64 ideas
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e) |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a) |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71 | |
A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light. |
18194 | 'Forcing' can produce new models of ZFC from old models [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Cohen's method of 'forcing' produces a new model of ZFC from an old model by appending a carefully chosen 'generic' set. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.4) |
18195 | A Large Cardinal Axiom would assert ever-increasing stages in the hierarchy [Maddy] |
Full Idea: A possible axiom is the Large Cardinal Axiom, which asserts that there are more and more stages in the cumulative hierarchy. Infinity can be seen as the first of these stages, and Replacement pushes further in this direction. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.5) |
18191 | Axiom of Infinity: completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The axiom of infinity: that there are infinite sets is to claim that completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically. In its standard contemporary form, the axioms assert the existence of the set of all finite ordinals. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.3) |
18193 | The Axiom of Foundation says every set exists at a level in the set hierarchy [Maddy] |
Full Idea: In the presence of other axioms, the Axiom of Foundation is equivalent to the claim that every set is a member of some Vα. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.3) |
18169 | Axiom of Reducibility: propositional functions are extensionally predicative [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility states that every propositional function is extensionally equivalent to some predicative proposition function. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) |
18168 | 'Propositional functions' are propositions with a variable as subject or predicate [Maddy] |
Full Idea: A 'propositional function' is generated when one of the terms of the proposition is replaced by a variable, as in 'x is wise' or 'Socrates'. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) | |
A reaction: This implies that you can only have a propositional function if it is derived from a complete proposition. Note that the variable can be in either subject or in predicate position. It extends Frege's account of a concept as 'x is F'. |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections' |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337 |
18171 | Cantor and Dedekind brought completed infinities into mathematics [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Both Cantor's real number (Cauchy sequences of rationals) and Dedekind's cuts involved regarding infinite items (sequences or sets) as completed and subject to further manipulation, bringing the completed infinite into mathematics unambiguously. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1 n39) | |
A reaction: So it is the arrival of the real numbers which is the culprit for lumbering us with weird completed infinites, which can then be the subject of addition, multiplication and exponentiation. Maybe this was a silly mistake? |
18190 | Completed infinities resulted from giving foundations to calculus [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The line of development that finally led to a coherent foundation for the calculus also led to the explicit introduction of completed infinities: each real number is identified with an infinite collection of rationals. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.3) | |
A reaction: Effectively, completed infinities just are the real numbers. |
18172 | Infinity has degrees, and large cardinals are the heart of set theory [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The stunning discovery that infinity comes in different degrees led to the theory of infinite cardinal numbers, the heart of contemporary set theory. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) | |
A reaction: It occurs to me that these huge cardinals only exist in set theory. If you took away that prop, they would vanish in a puff. |
18175 | For any cardinal there is always a larger one (so there is no set of all sets) [Maddy] |
Full Idea: By the mid 1890s Cantor was aware that there could be no set of all sets, as its cardinal number would have to be the largest cardinal number, while his own theorem shows that for any cardinal there is a larger. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) | |
A reaction: There is always a larger cardinal because of the power set axiom. Some people regard that with suspicion. |
18196 | An 'inaccessible' cardinal cannot be reached by union sets or power sets [Maddy] |
Full Idea: An 'inaccessible' cardinal is one that cannot be reached by taking unions of small collections of smaller sets or by taking power sets. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.5) | |
A reaction: They were introduced by Hausdorff in 1908. |
18187 | Theorems about limits could only be proved once the real numbers were understood [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Even the fundamental theorems about limits could not [at first] be proved because the reals themselves were not well understood. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
A reaction: This refers to the period of about 1850 (Weierstrass) to 1880 (Dedekind and Cantor). |
18182 | The extension of concepts is not important to me [Maddy] |
Full Idea: I attach no decisive importance even to bringing in the extension of the concepts at all. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], §107) | |
A reaction: He almost seems to equate the concept with its extension, but that seems to raise all sorts of questions, about indeterminate and fluctuating extensions. |
18177 | In the ZFC hierarchy it is impossible to form Frege's set of all three-element sets [Maddy] |
Full Idea: In the ZFC cumulative hierarchy, Frege's candidates for numbers do not exist. For example, new three-element sets are formed at every stage, so there is no stage at which the set of all three-element sets could he formed. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
A reaction: Ah. This is a very important fact indeed if you are trying to understand contemporary discussions in philosophy of mathematics. |
18164 | Frege solves the Caesar problem by explicitly defining each number [Maddy] |
Full Idea: To solve the Julius Caesar problem, Frege requires explicit definitions of the numbers, and he proposes his well-known solution: the number of Fs = the extension of the concept 'equinumerous with F' (based on one-one correspondence). | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) | |
A reaction: Why do there have to be Fs before there can be the corresponding number? If there were no F for 523, would that mean that '523' didn't exist (even if 522 and 524 did exist)? |
18184 | Making set theory foundational to mathematics leads to very fruitful axioms [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The set theory axioms developed in producing foundations for mathematics also have strong consequences for existing fields, and produce a theory that is immensely fruitful in its own right. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Second of Maddy's three benefits of set theory. This benefit is more questionable than the first, because the axioms may be invented because of their nice fruit, instead of their accurate account of foundations. |
