaction: Safranski describes this as the idea of 'structural self-evasion'. He detects the same idea in Nietzsche's 'Daybreak'. |
15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: For Heidegger moods are disclosive; they show us things in a more fundamental way than theoretical propositions ever can. For example, fear reveals something as a threat. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.30) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§30 | |
A reaction: Most modern students of emotion seem to agree. Even though they may not have specific content, it is always possible to consider the underlying cause of the mood. |
20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: We do not throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something is encountered as such, the thing in question has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.190-1), quoted by George Dickie - The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 3 'Undoing' | |
A reaction: Analytic philosophy and science have tried to dismantle experience, and Heidegger wants to put it back together. I would say there is a big difference between encountering a thing (which is a bit facty), and understanding it (which is more valuey). |
22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Because Dasein is lost in the 'they', it must first find itself. It must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], II.2.54) | |
A reaction: I wish there was some criterion for knowing when you are being yourself and when you are not. |
22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualised in individualisation. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.40) | |
A reaction: Is sounds like insecurity, as a sort of trauma that shocks one into self-realisation. The idea means very little to me personally. |
21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
Full Idea: For Heidegger, as a consequence of my anxiety in the face of death, I am set free to live my life as my own rather than doing things merely because others expect me to do them. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 7 | |
A reaction: Contrary to Epicurus, Heidegger thinks anxiety about death is a good thing. The point is, I suppose, that we all die alone, and people who are very socially contrained need to face up to death in order to grasp their autonomy. |
22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
Full Idea: Anxiety [angst] is the disturbing sense of uncanniness by which Dasein is overtaken (thrownness) when it discovers there is nothing other than its own freedom to sustain its projects (projection), and from which Dasein constantly takes flight (falling). | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227 | |
A reaction: This seems to be Kierkegaard's idea, unamended. In my experience anxiety only comes when I am forced into making decisions by worldly situations. An 'existential crisis' is a sort of blankness appearing where a future life was supposed to be. |
15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Dasein's Being-what-it-is (essentia) must….be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 67/42), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the origin of Sartre's famous slogan 'existence before essence'. It seems to be a rebellion against Husserl's quest for essences. |
20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Heidegger says you must choose your hero; either you choose 'das Man', the inauthentic life, or you choose yourself - the point being that you have to choose yourself as your hero in order to be authentic. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Simon Critchley - Impossible Objects: interviews 5 | |
A reaction: If Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' is the model for choosing yourself as hero, I am not too sure about this idea. Needing a hero seems awfully German and romantic. Ein Heldenleben. Be your own anit-hero (like a standup comedian)? |
2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for God to be immoral and not to be the acme of morality; and the only way any of us can approximate to God is to become as moral as possible. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176c) |
2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |
Full Idea: The elimination of evil is impossible, Theodorus; there must always be some force ranged against good. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176a) |