18185 | Unified set theory gives a final court of appeal for mathematics [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The single unified area of set theory provides a court of final appeal for questions of mathematical existence and proof. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
A reaction: Maddy's third benefit of set theory. 'Existence' means being modellable in sets, and 'proof' means being derivable from the axioms. The slightly ad hoc character of the axioms makes this a weaker defence. |
18183 | Set theory brings mathematics into one arena, where interrelations become clearer [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Set theoretic foundations bring all mathematical objects and structures into one arena, allowing relations and interactions between them to be clearly displayed and investigated. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
A reaction: The first of three benefits of set theory which Maddy lists. The advantages of the one arena seem to be indisputable. |
18186 | Identifying geometric points with real numbers revealed the power of set theory [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The identification of geometric points with real numbers was among the first and most dramatic examples of the power of set theoretic foundations. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
A reaction: Hence the clear definition of the reals by Dedekind and Cantor was the real trigger for launching set theory. |
18188 | The line of rationals has gaps, but set theory provided an ordered continuum [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The structure of a geometric line by rational points left gaps, which were inconsistent with a continuous line. Set theory provided an ordering that contained no gaps. These reals are constructed from rationals, which come from integers and naturals. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
A reaction: This completes the reduction of geometry to arithmetic and algebra, which was launch 250 years earlier by Descartes. |
18163 | Mathematics rests on the logic of proofs, and on the set theoretic axioms [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Our much loved mathematical knowledge rests on two supports: inexorable deductive logic (the stuff of proof), and the set theoretic axioms. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I Intro) |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a) | |
A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed. |
18207 | Maybe applications of continuum mathematics are all idealisations [Maddy] |
Full Idea: It could turn out that all applications of continuum mathematics in natural sciences are actually instances of idealisation. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], II.6) |
18204 | Scientists posit as few entities as possible, but set theorist posit as many as possible [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Crudely, the scientist posits only those entities without which she cannot account for observations, while the set theorist posits as many entities as she can, short of inconsistency. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], II.5) |
18167 | We can get arithmetic directly from HP; Law V was used to get HP from the definition of number [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Recent commentators have noted that Frege's versions of the basic propositions of arithmetic can be derived from Hume's Principle alone, that the fatal Law V is only needed to derive Hume's Principle itself from the definition of number. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) | |
A reaction: Crispin Wright is the famous exponent of this modern view. Apparently Charles Parsons (1965) first floated the idea. |
22333 | Only language is understandable Being [Gadamer] |
Full Idea: Being that can be understood is language. | |
From: Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truth and Method [1960], p.450), quoted by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 5.2 | |
A reaction: [also 1967 p.19] Glock quotes this to show that continental philosophers are just as linguistic in their approach as the analytic school. I think the main aim of representational painting is to grasp non-linguistic Being. |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d) | |
A reaction: This seems to be rhetorical, rather a precise theory, given that the One is said to be eternal and unchanging. The One is not just what we call 'reality'. |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08 | |
A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God. |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c) | |
A reaction: These seems to thoroughly pre-empt Plato's Theory of Forms a century before he created it. Which shows (as Simone Weil says) that Plato was just part of a long tradition. |
18205 | The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The case of atoms makes it clear that the indispensable appearance of an entity in our best scientific theory is not generally enough to convince scientists that it is real. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], II.6) | |
A reaction: She refers to the period between Dalton and Einstein, when theories were full of atoms, but there was strong reluctance to actually say that they existed, until the direct evidence was incontrovertable. Nice point. |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d) | |
A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism. |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5 | |
A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something? |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2 | |
A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships. |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies. |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts. |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically. |
18206 | Science idealises the earth's surface, the oceans, continuities, and liquids [Maddy] |
Full Idea: In science we treat the earth's surface as flat, we assume the ocean to be infinitely deep, we use continuous functions for what we know to be quantised, and we take liquids to be continuous despite atomic theory. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], II.6) | |
A reaction: If fussy people like scientists do this all the time, how much more so must the confused multitude be doing the same thing all day? |
20928 | Facts don't oppose values; they are integrated into each person's aspirations [Gadamer, by Zimmermann,J] |
Full Idea: Gadamer shows that we cannot oppose facts to values, but that all facts are integrated into meaningful wholes through a personal commitment to some kind of vision of how things ought to be. | |
From: report of Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truth and Method [1960]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction | |
A reaction: Straw man here. Whoever said that facts were 'opposed' to values? Certainly not David Hume. Any sensible empiricist of that type would try to develop values that integrated nicely with the facts. Gadamer seems to be denying facts. |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a) |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e) |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 231 |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b) |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 233. |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |